ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
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Bava Metzia 14
BAVA METZIA 11-17 - This study material has been produced with the help of
the Israeli ministry of religious affairs.
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Questions
1)
(a) Having just asked one Kashya on Rebbi Elazar from the Beraisa, we ask an
additional Kashya on Shmuel (who, like Rebbi Elazar, establishes the Beraisa
when the debtor denies the Sh'tar's validity as we explained above). Shmuel
rules - that someone who finds Sh'tarei Hakna'ah in the street should return
them, and we do not suspect that they may already have be paid (even if the
debtor claims that they have).
(b) This clashes with the Beraisa 'af-al-Pi she'Sh'neihem Modim Lo Yachzir
Lo la'Zeh ve'Lo la'Zeh' - because if when the debtor admits that he has
*not* yet paid, we are afraid that perhaps he has (and that he is in cahoots
with the creditor), how much more so when he claims that he *has*.
2)
(a) The reason Shmuel gives for the Rabbanan, who rule that one may claim
from Meshubadim even with a Sh'tar that does contain Ach'rayus is - the
principle 'Ach'rayus Ta'us Sofer Hu', as we explained above.
(b) Shmuel said that before entering 'Sh'vach, Sh'far ve'Shibud' into a
Sh'tar, the Sofer must first consult the debtor (which seems to clash with
his other statement 'Ach'rayus Ta'us Sofer Hu'), which means that Shibud is
mandatory.
(c)
1. 'Sh'vach' - is any improvement which the 'creditor' claims together with
the Meshubadim.
2. 'Sh'far' - is the right to claim them from the best of the debtor's
fields.
3)
(a) Rav Idi bar Avin reconciles the seeming discrepancy in Shmuel without
turning it into a Machlokes Amora'im - by establishing the latter statement
specifically with regard to a purchaser (whereas his former statement
pertains to a creditor).
(b) The reason for this distinction is - because a creditor gains nothing
from the loan, and is not willing to throw his money down the drain (so he
expects a guarantee in the way of Ach'rayus, which will enable him to
retrieve his money). A purchaser on the other hand, will buy a field from
whose fruit he stands to benefit, perhaps for a long time, on the off-chance
that the seller's creditor will claim it from him the very next day and he
loses it all.
(c) We cite an incident in support of this distinction, where Avuhah bar Ihi
purchased an attic from his sister, and her creditors then came and claimed
it from him. When he came before Shmuel with the intention of claiming from
his sister's Meshubadim (which she had sold after his purchase), Shmuel
asked him whether she had written Ach'rayus into his Sh'tar Mechirah. When
he replied in the negative, Shmuel sent him home empty-handed (because he
had foregone his right to claim from Meshubadim by not demanding that the
Sofer enters Ach'rayus into the Sh'tar).
(d) And he justifies this in spite of his earlier ruling 'Achrayus Ta'us
Sofer Hu' - by differentiating between a loan and a sale, as we just
explained.
4)
(a) Abaye rules that if Reuven sold Shimon a field with Ach'rayus, he is
permitted to appear in Beis-Din on Shimon's behalf, should the creditor
claim the field. We might have thought otherwise - because the creditor can
argue 'You are not my disputant! My claim from Shimon is none of your
business!'
(b) He is permitted to do so however - because he can counter that it is his
business, because, if Shimon loses the field, *he* will have to reimburse
him.
(c) Besides claiming that he already paid the debt, he might argue that his
creditor also owes him money and that he is holding this field as payment of
that debt.
(d) Others permit it even if he sold him the field without Ach'rayus -
because he can say that he doesn't want Shimon to bear him any grudges.
5)
(a) If Reuven sells a field to Shimon without Ach'rayus, and someone claims
that it is his, Shimon may retract, according to Abaye, as long as he has
not made a Chazakah, which in this regard means - if the purchaser has
walked round the borders of the field (see Tosfos DH 'Ad').
(b) He can no longer retract, once he has made a Chazakah - because the
seller can say to him that even if he bought a sack-full of knots. that was
his decision. He thought it over and accepted it! And, in the event that he
has not yet paid, he remains obligated to do so.
(c) But if Shimon purchased the field with Ach'rayus - he may retract even
after having made the Chazakah.
(d) Others disagree. They maintain that even then, he cannot retract -
because the seller can demand to see the claimant's Sh'tar before
reimbursing him!' And here too, he remains obligated to pay.
14b---------------------------------------14b
Questions
6)
(a) According to Rav, if Reuven sells Shimon a field which is then
discovered to have been stolen from Levi, he is obligated to reimburse him,
not only for the cost of the field, but also for any improvements for which
he was responsible. Although Levi is the one to benefit from the
improvements, he does not pay for them - because we are speaking in a case
where it was Reuven who spoiled the field (which he stole from Levi in good
condition [see also Rosh Si'man 39]).
(b) Shmuel rules - that Shimon may claim the cost of the field, but not of
the improvements.
(c) They asked Rav Huna what Shmuel would hold if the Sh'vach was
specifically included together with the Ach'rayus in the Sh'tar. The reason
that he might even then not be permitted to claim is - because seeing as the
field never belonged to Reuven, the money he received is a loan, in which
case, giving Shimon the Sh'vach looks like Ribis.
(d) Rav Huna wasn't too sure. First he said 'Yes', then he said 'No'.
According to Rav Nachman - Shmuel specifically ruled that Shimon could claim
the cost of the field, but not of the improvements.
7)
(a) The Mishnah rules in Gitin that one cannot claim Achilas Peiros, Sh'vach
Karka'os or Mazon ha'Ishah ve'ha'Banos from Meshubadim - because in all
these cases Chazal made a Takanah safeguarding the purchasers, since the
claim from the 'creditor' is not fixed, and is unknown at the time of the
field's purchase.
(b) Based on the inference (that they *can* claim from B'nei Chorin), Rava
asked Rav Nachman from this Mishnah - from the case of 'Sh'vach Karka'os',
which he established by someone who purchased from a Gazlan (in which case,
one cannot claim at all, according to him.
(c) What made him learn 'Sh'vach Karka'os' that way - is the fact that
*'Achilas Peiros'* clearly speaks in such a case, as we shall now see.
Presumably then, 'Sh'vach Karka'os' speaks in the same case.
(d) Rav Nachman replied however - that there is no reason not to establish
'Achilas Peiros' by someone who purchased from a Gazlan, and 'Sh'vach
Karka'os by a Ba'al-Chov ('Ha ke'de'Isa, ve'Ha ke'de'Isa').
8)
'Achilas Peiros' in the Mishnah in Gitin cannot refer to a case of a
Ba'al-Chov - because if, as we currently understand, the Tana speaks about a
purchaser reclaiming the field together with the fully-grown produce which
the Ba'al-Chov took from him, since when is a Ba'al-Chov entitled to take
the fully-grown produce from the purchaser?
9)
(a) In a Beraisa which comes to explain the above Mishnah, the Tana,
explaining 'Sh'vach Karka'os', writes that when the field is reclaimed from
the Gazlan, he claims the Keren from Meshubadim, and the Sh'vach from B'nei
Chorin. What forces us to amend the Beraisa to refer to a case when the
Gazlan sold it and it is the purchaser who improved it - is the fact that,
as it stands, since when does a Gazlan claim anything?
(b) In any event, we see that the Mishnah is speaking about a case of a
Gazlan and not of a Ba'al-Chov, as Rav Nachman explained earlier. Rav
Nachman refutes this Kashya however - by saying that if one needs to amend
the Beraisa anyway, then one may as well go further and establish it in case
of Ba'al-Chov.
10)
(a) We ask further on Rav Nachman from the above-mentioned Beraisa, which
explains 'Achilas Peiros' to mean that when the owner reclaims his field
from the Gazlan 'he claims the field from Meshubadim and the Peiros from
B'nei-Chorin. Here too, we amend the Beraisa for the same reason that we
amended the previous quotation from the same Beraisa - to a case where the
Gazlan sold the field, and it is the purchaser who improved it.
(b) This again poses a Kashya on Rav Nachman, according to whom the
purchaser from a Gazlan does not receive Peiros. To answer the Kashya, Rava
reinstates the original wording of the Beraisa. The claimant is now the
owner - but he cannot simply take his field, because the Tana speaks when,
after stealing the field and eating the fruit, the Gazlan dug pits all over
it.
11)
(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna establishes the Beraisa when Nochrim confiscated the
stolen field from the Gazlan. Here too - it is the owner who is now claiming
from the Gazlan, from whom takes a field from Meshubadim and Peiros from
B'nei-Chorin.
(b) And the reason that we obligate him to pay the owner is - because we are
speaking when the Nochrim confiscated the field specifically on his account
(because he owe them money or for some other reason).
(c) Both Rava and Rabah bar Rav Huna base their respective opinions on the
Lashon ' ... Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado'.
1. Rava declines to learn like Rabah bar Rav Huna - because, he says,
'Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado' implies legally (through Beis-Din and through
through Nochrim).
2. Rabah bar Rav Huna decline to learn like Rava - because, in his opinion,
'Yotzei mi'Tachas Yado' implies intact (and not full of pits).
12)
(a) Rav Ashi explains the Beraisa 'li'Tzedadin', by which he means - that
the Beraisa is speaking about two different claimants (as we shall now see).
(b) The case then is - when the Gazlan stole the field full of fruit, ate
the fruit, and, then the owner's Ba'al-Chov claimed it from the purchaser.
(c) The one who claims ...
1. ... the field (from Meshubadim) is - the purchaser.
2. ... the Peiros (from B'nei Chorin) - the owner.
(d) By explaining the Beraisa in this way - Rav Ashi gains what disturbed
both of the previous Tana'im, since according to him, the field is claimed
from the purchaser both legally and intact.
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