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1)

(a) 'ha'Noder mi'Shovsei Shabbos Asur be'Yisrael ve'Asur be'Kutim'. Kutim would ...

1. ... also be incorporated if one were to be Noder 'me'Ochlei Shum' ...
2. ... but not if he was Noder 'me'Olei Yerushalayim'.

(b) The significance of 'Ochlei Shum' is - that it is a Takanas Ezra to eat garlic on Erev Shabbos, because it increases the possibility of conceiving for Talmidei-Chachamim, whose Onah is on Friday night.

(c) 'Shovsei Shabbos' cannot mean ...

1. ... those who observe Shabbos - because then why does the Tana not include even Nochrim who observe Shabbos (even though they are forbidden to do so).
2. ... those who are commanded to observe Shabbos - because then, why does the Tana conclude 'ha'Noder me'Olei Yerushalayim ... u'Mutar be'Kutim', seeing as they too, are included in the command of 'Aliyas ha'Regel' three times annually, just like the rest of Yisrael.

(d) So Abaye explains 'Shovsei Shabbos' to mean both that they are commanded to observe Shabbos and that they fulfill it (including Kutim, but excluding Nochrim); 'Ochlei Shum' too, which the Kutim used to fulfill, includes Kutim and excludes Nochrim; whereas 'Olei Yerushalayim' excludes Kutim too (since 'Aliyas ha'Regel' is a Mitzvah which the Kutim did not fulfill).

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah states ...

1. ... 'Konem she'Eini Neheheh mi'B'nei No'ach, Mutar be'Yisrael'. A Yisrael is not included in the term 'B'nei No'ach' (despite the fact that they are descendants of No'ach) - because from the time that Avraham 'sanctified himself', he and his descendants left the realm of 'B'nei No'ach'.
2. ... 'Konem she'Eini Neheneh le'Zera Avraham, Asur be'Yisrael u'Mutar be'Ovdei-Kochavim'. Despite the fact that both Yishmael and Eisav were direct descendants of Avraham, the Tana does not distinguish between them are other 'Ovdei-Kochavim' - because Hashem said to Avraham "Ki be'Yitzchak Yikarei Lecha Zara" - "be'*Yitzchak*", 've'Lo be'Yishmael'; "*be*'Yitzchak", 've'Lo Kol Yitzchak'.

(b) Someone who is Noder not to receive benefit from Jews, must pay more than the market price for whatever he purchases from them and sell to them for less. This is only the case however, if the Noder forbids Hana'ah on himself. Should he forbid the Mudar's property on himself or vice-versa, then all business transactions with him will be forbidden, irrespective of how much either of them pays.

(c) If he declared a Neder forbidding Jews to benefit from him or vice-versa - he must sell to them for more than the market price and pay less for what he buys.

(d) 've'Ein Shom'in Lo' means - that nobody is obligated to sell to him (and lose). (Some even have the text '*Im* Shom'in Lo'.)

(a) We might have thought (in the latter case) that the Neder will not pertain to property that he purchases only after the Neder has been declared - because it is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (something that is not yet in the world and on which no transaction is valid).

(b) This is not the case however - because the Tana is speaking when he forbade *himself* on the property (and not the reverse), and *he* is in the world.

(c) It would have been the case if he had said for example 'Konem Peiros Dekel shel P'loni Alai' (forbidding next year's crop of dates of so-and-so date-palm on himself) or the fruit that he is about to purchase (both of which are considered not in the world as regards transactions), or if he had said 'Konem Nechasai Alecha' or 'Konem Nechasecha Alai' (restricting the Isur to property that they own now).

(d) Whether if a person forbids his property on others, and then exchanges some of it for other property - the new property is considered like fruit that grows on a forbidden tree (and is forbidden like the tree itself) or not, will be discussed later in Perek ha'Shutfin.

5)

(a) Shmuel says that someone who takes an object from the manufacturer to inspect before purchasing it in order to examine it, and breaks it, is obligated to pay - because the one who gains from the purchase is the purchaser. Consequently, when he takes the object to inspect it he resembles a borrower (who has all the benefits), and a borrower is Chayav for Onsin.

(b) Shmuel must be speaking specifically in a case when the price of the object is fixed, as we established in Bava Basra - because that is when the purchaser is confident that he will buy it, failing which one could hardly ascribe all the benefits to him.

(c) The problem that we have with Shmuel from our Mishnah 'she'Eini Neheneh mi'Yisrael, Mocher be'Pachos' according to Shmuel is - that, according to him, the Tana ought to have said 'Mocher Shaveh be'Shaveh' (i.e. for the market value, seeing as it is the purchaser alone who benefits).

(a) What makes ...

1. ... 'a bad sale' (where the object that is being sold is of inferior quality) solely the benefit of the seller (if he sells it at market price) is - the fact that the purchaser can easily find its equivalent, whereas the seller will have difficulty in selling it).
2. ... 'a good sale' (where the object is of superior quality) solely the benefit of the purchaser (if he buys it at market price) is - the fact that the seller can easily sell it, whereas the purchaser will have difficulty in finding its equivalent.

(b) We reject the suggestion that the Tana is referring specifically to 'a bad sale', on the grounds that the Tana, in the same breath, said 'Lokei'ach be'Yoser', and if the object is inferior, why should he not be permitted to pay the market price for it. The other objection is - from the Seifa 'she'Yisrael Nehenin Li ... u'Mocher be'Yoser'. Now if we are speaking of an inferior object, why should he not be permitted to sell it at market price (which is more than its real value)?

(c) We reject the suggestion that in the Seifa, the Tana is referring specifically to 'a good sale' on the same grounds. So, to reconcile Shmuel with our Mishnah, we establish the Mishnah by a regular article (where both the seller and the purchaser benefit) and Shmuel when it is 'a good sale' (where it is the purchaser alone who benefits, as we explained earlier).

(d) We did not for one moment, believe that it was possible to establish our Mishnah by a 'bad sale' or 'a good sale' - only we cited all the possibilities in order to establish the table of Halachos.

7)

(a) The Beraisa refers to the case of someone who purchases objects from a store to take to his in-laws - stipulating with the store-keeper that he will pay the full value of the articles should they accept them, but only 'Tovas Hana'ah' (for the benefit that he receives from the transaction) should they not.

(b) The Tovas Hana'ah in this case - is what it is worth to him to demonstrate to his in-laws how much he cares for them.

(c) Should an O'nes occur on his outward journey - he is obligated to pay in full, because, since he has all the benefit, he has the Din of a borrower, supporting Shmuel's theory (that someone who receives an object from the store-keeper for inspection is Chayav Onsin like a borrower).

(d) On the return journey, however, where he no longer derives any benefit from the article - he no longer has the Din of a borrower, and is therefore Patur from Onsin. He is however, obligated to pay for theft or loss (like a borrower after his allotted time has expired, when he adopts the Din of a Shomer Sachar), due to the principle 'Ho'il ve'Neheneh, Mehaneh' (Someone who receives benefit, repays benefit).

(a) If someone forbids Hana'ah on himself from 'Arleilim' (or forbids them to have Hana'ah from him) - he includes all Jews, even if they are uncircumcised, and excludes all Nochrim, even if they have been circumcised.

(b) We learn from the Pasuk "Ki Chol ha'Goyim Areilim, ve'Chol Beis Yisrael Arlei Lev" - that even a circumcised Nochri is called an 'Arel'.

(c) We nevertheless need to quote the Pasuk ...

1. ... "ve'Hayah ha'P'lishti ha'Arel ha'Zeh" to teach us this - because otherwise, we might have thought that Nochrim are called 'Arlei Lev' (of impure hearts - to conform with the continuation of the Pasuk), but not 'Areilim' S'tam (uncircumcised).
2. ... "Pen Tismachnah B'nos ha'Pelishtim, Pen Ta'aloznah B'nos ha'Areilim, to teach us the same thing again - because the previous Pasuk might refer exclusively to Golyas (whom David presumed was not born Mahul - like the majority of people), whereas this Pasuk refers to all of the P'lishtim, some of whom must have been born circumcised, yet David calls them all 'Areilim'.

(d) Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah extrapolates the Torah's disgust of the Orlah - from the Pasuk "Ki Kol ha'Goyim Areilim".

(a) The Mishnah continues to list the various praises and advantages of B'ris Milah. According to Rebbi Yishmael - it is praiseworthy due to the thirteen covenants (corresponding to the numerical value of "Hashem *Echad* and of "Ahavah") that the Torah mentions on account of it in Parshas Lech Lecha.

(b) We learn from the Pasuk "u'va'*Yom* ha'Shemini Yimol B'sar Orlaso" (from which Rebbi Yossi extrapolates the praise of Milah) - that one must perform the Mitzvah even on Shabbos (despite the fact that Shabbos is a La'av which carries with it Kareis, and which an ordinary Asei cannot override).

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah cites the fact that Moshe almost lost his life the moment he delayed circumcising his son ...

1. ... Rebbi Nechemyah - from the Pasuk "u'va'Yom ha'Shemini Yimol *B'sar* Orlaso" - which teaches us that Milah overrides the La'av of removing Tzara'as from one's flesh.
2. ... Rebbi (or Rebbi Meir) - from the Pasuk "His'halech Lefanai ve'Heyei Samim" - which teaches us that, in spite of Avraham's many Mitzvos, he was not termed 'complete' until he performed the B'ris Milah.

(a) The final praise listed in our Mishnah ('Davar Acher') cites the Pasuk "Koh Amar Hashem, Im Lo B'risi, Yomam va'Laylah Chukos Shamayim va'Aretz Lo Samti" - from which we learn that the entire world was only created on the merit of the B'ris Milah.

(b) Some add an additional source "Hinei Dam ha'B'ris" (mentioned at Matan Torah), from which we learn 'Gedolah Milah she'Hi Shekulah Keneged Kol ha'Mitzvos'.

(c) Even though this Pasuk refers to the blood of the Korban that they sacrificed at Har Sinai, and not about the B'ris Milah at all - nevertheless, since the whole Torah is referred to as 'B'ris' and the Milah too, is called 'B'ris', it places B'ris Milah on a par with all the Mitzvos (see also Tosfos DH 'Hinei').

(a) Rebbi Yossi disagrees with Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah in our Mishnah. According to him, Moshe was not lax regarding the Milah at all. In fact, his delay in delaying the Milah was perfectly justifiable - because on the one hand, he learned from the men of Sh'chem (by whom the Torah writes "Vayehi ba'Yom ha'Shelishi, bi'Heyosam Ko'avim") that after an operation of this nature, one is in deep pain on the third day) and therefore vulnerable; whereas on the other, he could hardly perform the Milah, wait three days and then go to Egypt, seeing as Hashem had instructed him to go now.

(b) We cannot infer from the men of Sh'chem that the pain on the third day is more intense than on the other two days - only that two days of continued pain sap one's strength, and that one is weakest on the third day (so that the pain then renders one more vulnerable, as we explained).

(c) Moshe was not lax in delaying the B'ris per se - but for settling into the hotel before performing the Mitzvah of Milah (and that was why the angel nearly killed him).

(d) He would have had no problem with completing his journey to Egypt as Hashem had commanded him, in spite of his newly-circumcised baby - because he was close to the borders of Egypt, and such a short journey would not have posed a threat to the baby's life.

(a) According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, it was not Moshe whom the angel threatened - but the baby whose Milah was due.

(b) He proves this from Tziporah's statement "Ki Chasan Damim Atah Li" - because there was no reason to refer to Moshe as 'Chasan', whereas her son (whom some say was their first son Gershom, and others say Eliezer, their youngest son), was entering into his first Mitzvah (see Rosh) and it was appropriate to refer to him by this title.