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1)

(a) Rav Hoshaya asked whether - if a man gave a woman two P'rutos, saying that with one of them he is betrothing her now, and with the other, after he divorces her, the Kidushin is effective or not.

(b) Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi attempted to resolve this She'eilah from bar Pada - who holds 'Chozros ve'Kodshos', even though the Noder did not issue a fresh declaration after redeeming them. The same will apply in this case, they maintain, and the second Kidushin will take effect after the divorce, even without a fresh Kidushin.

(c) We already learned above (Rebbi Yochanan's ruling) that if a third person redeems the plants from Hekdesh, then even bar Pada, who holds 'Chozros ve'Kodshos, will agree that they do not become Hekdesh - and this will apply even if the purchaser subsequently bought them back from him.

(a) Upon arousing himself from his nap, Rebbi Yirmiyah refuted Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi's proof - by comparing the case of Kidushei Ishah to a third person, where, we have already learned, we do not say 'Chozros ve'Kodshos'.

(b) What gives a woman the Din of a third person in this regard is - the fact that, the moment she leaves her husband jurisdiction, she is not like the original owner of the plants, who had and who has the power to declare them Hekdesh (because the Torah writes "Ki Yikach Ish Ishah", but rather, she resembles Hefker. Kidushin can only be performed by the husband, and as far as *he* is concerned, she is like a third person.

(c) This does not mean that Rebbi Yirmiyah considers her completely like a third person, in which case he will resolve Rav Oshaya's She'eilah in the opposite direction (and the second Kidushin will not take effect) - because neither does she resemble a third person, seeing as she is the one to bring herself into her husband domain, by giving her consent, in which case she is somewhat similar to Hekdesh (and the second Kidushin ought to be valid).

(a) According to Rebbi Yirmiyah then, the She'eilah remains unresolved. In the opinion of the Rashba however, Rebbi Ila (in Kesuvos and later in this Masechta), does resolve it. Rebbi Ila says - that if someone declares a field that he is about to sell Hekdesh for when after he re-purchases it from the buyer, the field is then Hekdesh.

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah did not quote Rebbi Ila - because he did not know about his ruling.

(c) The Rambam too, agrees with the Rashba. This ruling will apply even to the case of bar Pada, when a third person redeems the plants (where the Hekdesh is not automatically effective) - to validate a specific Neder that he made prior to the redemption, declaring them Hekdesh now after he buys them from the purchaser.

(d) We reject the Rashba's proof from Kesuvos however - because there, seeing as the owner could have declared the field Hekdesh *now* had he so wished, the Hekdesh now for later is also effective; whereas in our case and in the case of Kidushin, where he is 'Makdish ve'Chozer u'Makdish' or 'Mekadesh ve'Chozer u'Mekadesh' and where the second Hekdesh or Kidushin could not be effective now (before the first one), it will not be effective later either.

(a) Someone who forbids Hana'ah from sailors is permitted to benefit from people who reside on dry land. But someone who forbids Hana'ah from people who reside on dry land - may not benefit from sailors, because they reside on dry land, too.

(b) Rav Papa and Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ika argue over the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Lo ke'Eilu she'Holchin me'Acco le'Yaffo, Ela be'Mi she'Darko Lefaresh'. According to one of them, this refers to (the inference from) the first case 'ha'Noder mi'Yordei ha'Yam, Mutar be'Yoshvei Yabashah', 'Ha mi'Yordei ha'Yam Asur' - but only from long distance sailors who travel overseas, not from ferry-boat men who only sail from Acco to Yaffo.

(c) According to the other, it refers to the second case 'ha'Noder mi'Yoshvei Yabashah, Asur be'Yordei ha'Yam' - and not just ferry-boat men, but even long-distance sailors.

(d) This second opinion, which says nothing about the Reisha with regard to Yordei ha'Yam who only sail from Acco to Yaffo - presumably does not differentiate, and they too, are considered sailors and included in the Neder (even though, the first opinion ruled leniently).

(a) 'Those who travel from Acco to Yaffo' might pertain only to those who do so regularly, says the Rashba - or it might pertain to those who happened to have been traveling on that route at that particular moment.

(b) The Yerushalmi cites the Machlokes Tana'im in the last Perek of this Masechta, where if a woman undertakes to become a Nazir from the time that she marries, Rebbi Yishmael holds that her husband may annul her Neder, and Rebbi Akiva holds that he may not. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether we go after the time when the Neder takes effect (Rebbi Yishmael) or after the time when the Neder is made (Rebbi Akiva). The Halachah is like Rebbi Akiva.

(c) The Yerushalmi proves from here - that someone who forbade Hana'ah from sailors after thirty days, whether people who become sailors during the thirty-day period are included in the Neder or not is a Machlokes Tana'im.

(d) Whether people who go on cruises are considered sailors in this regard or not - constitutes an unresolved She'eilah in the Yerushalmi (and we rule le'Chumra).

6)

(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Ro'ei ha'Chamah' is not permitted to benefit from blind people because he was really referring to all living creatures whom the sun sees - in which case, his Neder comes to preclude fish and animal fetuses, which are permitted to him.

(b) He cannot have meant what he said - because then he ought to have said 'me'Ro'in' (rather than 'me'Ro'ei ha'Chamah').

(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from black-haired people is forbidden to receive any benefit from both bald people and from white-haired people. He may however - receive benefit from women (whose hair is always covered - and regarding whom the title 'covered-haired' is more apt) and small children (whose hair is always uncovered - and regarding whom the title 'uncovered-hair' is more apt).

(b) We know that ...

1. ... he did not mean to preclude bald people - because then he would have said 'Ba'alei Sei'ar').
2. ... white-haired people - because now that 'Shechorei Rosh' does not preclude bald people, it does not preclude white-haired people either.

(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Yilodim', is permitted to receive benefit from Noladim (because 'Yilodim' implies those who have already been born, but not those who have yet to be born). Someone who made a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from 'Noladim' on the other hand, may not receive benefit from Yilodim, according to the Chachamim - because 'Noladim' incorporates both those who are born already and those who have yet to be born.

(b) The problem with the statement 'Rebbi Meir Matir Af be'Yilodim' is - that if the Noder is permitted to receive benefit *also* from the Yilodim, then who is included in the Neder?

(c) In fact, there are words missing in our Mishnah, which reads - 'Rebbi Meir Omer, Af ha'Noder min ha'Noladim, Mutar be'Yilodim'.

(a) We can prove from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Sh'nei Banecha ha'Noladim Lecha be'Eretz Cana'an" - that 'Noladim' means those who have already been born.
2. ... "Hinei Ben Nolad le'Veis David Yoshiyahu Sh'mo" - that it also means those who have yet to be born.

(b) We reconcile this with Rebbi Meir, who considers 'Noladim' to mean specifically people who will be born - by differentiating between Lashon Torah and Lashon B'nei Adam (in other words, even though the Torah refers to both as "Noladim", in colloquial language, 'Noladim' refers to people who have yet to be born.

(c) According to the Chachamim (who also agree with the principle 'bi'Nedarim Holchin Achar Leshon B'nei Adam'), people tend to apply the term 'Noladim' to those who have been born as well as to those who have yet to be born (just like the Torah does).

(a) The Chachamim in the Seifa of our Mishnah say 'Lo Niskaven Ela be'Mi she'Darko Lehivaled' - to preclude fish and Sheratzim, which do not give birth, but lay eggs.

(b) This is not a third opinion - but merely an explanation of the Tana Kama of Rebbi Meir (who does not preclude someone who is already born from the word 'Noladim').