Previous daf

1)

(a) The Beraisa states that even a Yevamah with whom one of the brothers performed *Chalitzah*, is obligated to wait three months - from the death of the Yevamah's husband and not from the time of the Chalitzah.

(b) According to Rav, a divorced woman is obligated to wait three months before marrying from the time she *receives* her Get. Shmuel says - from the time her husband *wrote* it.

(c) We must say that, even according to Rav, the husband was not secluded with his wife from the time that he wrote the Get - because otherwise, the Get is Pasul because of 'Get Yashan' (which will be explained in Gitin).

(d) In spite of Rav's stringent opinion by Get - a Chalutzah is not obligated to wait three months from the time of the Chalitzah, because, if we permit a Yevamah to perform *Yibum* after three months from her husband's death (involving a possible Isur Kareis), how can we forbid a Chalutzah to get *married le'Shuk* (which is no more than an ordinary La'av), once three months from her husband's death have passed?

(a) Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel learns from the Pasuk in Lech-Lecha "Lihyos Lecha l'Elokim u'le'Zar'acha Acharecha" - that it is a Mitzvah to distinguish between the seed of one man and another (to know exactly who the father of the baby is), because the Shechinah only rests on K'lal Yisrael when their Yichus is clearly established).

(b) Rava asks on this from a Ger and Giyores who were married and converted (who are obligated to separate, even though their seed is clearly established anyway). Havchanah *is* however, applicable to them - to distinguish between a baby that was sown bi'Kedushah and one that was not.

(c) According to Rava, the reason for the three-month period is that otherwise a man might marry his paternal sister, perform Yibum with his maternal sister, and that he might cause his mother or his brother's wife to believe that she is exempt from Yibum (when really she is obligated). He will ...

1. ... marry his paternal sister - by believing that, since he was born in the house of the second husband, he must be his son, and then marrying the daughter of his mother's first husband (who is really his father) who was born to him from another wife.
2. ... perform Yibum with his maternal brother's sister - by performing Yibum with the wife of a brother (a son who is born to his mother from her second husband - whom he believes to be his father, but who is not).
3. ... cause his mother to believe that she is exempt from Yibum - should she have no more children from her second husband up to the time that he dies.
4. ... cause his brother's wife to believe that she is exempt from Yibum - should his mother's first husband (his real father) die leaving behind one other son, whom he tells that he is not his brother.

(d) Only the second of these reasons apply to a Ger and a Giyores too (maybe he will perform Yibum with his maternal brother's sister) - should he really have been born after nine months, in which case he was conceived before his mother converted, making it probable that his father was another man (due to the fact that Nochrim tended to lead extremely adulterous lives). His mother, on the other hand, believes that he was conceived after seven months, (after her conversion) and is therefore her husband's son. Should they later have another son who dies, his (maternal) brother will perform Yibum with his widow.

(a) The Beraisa which states that whereas the reason that Chazal forbade all the women to perform Yibum or to marry is to prevent the mother herself from being guilty of incest, the decree of waiting three months is because of the child, goes well with Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel. Rava will explain this to mean - that it is in order to prevent the child from transgressing any of the Arayos (whereas all the other cases have nothing to do with the child).

(b) We think that it should not be necessary to wait three months, only ...

1. ... one - because if the baby is born seven months later, he must be the son of the second husband (because had he been the son of the first, he would be an eighth-month baby who could not survive); and if he is born after eight months, he must the son of the first husband.
2. ... two and a half - because if the baby is born seven months later , he must be the son of the *second* husband (since a ninth-month baby cannot live), and if he is born six and a half months later, he must be the son of the *first* (since we now contend that a baby cannot be born in the middle of the seventh month).

(c) We refute the contention ...

1. ... that one month will suffice - on the grounds that, even if he was born after *eight* months, he could be the seven-month son of the second husband, who was born one month late (By the same token, we could also have answered that even if he was born after *seven* months, he could be a ninth-month baby of the first husband, who was born one month late).
2. ... that two and a half months are sufficient on the basis of "Vayehi li'T'kufos ha'Yamim" - from which Mar Zutra learns that a woman can give birth after six months and two days. Consequently, even if he is born six and a half months later, he can still be the son of the second husband.

(a) It would be possible to ascertain whose baby the pregnant woman is carrying, by waiting a week or two before allowing her to marry, and then, three months from the death of her first husband, examining her (breasts) to see if she is pregnant. Assuming that her pregnancy was then recognisable, this would prove that she was pregnant from her first husband, seeing as a baby becomes recognizable only after three months (not before and not later). By the same token, if her pregnancy was not recognisable yet, we would know that when she became pregnant, the father of the baby would have to be the second husband.

(b) We do this (to spare her waiting unnecessarily) - because examining a wo man in this way, causes her to become despised in her husband's eyes.

(c) Neither is measuring the depth of her footsteps in the sand a reliable gauge - because we suspect that she will deliberately make herself light, so as let us believe that her baby is the son of her *second* husband (since he is the one with whom she is currently living), to ensure that he ultimately inherits his property.

(a) Chazal forbade a man to marry a woman during her period of pregnancy and whilst she is feeding. If he did - he must divorce her and never take her back.

(b) We initially ascribe the former decree to the fact that she might cause the baby's death should she become pregnant again. We reject this however - on the grounds that if that is so, why do we not forbid every woman's husband to have relations with her during her period of pregnancy? And if you will answer that she is permitted to use a cloth (as we learned above on Daf 12b., according to Rebbi Meir), or that Hashem will have mercy on her (according to the Chachamim there), then, by the same token, we ought even to allow her to get married whilst she is pregnant.

(c) And we reject the contention that it is because she might squash the baby to death during Tashmish - for the same reason (because if so, we ought to forbid relations with her husband); and, if you say he will be careful not to squash his own baby, then he will also be careful not to squash somebody else's (because Jews are not suspect of destroying a living soul).

(d) The real reason for the decree is - because when a woman is pregnant, it means that shortly she will be feeding, and we are afraid that she will become pregnant from her husband, causing her to lose her milk, and the baby will die.

6)

(a) In spite of the fact that Chazal were concerned about causing the death of the feeding baby with regard to marrying a pregnant woman, they did not decree, forbidding Tashmish whenever one's wife becomes pregnant - because her husband will ensure that the baby receives eggs and milk instead.

(b) They nonetheless decreed, forbidding her to marry whilst she is feeding, because her husband will not be willing to sustain someone else's baby. Nevertheless, we do not allow her to go ahead and marry, and, if necessary, claim eggs and milk from her first husband's heirs - because women are generally shy of going to Beis-Din to claim money, with the result that her baby will die.

8)

(a) Rebbi Asi told Rebbi Elazar that Rebbi Yochanan ruled like Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah. Rebbi Elazar commented - that this implies that it is only an individual who argues with him (because the principle that we always rule like Rebbi Yossi is restricted to where he argues with an individual, but not when he argues with a majority).

(b) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa says that a woman who is angry with her husband, or if he or she could not have children, or if she was obviously not pregnant, for whatever reason - is nevertheless forbidden to get married within three months of her husband's death (proving that *he* is the individual with whom Rebbi Yossi argues).

(c) The difference between an Aylonis and a woman 'who cannot have children' is - that, whereas the former is born with a physical disability (demonstrated by her retaining the physical make-up of a child even after she turns twelve and a half), the latter became afflicted only afterwards, due to something that she took or to an illness.

(a) Rebbi Chiya bar Aba says that Rebbi Yochanan retracted from his previous ruling (because of the Beraisa that was quoted in the name of the Chachamim of Kerem be'Yavneh - Rav Yosef adds). The Sanhedrin are called by that name - because they would sit in rows, much in the s six and a half months laterame way as the trees in a vine-yard were planted in rows.

(b) Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi quoting the Chachamim of Kerem be'Yavneh, said in that Beraisa - that all women are obligated to wait three months.

(c) Rav Yirmiyah asked how Rebbi Yochanan could possibly rule like Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah, when he always follows the opinion of a S'tam Mishnah, and our Mishnah states S'tam that *all women* are obligated to wait three months. Rav Zerika dismissed Rav Yirmiyah's Kashya out of hand however - on the grounds that this Mishnah is not a S'tam Mishnah at all, seeing as Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi disagree with the Tana Kama.

(a) The Din in the case of ...

1. ... S'tam ve'Achar-Kach Machlokes is - 'Ein Halachah ki'S'tam.
2. ... Machlokes ve'Achar-Kach S'tam - Halachah ki'Stam.

(b) It make no difference whether the S'tam is learned in the same Masechta or in a different one - as long as it comes after the Machlokes and is in the same Seider.

(c) In the case of ...

1. ... a S'tam Mishnah and Machlokes in a Beraisa - the Halachah is like the S'tam Mishnah.
2. ... a Machlokes in the Mishnah and a S'tam Beraisa - the Halachah is not like the S'tam, because, if Rebbi did not insert it as a S'tam Mishnah, where did Rebbi Chiya (his Talmid, and the compiler of the Beraisos), get it from?