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1)

(a) What causes us to comment that according to both Rava and Rabah bar Rav Huna, who establish the Beraisa by a Gazlan and Nigzal, the loan is only an oral one - is the fact that nobody writes a Sh'tar for a Ganav.

(b) The problem then is - that one cannot claim an oral loan from Meshubadim (so how can the Nigzal claim his stolen field from Meshubadim?)

(c) We answer that, before selling the field (or before the Nochrim claimed it) they had been to Beis-Din. Bearing in mind that the reason that one cannot claim an oral loan from Meshubadim is because there is no 'Kol' (and the purchaser has no way of safeguarding himself against the Ba'al-Chov) - going to Beis-Din creates a 'Kol', giving subsequent claims the strength of a written loan.

(d) And the reason that the owner may claim the Peiros only from B'nei-Chorin is because they had abjugated on the Keren but not on the Peiros. We justify establishing the Beraisa like this - on the grounds that it is quite normal to first abjugate on the Keren and only later on the Peiros.

(a) The three things Shmuel instructed Rav Chin'na bar Shilas (who was a Sofer) to consult with the debtor before inserting them in the Sh'tar - were Shufra (Idis), Sh'vach and Peiros.

(b) This cannot be referring to a case of Ba'al-Chov - because Shmuel holds that a Ba'al-Chov claims the Sh'vach, but not the Peiros.

(c) He must therefore be referring to - a purchaser from a Gazlan.

(d) Rav Yosef reconciles this with Shmuel's own ruling that a purchaser from a Gazlan does not take the Sh'vach - by establishing the case when the Gazlan had Karka at the time of the sale and that is what now he subsequently gave him. Since he did not compensate him with money, it looks less like Ribis.

(a) Abaye objects to Rav Yosef's answer however - inasmuch as if, Lechatchilah, Chazal forbade 'Sa'ah be'Sa'ah (lending a Sa'ah against the value of a Sa'ah) due to the fact that the price might rise, and it looks like Ribis, then it should certainly be forbidden in our case to give the purchaser more than he received.

(b) In answer to Abaye's Kashya, Rav Yosef explains - it is only by Sa'ah be'Sa'ah, which is in the form of a loan (whose basic Ribis is d'Oraysa), that Chazal decreed in all cases, but not by the case of Shmuel, which is in the form of a purchase (whose basic Ribis is de'Rabbanan). There, Chazal permitted such a transaction provided the 'seller' gave the purchaser Karka.

(c) Alternatively, Rav Yosef makes the same distinction in the case where they made a Kinyan when obligating the 'seller' to accept Achrayus, which will be effective here, but not in the case of Sa'ah be'Sa'ah.

(a) The seller writes in the Sh'tar of sale 'Ana Eikum, ve'Ashpi, ve'Adki, ve'Amrik Z'vini Ilein'.

1. 've'Ashpi' means - 'and I will silence (any claimant).
2. 've'Adki '(which is smilar in meaning to 've'Amrik') - means 'and I will cleanse it (of any protestations').

(b) We prove from the continuation 'Inun, ve'Amleihon *u'Shevacheihon'* - that the Ba'al-Chov claims the Sh'vach (because otherwise, why would the seller need to compensate him).

(c) And from the fact that this is omitted from a Sh'tar Matanah - Rava extrapolates that he cannot claim it from the recipient of a gift.

(d) Rav Chiya bar Avin asked Rava whether a gift was really more powerful than a sale in this regard - to which Rava replied in the affirmative.

(a) Rav Nachman proves Shmuel right from a Beraisa which rules (in connection with a field which is taken away from Shimon, after he bought it from Reuven) that he - the Shimon claims from Reuven, the Keren from Meshubadim and the Sh'vach from B'nei Chorin.

(b) Rav Huna explains the Beraisa in connection with someone who purchased from a Gazlan, and it is - the purchaser who is now claiming from the Gazlan.

(c) According to Rav Huna, the purchaser would not claim in the case of a Ba'al-Chov - because it would not be necessary, seeing as the Ba'al-Chov is not permitted to claim the Sh'vach from *him*.

(d) What gives a Nigzal more rights than the Ba'al-Chov (according to him) is - the fact that the Nigzal previously owned the field, in which case he can claim that it is his field which improved; whereas the Ba'al-Chov never owned the field.

(a) Another Beraisa discusses a case where a purchaser had improved the field, when the Ba'al-Chov claimed the entire field including the Sh'vach. The Tana differentiates between where the Sh'vach amounts to more that the expenses and vice-versa. Assuming that ...

1. ... the Sh'vach amounts to more than the expenses - the purchaser claims the Sh'vach from the owner, and the Sh'vach from the Ba'al-Chov.
2. ... the expenses amount to more than the Sh'vach - he claims the expenses to the value of the Sh'vach from the Ba'al-Chov.

(b) The Kashya on Shmuel from the Reisha ...

1. ... if we establish the case by a purchaser from a Gazlan is - that according to Shmuel, someone who purchases from a Gazlan is not entitled to claim the Sh'vach.
2. ... and from the Seifa, if we establish it by a Ba'al-Chov is - that a Ba'al-Chov is entitled to the Sh'vach (so why should he have to pay the purchaser his expenses to the value of the Sh'vach)?

(c) The two possible conditions under which we might establish the Beraisa by a purchaser from a Gazlan are - if either the Gazlan gave him Karka, or if they made a Kinyan (as we explained above).

7)

(a) Alternatively, we even establish the Beraisa by a Ba'al-Chov. To reconcile Shmuel with the Tana, we differentiate between 'Sh'vach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim' and 'Sh'vach she'Eino Magi's li'Kesafim'. 'Sh'vach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim' - is Sh'vach which still needs the ground but which has almost attained its full ripeness, and is therefore considered Peiros.

(b) We establish ...

1. ... the Beraisa - by 'Sh'vach ha'Magi's li'Kesafim', which the Ba'al-Chov is not entitled to claim unless he pays the expenses. Note, that the Sugya is speaking exclusively about Sh'vach that is attached to the ground and that still needs the ground. The Ba'al-Chov has no claim whatsoever on detached crops, and crops that no longer need the ground are considered as if they were detached.
2. ... Shmuel - by 'Sh'vach she'Eino Magi'a li'Kesafim', which the Ba'al Chov takes as part of the field.

(c) When Shmuel would regularly authorize the Ba'al-Chov to claim even 'Sh'vach ha'Magi'a li'Kesafim' without having to pay the expenses - that was when the debt amounted to the combined value of the field plus the Sh'vach, whereas our Sugya is talking when the debt is covered by the value of the field alone.

(d) The reason the Tana say that the purchaser takes the Yetzi'ah ... (rather than that he takes the equivalent of his debt from the owner and the rest from the Ba'al-Chov) is - to teach us that even though the expenses exceed the Sh'vach, he only takes as much of the expenses as are equivalent to the Sh'vach.

(a) Some say that even if the purchaser has money, he is obligated to give the Ba'al-Chov the field that is Meshubad to him. Others say - that he has the right to pay the Ba'al-Chov money.

(b) The problem this creates with the Beraisa's ruling (that the Ba'al-Chov takes the field and pays the purchaser money for his Sh'vach) - is why the purchaser cannot then claim part of the field in lieu of the Sh'vach, on the grounds that if he would have had money, he could have given him money and retained the field.

(c) We answer by establishing the Beraisa, 'K'gon she'As'o *Apotiki'*- a field which the debtor specifically designated for the creditor.

(d) This answers the Kashya - inasmuch as everyone agrees that the purchaser cannot pay the Ba'al-Chov money, when the field that is Meshubad is an Apotiki. Consequently, he has no claim to Karka whatsoever.

(a) According to Rav, if the purchaser bought the field from the 'seller' knowing that it was stolen, he is entitled to claim the value of the field but not the Sh'vach. According to Shmuel - he cannot even claim the value of the field.

(b) The basis of their Machlokes is - whether the money that he paid is considered a Pikadon (Rav), or a gift (Shmuel).

(c) According to ...

1. ... Rav, the purchaser did not say that he gave the money as a Pikadon - because he the purchaser, he figured, would decline to accept it.
2. ... Shmuel, he did not say that he gave the money as a gift - because he was too embarrassed to say so.

(a) We find the same Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel - in connection with someone who betroths his sister (since everyone knows that such a Kidushin is not valid).

(b) Had they only presented their Machlokes ...

1. ... here, we would have thought that, in Kidushin, Rav would concede that the money is a gift - because it is only in our Sugya that he considers the money a Pikadon, because one doesn't tend to give gifts to a stranger, whereas in Kidushin, it is his sister who is involved, and not a stranger.
2. ... in Kidushin, we would have thought that Shmuel would concede here that the money is a Pikadon - using the reverse logic (because whereas there it is his sister who is involved, here it is a stranger).

(c) When we ask, according to both Rav and Shmuel, how the purchaser can possibly eat the fruit - we are actually querying the basis of their Machlokes, because if it is a question of what we consider the money to be, how will that authorise the purchaser to eat the fruit?

(d) And we reply - that the purchaser eats the fruit (not because it is legal to do so, but) because he thinks that he is no worse than the Gazlan, who also ate it.

(a) We conclude 've'Hilch'sa Yesh Lo Ma'os, ve'Yesh Lo Sh'vach' - (like Rav) with regard to the first Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel (on the previous Daf), in the case where someone purchased a field which was subsequently found to have been stolen.

(b) With regard to ...

1. ... our current Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel, we rule that the money is a Pikadon (like Rav).
2. ... Ach'rayus - we rule 'Ach'rayus Ta'us Sofer Hu' (not like Shmuel, who holds that the Sofer must also consult the debtor about Shibud). And this ruling extends to purchases too.

(c) We ask what the Din will be if, after selling the stolen field to the purchaser, the Gazlan buys it from the owner - whether the Gazlan's initial sale will be invalid (as would be the case if a third person were to purchase the field from the owner), or whether for some reason, the sale will remain valid.

(d) We rule that the Gazlan cannot claim the field from the purchaser - because the Gazlan sold the purchaser all the rights (not only those that he already had, but also those) that he would have in the field.

(a) According to Mar Zutra, this is because of a Chazakah that he does not wish to be called 'a Gazlan' - because he took back the field that he sold him.

(b) Rav Ashi says - that it is because he wants to remain on good terms with the purchaser.

(c) Initially, we take the ramifications of this Machlokes to be when the purchaser died, where, we think, the first reason will no longer apply (and the Gazlan will then be able to take the field), whereas the second one will. We refute ...

1. ... this suggestion however, on the grounds - that if the sale were to be nullified, then the purchaser's heirs would refer to the 'seller' as a Gazlan (no less than the purchaser himself). So either way, the sale will stand.
2. ... the suggestion that the difference will be when the Gazlan died, where again the first reason will no longer apply, but the second one will (since the children will still want to be in the good books of the purchaser), on the grounds that - here too, if the sale were to be annulled, the purchaser would still refer to the heirs as 'sons of a Gazlan'. So in this case too, either way, the sale will stand.

(d) The ramifications, we finally conclude of the Machlokes between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi - are manifest in a case where the Gazlan (did not sell the field to the recipient, but) gave it to him as a gift. In that case, he will still want to remain on good terms with the purchaser (by not negating the sale when he buys the field from the owner) on the one hand, but on the other, he has no reason to be afraid of being called a Gazlan, since he has not stolen anything from him.