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1)

(a) We conclude that both Rav and Rebbi Nasan go after Umdena. Nevertheless, one of them rules like the Tana Kama in our Mishnah, and not like Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, who assesses the Chasan's intentions (to only give his betrothed Masayim once they are married) - because a Kesuvah of Masayim is based on the assessment of the closeness that a man feels towards his wife who is a Besulah. The Tana Kama too (this opinion holds), assessed that that closeness begins already with the betrothal.

(b) 'Amar Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi Mishum Rabeinu, Halachah ke'Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah' - Rabeinu refers to Rav (see Tosfos DH 'Amar').

(c) Rav and Shmuel (among others) rule like Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah. Rav Nachman among others, not only rules like the Tana Kama - but actually pronounces a curse against those who rule like Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah.

(d) The Halachah is nevertheless like Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah.

(a) According to Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, Eirusin does not acquire the Kesuvah of Masayim. Ravin is not sure then what *does* acquire it - whether it is the love of Chupah or the love of Bi'ah.

(b) We try to prove from the Beraisa of Rav Yosef, which states that he only writes the Kesuvah because of 'the love of the first night' - that it must be the love of Chupah that acquires, because if the Tana meant Bi'ah, does Bi'ah take place only on the first night and not on subsequent nights?

(c) We counter this however, from the Tana's reference to night - which suggests that he is referring to the Bi'ah, because the Chupah can just as well take place in the day, which Bi'ah generally does not (despite the concession of performing Bi'ah by day in a dark room).

(d) We refute this latter proof - by establishing the norm to perform Chupah too, at night, seeing as S'tam Chupah is for the purpose of Bi'ah. In any event, the outcome of Ravin's She'eilah is that it is the love of Chupah that acquires the Kesuvah of Masayim.

(a) Rav Ashi asks what the Din will be if the woman becomes a Nidah during the Chupah - because even though we just concluded that, according to Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah it is the love of Chupah that is Koneh, perhaps he requires a Chupah that leads to Bi'ah, but not a Chupas Nidah.

(b) The She'eilah - remains unresolved.

(a) In a Mishnah in Bava Basra, Rebbi Yossi holds that, if someone pays part of a debt, the creditor writes him a receipt. According to Rebbi Yehudah - they tear up the original document and write him a new one for the balance. Rebbi Yehudah disagrees with the concept of writing a receipt, since it forces the debtor to have to guard it against mice.

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah resolves the apparent contradiction between Rebbi Yehudah in Bava Basra and Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah (who permits the woman to write her husband a receipt for part of her Kesuvah) - by establishing that the receipt in our Mishnah is actually written into the Kesuvah itself, and not in the form of an independent document.

(c) Abaye establishes Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah by a regular receipt, dispensing with the Kashya in a different way. He maintains that it is in Bava Basra that Rebbi Yehudah argues with Rebbi Yossi - because there the debtor definitely paid, and to write a receipt places him in jeopardy of having to pay again; whereas in our Mishnah, where the husband has not actually paid anything, we are not so concerned that he might lose the receipt and have to pay. On the other hand, should the creditor wish to avoid this happening, he has the option of looking after the document carefully.

(d) It is easy to understand why Abaye declines to learn like Rebbi Yirmiyah, seeing as the Tana in our Mishnah does not speak about writing the receipt into the Kesuvah. Rebbi Yirmiyah on the other hand, declines to learn like Abaye - because he maintains that Chazal decreed against the one because of the other.

(a) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa says that if a man betrothes a woman on the condition that he is exempt from feeding her, clothing her or from performing his marital obligations - the woman is betrothed and his condition is invalid, because any condition that undermines the Torah's instructions, is invalid.

(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah - monetary conditions are valid. Consequently, if a man betrothes a woman on condition that he is exempt from feeding or clothing her, his condition is valid.

(c) We resolve the apparent contradiction between Rebbi Yehudah here and Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah, who requires that when the woman claims that she has received part of the Kesuvah, she is obligated to write it in the Kesuvah, but saying it verbally is not sufficient - by establishing that Rebbi Yehudah holds Kesuvah is de'Rabbanan, and the Rabbanan were more stringent in Rabbinical issues than they were in Torah ones.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah says in a Mishnah later, that unless a man writes that he relinquishes his rights over his wife's property, the Peiros and the Peirei Peiros forever, he may continue to eat Peirei Peiros. 'Peirei Peiros' mans - that one sells the Peiros, to buy with the proceeds land and to eat its fruit.

(b) Although Rebbi Yehudah explicitly says 'Kosev' there - we have a tradition that 'Kosev' means that he says so verbally.

(c) In spite of what we just concluded with regard to a Kesuvah, which, according to Rebbi Yehudah, is only de'Rabbanan, and which the woman can therefore not relinquish verbally - we justify his latter ruling in view of the fact that Nechsei mi'Lug are not common, and the Rabbanan's decrees only pertain to areas that are common.

7)

(a) The Tana Kama says in a Mishnah in D'mai that if two ass-drivers arrive in town, and one of them declares his own produce to be Chadash and un'Ma'asered, whereas his friend's is Yashan and Ma'asered, he is not believed. 'Chadash' and 'Yashan' means - fresh (inferior) produce and old (superior) produce respectively.

(b) Chadash and Yashan cannot be understood literally - because firstly, when we answer that Chazal were lenient by D'mai, what will we answer by the Isur of Chadash? And secondly, we do not find anywhere that Amei ha'Aretz are not believed with regard to the Isur of Chadash.

(c) The ass-driver is not believed - because an Am ha'Aretz is never believed on Ma'asros, and even though he declares his own produce un'Ma'asered, that is only a ruse to encourage people to believe him on his friend's.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah says in the Mishnah in D'mai - that the ass-driver *is* believed.

(b) The problem with Rebbi Yehudah in this Beraisa, in view of his opinion in our Mishnah, where he required the condition there to be in writing - is that if he is stringent there, because Rabbinical institutions (such as K'suvos) require reinforcement, then why is he lenient here (seeing as D'mai is also mi'de'Rabbanan)?

(c) Abaye answers that it is only by a Vadai de'Rabbanan that Rebbi Yehudah is stringent, but not a Safek. Rava explains - that he is lenient by D'mai, because even compared to other cases of Safek de'Rabbanan, D'mai is more lenient, because it was only a minority of Amei ha'Aretz who did not separate Ma'asros.

(a) We infer from the words of Rebbi Meir, who says in our Mishnah *'Kol ha'Poches* li'Besulah mi'Masayim ... Harei Zu Be'ilas Z'nus' (and not 'Kol Besulah she'Ein Lah Masayim ... ') - that his condition is Bateil and that, in fact, she receives Masayim.

(b) What turns all their Bi'os into Bi'os Z'nus - is the fact that the woman no longer expects to receive two hundred Zuz (she marries with reservations, which in the realm of transactions, is not considered a transaction).

(c) We can infer from Rebbi Meir who holds 'Kol ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, T'na'o Bateil' - that 'mi'de'Rabbanan, T'na'o Kayam' (with regard to Rabbinical issues, his condition remains intact).

(d) In our Mishnah, he holds that in the case of Kesuvah, his condition is Bateil, as we just explained - because, it is Rebbi Yehudah who holds that Kesuvah is mi'de'Rabbanan. *He* holds that it is d'Oraysa .

(a) We just discussed the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah (regarding the woman foregoing her Kesuvah). Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa has a third opinion. He holds - that she may forego part of her Kesuvah, even orally.

(b) The Tana Kama in another Beraisa forbids a man to designate Metaltelin for his wife's Kesuvah - in case they get lost or depreciate.

(c) In order to establish their Machlokes, we explain that they argue when the husband accepted responsibility for them - in which case, her Kesuvah is safeguarded against loss.

(d) Rebbi Yehudah argues with the Tana Kama - on the grounds that acceptance of responsibility may well safeguard her against loss, but it will not safeguard her against the fluctuating price of Metaltelin, which will sometimes cause her to suffer a big loss. The Tana Kama however, is concerned about loss, but not about depreciation.

12)

(a) When Rav Ivya's wife (the sister of Rami bar Chama) lost her Kesuvah, Rav Yosef quoted them a statement by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - who said that even though Rebbi Meir considers every Bi'ah performed with a woman who does not posses a Kesuvah of Manah or Masayim a Bi'as Z'nus, the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Meir, and permit them to live together even for two or three years without a Kesuvah.

(b) Abaye objected to Rav Yosef's ruling however, on the basis of a statement by Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel - who said that the Halachah is always like Rebbi Meir in his decrees (wherever he claims that Chazal decreed regarding Isur and Heter, to add a stringency on to Torah law).

(c) We learned earlier (on Daf 51a.) that if a man did not write his wife whom he married a Besulah, a Kesuvah, she nevertheless receives Masayim; whereas if he married her an Almanah, she receives a Manah. We could reconcile that ruling with our Sugya by esablishing it in a place where it is customary not to write a Kesuvah. Alternatively, we might explain that indeed when the time to claim falls due, she receives her Kesuvah. All her Bi'os until then however, are Bi'os Z'nus.