Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Bava Metzia, 20

1) ONE WHO FINDS A RECEIPT FOR A KESUVAH

QUESTION: The Beraisa (end of 19b) states that when one who finds a receipt ("Shover") for the payment of a Kesuvah, we return it to the husband when the woman agrees that she received the money. The Gemara asks that even when she agrees, we should not give the receipt to the husband, because perhaps it was written in Nisan and was not given to him until Tishrei. We should be concerned that perhaps she sold to someone else the rights to collect her Kesuvah (in the event that she is widowed or divorced), and the buyer collected the Kesuvah after Nisan (before Tishrei), and her husband will come and collect unlawfully from the buyer based on his receipt that says that he already paid the Kesuvah to the woman in Nisan!

Rava answers that this Beraisa is support for Shmuel who rules that a lender who sold a Shtar Chov to a third party and then pardoned the debt, the debt is cancelled. Likewise, in the case of our Gemara, we are not concerned that the husband will collect unlawfully from the buyers, because the woman who sold the rights to collect her Kesuvah is entitled to pardon the debt, and thus the buyers were not entitled to collect the Kesuvah from the husband and thus he is justified in taking it back from them.

Abaye rejects Rava's answer and says that the Beraisa does not support Shmuel's ruling. Abaye answers instead that the case of the Beraisa is when the woman is holding her Kesuvah, so we are not concerned that she sold it. Rava rejects this answer, because perhaps the husband wrote two Kesuvos to his wife, and she sold the first one.

Abaye retorts that, first, we are never afraid that two Kesuvos were written, and, second, even if we were concerned for two Kesuvos, the receipt pardons the debt on the day that it was signed (and not just on the date that it was given), and thus the buyers indeed were not entitled to collect the Kesuvah. Abaye is consistent with his own ruling earlier (13a, 19a) where he rules that when witnesses sign a document, the document takes effect immediately.

Abaye's answers are difficult to understand. If Abaye holds that the document takes effect at the moment that the witnesses sign it, then his second answer is the accurate explanation for the Beraisa's ruling! What purpose is there in answering that the woman is holding her Kesuvah, and since we do not suspect that two Kesuvos were written, the fact that she is holding it proves that she did not sell it? According to Abaye's opinion, the Beraisa can be referring to all cases -- even when the woman is not holding the Kesuvah, because the receipt took effect at the time that it was signed!

ANSWERS:

(a) The RI MI'GASH (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) answers that Abaye gives his first answer as an answer even according to Rava's own reasoning. That is, even if Rava maintains that the document does not take effect until it is given over to the recipient and not at the moment that the witnesses sign it, and thus, in our case, the receipt that the woman wrote for her husband did not take effect at the moment that the witnesses signed it, nevertheless the Beraisa can be explained as referring to a case in which the woman is holding her Kesuvah. Since we do not suspect that two Kesuvos were written, the fact that she is holding it proves that she did not sell it to anyone.

(b) SEFER MAYANEI HA'CHOCHMAH offers an answer based on the opinion of the RIF according to the ROSH, who maintains that even though the witnesses cause the document to take effect when they sign it, if the subject of the document is sold between the time that the document was written and the time that it was given, the effect of the signatures is voided. Consequently, in the case of our Gemara, Abaye's second answer does not suffice, since we are afraid that the woman sold the Kesuvah for which the receipt was written.

Therefore, Abaye answers that the Kesuvah is still in the woman's hands. Why, then does he give the second answer, if the second answer does not suffice? The reason why he gives the second answer is because there remains a different concern -- perhaps the woman borrowed money after writing (but before giving) the receipt, and as a result the Kesuvah is Meshu'abad to the loan (through the Halachah of Rebbi Nasan, who teaches that a lender is permitted to collect his debt from someone else who owes money (in this case, the husband) to the borrower). In such a situation, the woman certainly cannot pardon the Kesuvah to her husband (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 86:5 and Shach there). Hence, we must suspect that the woman and her husband are conspiring to cheat her creditor (by giving the pre-dated receipt to her husband, he will then be able to take back the property of the Kesuvah that the creditor collected). The fact that she is holding her Kesuvah is irrelevant, since the fear is not that she sold it, but that she borrowed money against it. Therefore, Abaye answers that the receipt indeed took effect from the moment that the witnesses signed it. (I. Alsheich)

(See also BA'AL HA'ME'OR and CHEMDAS SHLOMO.)

QUESTION: The Beraisa (end of 19b) states that when one who finds a receipt ("Shover") for the payment of a Kesuvah, we return it to the husband when the woman agrees that she received the money. The Gemara asks that even when she agrees, we should not give the receipt to the husband, because perhaps it was written in Nisan and was not given to him until Tishrei. We should be concerned that perhaps she sold to someone else the rights to collect her Kesuvah (in the event that she is widowed or divorced), and the buyer collected the Kesuvah after Nisan (before Tishrei), and her husband will come and collect unlawfully from the buyer based on his receipt that says that he already paid the Kesuvah to the woman in Nisan!

Rava answers that this Beraisa is support for Shmuel who rules that a lender who sold a Shtar Chov to a third party and then pardoned the debt, the debt is canceled. Likewise, in the case of our Gemara, we are not concerned that the husband will collect unlawfully from the buyers, because the woman who sold the rights to collect her Kesuvah pardoned the debt. As a result, the buyers were not entitled to collect the Kesuvah from the husband, and thus he is justified in taking it back from them.

RASHI (DH Shema Minah) explains that this Beraisa is support for Shmuel because we see that the Beraisa is not concerned that the husband will collect unlawfully from the buyers, for even if the woman did sell the debt of her Kesuvah before giving the receipt to her husband, "her husband justly acquires the receipt." The straightforward understanding of Rashi's words is that the woman's act of giving the receipt to her husband is, itself, an act of pardoning the debt. (This, too, is the way the NIMUKEI YOSEF, RASHBA, and RAN explain.)

However, Rashi later (DH l'Shtei Kesuvos), in explaining Rava's response to Abaye when Rava says that we must suspect that two Kesuvos were written, writes that the Beraisa indeed supports Shmuel's ruling, and "since it is in her hands to pardon the Kesuvah to her husband," there is no concern that she sold the rights to collect the Kesuvah and now she is giving a receipt to her husband. Rashi here is not explaining that the woman's act of giving the receipt to her husband is an act of pardoning the debt. Rather, Rashi is clearly explaining (as Tosfos explains) that the woman has a "Migu" -- since she could have pardoned the debt, she is able to give the receipt to her husband and it takes effect! How are we to reconcile the two comments of Rashi? (MAHARIM SHIF)

ANSWER: RAV ISUR YEHUDAH UNTERMAN zt'l (She'eilos u'Teshuvos, Kuntrus Acharon 80:18) answers based on the view expressed in the Yerushalmi that when a creditor pardons a debt owed to him while he is holding the document, the pardon is ineffective and the debt remains in force (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 241, and the Shach there #4). In our Gemara, Abaye says the woman is holding the Kesuvah (in order to explain why we are not concerned that she sold it to others). According to Abaye, therefore, her act of giving the receipt to her husband cannot qualify as an effective pardon of the debt of the Kesuvah, because she is holding the Kesuvah in her hands! It must be that the receipt takes effect because of a "Migu" that the woman, if she wants, could pardon the debt right now. Rashi explains that the receipt takes effect because the woman has the ability to pardon it if she wants to, and not because her act of giving the receipt is considered an effective pardon, because he is explaining Rava's response to *Abaye* who says that she is holding the Kesuvah! Earlier, though, Rashi was explaining the words of Rava (before Abaye responded to them), who learned that the Beraisa was referring to a case in which the Kesuvah is *not* in the woman's hands, and thus she has the ability to pardon the debt of the Kesuvah. (See a different approach in CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER.) (I. Alsheich)

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one who found "Igros Mazon" may return it to the bearer of the document who lost it. RASHI explains that an "Igeres Mazon" is a document in which a man obligated himself to support his step-daughter (the daughter of his wife).

If the "Igeres Mazon" is a document of obligation, then why are we not concerned that perhaps he wrote the document but decided not to give it (as we are concerned with regard to the other types of Shtaros, as the Mishnah describes on 12b and 18a)? By returning the document to the woman, we are causing the man to lose unjustly!

ANSWERS:

(a) The RASHASH answers that Rashi means that in the "Igeres Mazon" it is written that the man accepted this obligation upon himself "with a Kinyan," and therefore he is not able to retract his commitment to support his step-daughter. Since the Kinyan made the obligation take effect (and not the Shtar), the Shtar itself serves merely as proof of his obligation.

(b) The IMREI MAHARSHACH answers that, according to Rashi, the Mishnah is referring to a case in which the Shtar was written in Beis Din. Since Beis Din authorizes the writing of documents only when they are being written with intention to be used and to take effect, there is no fear that the man changed his mind. (Rashi himself writes this with regard to "Kol Ma'aseh Beis Din" in DH Harei Zeh Yachzir (#1).) (I. Alsheich)

20b

QUESTION: When a Get was found in the court of Rav Huna, Rabah ruled that it may be returned to the Shali'ach who lost it, basing his ruling on the Mishnah (20a) which states, "Any document written in Beis Din may be returned." Rav Amram questioned how Rabah could learn a Halachah for a matter of Isur (divorce) from a monetary matter (Shtaros). Rabah responded, "Fool! The Mishnah is [also] discussing Shtarei Chalitzah and Mi'un (which are matters of Isur)!"

What was Rav Amram's intention when he asked Rabah how can he learn a Halachah of Isur from a monetary matter? He certainly knew that the Mishnah mentions Chalitzah and Mi'un!

ANSWERS:

(a) The PNEI YEHOSHUA writes that Rav Amram maintained that there is a difference between the Isur involved with Chalitzah and the Isur involved with Gerushin. Chalitzah involves only an Isur Lav (that is, one who marries a woman who did not do a proper Chalitzah transgresses a Lav), while Gerushin involves an Isur of Eshes Ish (that is, one who marries a woman who did not receive a proper Get transgresses the Isur of Eshes Ish), which is very severe. Rabah, on the other hand, maintains that regardless of the severity of the Isur, they are both Isurim.

(b) The EIN YEHOSEF explains that Rav Amram was asking on the language that Rabah used in his ruling when he based his ruling on the "Ma'aseh Beis Din" written in the Mishnah. Rav Amram maintained that "Ma'aseh Beis Din" refers only to Shtaros of monetary matters. Rabah answered that since this Mishnah also discusses Shtaros of Chalitzah and Mi'un, "Ma'aseh Beis Din" includes all types of Shtaros. (I. Alsheich)

QUESTION: When a Get was found in the court of Rav Huna, Rabah ruled that it may be returned to the Shali'ach who lost it, basing his ruling on the Mishnah (20a) which states, "Any document written in Beis Din may be returned." Rav Amram questioned how Rabah could learn a Halachah for a matter of Isur (divorce) from a monetary matter (Shtaros). Rabah responded, "Fool! The Mishnah is [also] discussing Shtarei Chalitzah and Mi'un (which are matters of Isur)!"

How could Rabah, a holy Amora, call Rav Amram a "fool?" (See Insights to Bava Kama 65a, where we quote the CHAVOS YA'IR (#152) with regard to a similar question.)

ANSWER: The Mashgi'ach of the Mirrer Yeshivah, RAV YERUCHAM LEVOVITZ zt'l, writes in DA'AS CHOCHMAH U'MUSAR (volume 2) that everything that the holy Amora'im did, they did with the utmost purity and holiness. We, who do not live on such a lofty level of holiness, would be insulting and degrading our fellow man were we to call him by a derogatory name, and it indeed would be a severe transgression, for we cannot be confident that no impure motive was mixed with our words or actions. The holy Amora'im, on the other hand, spoke only with absolute purity of intention. Hence, even words that might seem to us be be words of derision were spoken - and understood -- by the Amora'im with the "fire of Torah" burning in them, with only the purest intentions. (I. Alsheich)

QUESTION: Rav Safra explains that when a Malveh finds a receipt, or Shover, among his torn Shtaros which states that a certain debt was repaid to him, that receipt is valid and he may not claim the debt for which it was written.

RASHI (DH she'Nimtza) writes that the Shtar itself (and not the Shover) was found among the torn Shtaros. Why does Rashi say that the Shtar was found among torn Shtaros, when the Gemara is clearly referring to the Shover?

ANSWERS:

(a) The MAHARSHA, MAHARAM, and MAHARAM SHIF answer that Rashi is referring to the two Shtaros for which this Shover might have been written (for example, two borrowers with the same name borrowed money from this lender, and a Shover was written that one of the Shtaros is paid). Rashi means that the two Shtaros are resting among torn Shtaros, and when each Loveh claims that "this is my Shtar," he is claiming that the Shtar for which a Shover was written is his Shtar.

(b) The EIN YEHOSEF answers that when Rashi here mentions "Shtar," he is referring to a Shtar of receipt, a Shover.