QUESTION: In the Mishnah, the Tana Kama (Rebbi Yehudah) and Rebbi Yosi
argue whether one fulfills his obligation to recite the Shema if he does
not hear what he says. The Tana Kama says that he fulfills his obligation
and Rebbi Yosi says that he does not. The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yosi
derives from the word "Shema" ("hear") that one must hear what he says and
that Shema may be recited in any language. How does Rebbi Yosi derive two
things from one verse?
ANSWERS:
(a) RASHI (DH Tarti Shema Minah) explains that once we derive the Halachah
"in any language *which you can hear*" from the word "Shema," it is
implicit that you must *hear* what you say as well. (That is, if the verse
just meant to teach that Shema must be said in any language, it should have
used the word "Haven" ("understand").)
(b) The RASHBA says that once we derive the Halachah that the Shema can be
said in any language, it can be inferred that Shema must be recited
audibly. If one could fulfill his obligation by just *thinking* the words
of Shema, it would not be relevant to derive that Shema could be said in
any language because in *thought* no language is used. (The Tana Kama,
though, explains that although one does not have to hear what he says, he
does have to pronounce the words with his mouth. Rebbi Yosi maintains that
this is not considered speech, and therefore the only way that the Shema
could be recited in any language is if one speaks it audibly.)
TOSFOS (Shabbos 12b, DH sh'Ein Malachei ha'Shares) also seems to maintain
that thought is not done with language. The Gemara in Shabbos says that the
angels do not understand the Aramaic language. Tosfos asks that if the
angels understand the thoughts of man, then they should understand when a
person speaks Aramaic. Whenever a person speaks, he thinks, and his
thoughts are not in Aramaic. (Tosfos leaves his question unanswered.)
TOSFOS later in Shabbos, though, seems to disagree. Tosfos (Shabbos 40b, DH
v'Chi Teima) there implies that one does think in the language in which he
speaks.
Apparently, there are different levels of thought. Thought can be done with
language, but there is a deeper level of thought that is done without
language. Had it been possible to fulfill the Mitzvah of Shema through
*thought without language*, the Mitzvah of Shema would have been similar to
the Mitzvah of learning Torah, which can be accomplished through
understanding the words without speaking them out in the mind. (M.
Kornfeld)
QUESTION: Two Amora'im in the Gemara attribute two different Mishnayos to
Rebbi Yosi. (1) Rav Chisda says that Rebbi Yosi is the Tana of the Mishnah
in Terumos (1:2) that says that a deaf person who separated Terumah has
fulfilled his obligation b'Di'eved even though he could not hear the
blessing. (2) Rav Masnah attributes to him the Mishnah in Megilah (19b)
that says that a deaf person cannot read the Megilah on Purim because he
cannot hear what he says.
The Gemara goes into a lengthy discussion following each statement of these
two Amora'im, proposing which Tana is the author of which Mishnah or
Beraisa that deals with reciting a prayer or blessing inaudibly.
In the end of both Sugyos, the Gemara introduces a third opinion -- Rebbi
Elazar Ben Azaryah's opinion -- besides the opinions of Rebbi Yosi and
Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah. Rebbi Elazar Ben Azaryah maintains that if
someone reads the Shema without hearing what he says, he fulfills his
obligation b'Di'eved. The Gemara concludes that Rebbi Yehudah agrees with
the opinion of Rebbi Elazar Ben Azaryah, that one fulfills his obligation
only b'Di'eved.
In the first stage of both Sugyos, when the Gemara assumes that Rebbi
Yehudah does not agree with Rebbi Elazar Ben Azaryah, RASHI (in the first
Sugya, DH Ela Rebbi Yehudah l'Chatchilah Ka'amar; and in the second Sugya,
DH l'Olam Rebbi Yehudah) writes that the Tana of the Mishnah in Terumos
(first Sugya) and the Mishnah in Megilah (second Sugya) is Rebbi Yosi. In
other words, Rav Chisda and Rav Masnah were correct.
In the end of both Sugyos, when the Gemara concludes that Rebbi Yehudah
agrees with Rebbi Elazar Ben Azaryah, Rashi (in the first Sugya, DH Afilu
Teima Rebbi Yehudah; and in the second Sugya, DH Afilu Teima Rebbi Yehudah)
says that the authors of those two Mishnayos (in Terumos and in Megilah)
are *not* Rebbi Yosi, but Rebbi Yehudah, and Rav Chisda and Rav Masnah were
incorrect.
Why does Rashi change this point?
ANSWER: The Gemara is trying to defend the statements of Rav Chisda and Rav
Masnah. Rashi understood that when the Gemara introduced Rebbi Elazar Ben
Azaryah (who says that one fulfills his obligation b'Di'eved), the Gemara's
intention was to defend Rav Chisda and Rav Masnah. What is the defense?
The Gemara at first asserts that Rebbi Elazar Ben Azaryah of the Beraisa is
the only one who maintains that one fulfills his obligation b'Di'eved when
he does not hear what he says. By showing us that there is no Tana in any
*Mishnah* that is of that opinion -- other than Rebbi Yosi in our Mishnah
-- it must be that the Tana of the Mishnah in Terumos that says that one
fulfills his obligation b'Di'eved is none other than Rebbi Yosi. It is
unlikely that the Tana of the Mishnah in Terumos is a Tana that is not
mentioned elsewhere in a Mishnah (but only in a Beraisa, such as Rebbi
Elazar ben Azaryah). Similarly, the Gemara defends Rav Masnah by showing
that Rebbi Yosi is the only Tana in a Mishnah who is of the opinion that
one fulfills his obligation b'Di'eved. If so, the Mishnah in Megilah is
likely to be Rebbi Yosi (and the Mishnah there is teaching that a deaf
person cannot read the Megilah even b'Di'eved).
In the end, when the Gemara concludes that Rebbi Yehudah agrees with Rebbi
Elazar Ben Azaryah, Rashi understood that the Gemara was refuting Rav
Chisda and Rav Masnah for good. That is, each of those Mishnayos could be
either Rebbi Yehudah or Rebbi Yosi, so why did Rav Chisda and Rav Masnah
say that they could *only* be Rebbi Yosi? (M. Kornfeld, based on the
Maharsha)