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1) DIFFERENT INTENTIONS (cont.)

(a) (Mishnah): R. Yehudah says, the general rule is - if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there is Kares.
(b) Question: According to R. Yochanan, 'the general rule' comes to include intentions in one Avodah - but according to Ilfa, what does this come to include?
(c) This is left difficult.
(d) (Mishnah - R. Meir): If Reuven said 'This (Chulin) animal is Temuras (in place of my) Olah, Temuras Shelamim' - it is Temuras Olah (i.e. it is an Olah);
(e) R. Yosi says, if he meant to say both from the beginning, they both take effect (the animal will be sold, half the money will be used to buy an Olah, half to buy a Shelamim) - since he cannot say them simultaneously, there is no reason to favor his first words;

1. If after saying 'Temuras Olah' he reconsidered and said 'Temuras Shelamim', it is an Olah.

(f) Question: If he said 'Temuras Olah *v*Shelamim', what is the law?
(g) Version #1 (Rashi) Question: If he said 'l'Chatzos' (half should be Temuras Olah, half should be Temuras Shelamim), what is the law?
(h) Version #2 (R. Chananel): If he said 'l'Chatzos' ('At midday it should become Temuras Olah v'Shelamim' (so they take effect simultaneously)), what is the law?
(i) Answer #1 (Abaye): Surely, even R. Meir agrees that both take effect.
(j) Question (Rava): But this is like different intentions in slaughter, and R. Yehudah (argues with Chachamim and) says that we follow the first intention (just like R. Meir)!
(k) Answer (Abaye): You assume that slaughter is instantaneous (i.e. until the majority of the Simanim are cut is only *preparation*, cutting Mashehu (an arbitrarily small amount) past half is the actual slaughter - therefore, both intentions take effect simultaneously at the moment slaughter is finished);

1. You are wrong - the entire cutting (of the Simanim, until the majority are cut) is considered slaughter (therefore, the intentions take effect one after the other).

(l) Question (Rava): But 'L'Chatzos' is like different intentions in Kemitzah (which is instantaneous), and R. Yehudah says that we follow the first intention!
(m) Answer (Abaye): The case is, he had one intention when burning the Kometz, and the other intention later, when burning the frankincense.
(n) Question (Rava): But R. Yehudah argues even regarding Kemitzah of a Minchas Chotei (which has no frankincense)!
(o) Answer #1 (Abaye): No, he agrees in that case.
(p) Answer #2 (Rav Ashi): We could say that he argues, when the intentions came during different steps (while bringing the Kometz to the Mizbe'ach).

1. Rav Simi Bar Ashi holds like Abaye, Rav Huna bar Noson holds like Rava.

(a) (Rav Dimi): R. Meir holds like R. Yehudah, we follow the first thing said.

1. (Mishnah - R. Yehudah): The general rule is - if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there is Kares.

(b) Question (Abaye): But Rabah bar bar Chanah cited R. Yochanan to say that R. Meir and R. Yosi do not argue.

1. Objection: They do argue!
2. Answer: He means, they do not argue except for what they explicitly argue about, not whether or not we follow the first thing said.
3. (R. Yitzchak bar Yosef): All agree that if he said 'This should take effect (Temuras Olah), and then this (Temuras Shelamim)', the latter does not take effect;
4. All agree that if he said 'This should not take effect unless this also takes effect', both take effect;
5. They argue when he said 'Temuras Olah Temuras Shelamim':

i. R. Meir says, (if he wanted both to take effect) he should have said 'Temuras Olah v'Shelamim' - since he did not say this, this shows that he tried to retract (but he cannot);
ii. R. Yosi says, he did not say 'Temuras Olah v'Shelamim', for this would imply that half is Temuras Olah, half is Temuras Shelamim (he knows that this cannot be offered);
iii. He intended that the entire animal is Temurah of an Olah and also of a Shelamim (he thought that this can be offered).

(c) Answer (Rav Dimi): I argue with Rabah bar bar Chanah, I say that R. Meir argues with R. Yosi.

(a) Question (Ula): What is the text of our Mishnah - k'Zayis (tomorrow) k'Zayis (Chutz li'Mkomo), or k'Zayis *ve'*k'Zayis?

1. If the former, only in this case R. Yehudah follows the first intention, but k'Zayis vek'Zayis, the intentions are mixed, he admits that there is no Kares.
2. If the latter, R. Yehudah considers even this to be Prata (separate intentions), all the more so he says so regarding k'Zayis k'Zayis.

(b) Answer: We learn from the following:
(c) Levi: If one intended (to eat the same) k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz (li'Mkomo), what is the law?
(d) Rebbi: A fine question! It is Pasul, there is no Kares.
(e) R. Shimon b'Rebbi: Why was it a good question - we already learn this from our Mishnah!

1. (Mishnah): K'Zayis b'Chutz, k'Zayis tomorrow, or vice-versa, or half a k'Zayis b'Chutz, and half a k'Zayis tomorrow, or vice-versa, it is Pasul, there is no Kares; (R. Yehudah says, if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there is Kares).
2. They argue about intentions for different k'Zeisim, but all agree that intentions about the same k'Zayis are Klala (mixed), there is no Kares!

(f) Rebbi: Based on what I taught him, he asked properly.

1. I taught you (R. Shimon) two cases (of Prata, k'Zayis k'Zayis and k'Zayis vek'Zayis) - you properly inferred that the third case (intentions about the same k'Zayis) is Klala;
2. I taught Levi one case (of Prata), he heard Rabanan saying two cases. He was unsure whether I was precise with him (the second case is Klala), and Rabanan (mistakenly) extrapolated to the second case, or if I taught both to them, and I omitted teaching him one of them.

(g) Question: Which case did Rebbi teach to Levi?

1. Suggestion: He taught him k'Zayis vek'Zayis.
2. Rejection: If so, Levi would have known, all the more so k'Zayis k'Zayis!

(h) Answer: He taught him k'Zayis k'Zayis.
(i) Question: If Levi was unsure about k'Zayis vek'Zayis, why didn't he ask about it?
(j) Answer: It was better to ask 'k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz, for he will learn two things from the answer.

1. Had he asked k'Zayis vek'Zayis, and Rebbi answered that it is Klala, Levi would indeed know that all the more so, k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz is Klala;
2. But if Rebbi would answer that it is Prata, he would not know k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz.

(k) Question: The same applies to asking k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz!

1. If Rebbi will answer that it is Prata, Levi would indeed know, all the more so, k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz;
2. But if Rebbi would answer that it is Klala, Levi would not know k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz.

(l) Answer: Levi could derive it from Rebbi's response. (Levi's question implies that Levi is sure that k'Zayis vek'Zayis is Prata).

1. If k'Zayis vek'Zayis is indeed Prata, Rebbi would not be angry.
2. But if k'Zayis vek'Zayis is Klala, Rebbi would be angry that Levi did not infer this (from the fact that Rebbi only taught him k'Zayis k'Zayis), rather assumed the opposite!