How can the seller prohibit the buyer from writing a Shtar with the
signatures of witnesses to attest to the sale? If the witnesses saw the sale
take place, then they should be able to testify to that effect and sign a
Shtar without the consent of the seller! This seems to be clear from the
Gemara later in Bava Basra (171a), which teaches that if a buyer loses a
Shtar, he may tell the witnesses to write him another Shtar, without the
consent of the seller, as long as the Shtar does not involve being
Mesha'abed the Nechasim of the seller. Here, too, the witnesses should be
permitted to write a Shtar that does not include Achrayus Nechasim! Perhaps
our Gemara means that the Shtar *may* be written, but *Achrayus* cannot be
written in the Shtar when the seller retracts his consent to write a Shtar.
However, TOSFOS points out that this does not seem to be what the Gemara
means, because the Shtar is not necessary to create a Chiyuv of Achrayus in
this case, since the Gemara (41b) teaches that when someone sells a field in
front of witnesses, the Chiyuv of Achrayus is automatically created. Hence,
the Shtar is necessary only as proof of the sale, and as such it should be
permitted to write the Shtar even without the consent of the seller. (TOSFOS
DH Chozer)
(a) The PISKEI RID and the RA'AVAD cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes explain
that the Gemara indeed is prohibiting the writing of the Shtar without the
permission of the seller only when the Shtar includes Achrayus Nechasim. For
example, if the seller specified at the time of the sale that he does *not*
want to obligate himself with a Chiyuv of Achrayus unless he later writes a
Shtar obligating himself, the seller may change his mind about writing that
Shtar.
How can the Gemara be discussing such a limited and specific case, when it
does not specify such circumstances? These Rishonim explain that the Gemara
(on 41b) does not mean that every sale without a Shtar includes a Chiyuv of
Achrayus. Rather, the Gemara means that if the seller specifies that he is
obligating himself with Achrayus, then the buyer may collect not only from
Nechasim Benei Chorin, but even from Nechasim Meshu'abadim. They infer this
from the Gemara in Bava Metzia (14a) which says that "Achrayus Ta'us Sofer,"
meaning that (according to the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Meir) if a Shtar
written for a sale does not specify a Chiyuv of Achrayus, then we assume
that there is a Chiyuv of Achrayus anyway and that the scribe merely forget
to write it in the Shtar. These words imply that only with a written Shtar
do we say that he must have meant to obligate himself with Achrayus even if
it is not written in the Shtar, since he went through the trouble of writing
a Shtar. In contrast, when the field is sold without a Shtar, it is assumed
that the seller is not Chayav for Achrayus unless he explicitly says that he
accepts Achrayus.
(b) The RABEINU YEHONASAN cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes writes that the
Shtar can be written even without the seller's permission. When the Gemara
says that the seller may change his mind, it means that if he originally
offered to pay for the writing of the Shtar, he can change his mind and the
buyer will have to pay on his own to have the Shtar written.
(c) TOSFOS answers that a Shtar that was lost can be rewritten since the
seller has nothing to lose if the Shtar is rewritten. In our case, however,
the seller will lose if a Shtar is written, because there never was a Shtar
until now. When a Shtar is written it publicizes that the person has sold
his land, and thus people will not want to extend loans to him since he does
not have as much real estate to be Mesha'abed as collateral for the loan.
The RASHBA adds that the value of his real estate will decrease when word
gets out that he needs to sell his property. (Although when one sells his
property without writing a Shtar, his property becomes Meshu'abad because of
the rumor (Kol), nevertheless when a Shtar is written it becomes publicized
even more (Rashba).)
RABEINU TAM cited by Tosfos suggests a similar answer. Our Gemara is
discussing land that was given as a gift without a Shi'abud on the giver's
Nechasim. If the recipient writes a Shtar, then those who hear about the
Shtar might mistakenly assume that the Shtar was either a Shtar Mecher (a
bill of sale) or a Shtar Chov (a bill of debt, in which the land mentioned
in the Shtar was a Mashkon for the debt), and that the owner was Mesha'abed
himself. Since it is to the detriment of the giver to have a Shtar written,
it may not be written without his consent. (In the case in which a person
lost the original Shtar, the giver does not lose by having another Shtar
written, because Rabeinu Tam holds that people will realize that both
Shtaros were written for the same field, and it will not look like he is
giving an additional field, or that he is giving a Shtar Chov.
(d) RABEINU YONAH explains that even though there already exists a Shi'abud,
the witnesses may not sign a Shtar which can also be used to prove that
there is a Shi'abud without the consent of the seller, since this Shtar
might be used in court to prove the Shi'abud. A Shtar written without the
consent of the seller is not valid to prove the Shi'abud, since testimony
must be given in front of the court and in front of the seller whom the
Shi'abud obligates. Therefore, if the witnesses sign a Shtar without the
consent of the seller, the entire Shtar is invalid, even as a proof to the
transaction, since the witnesses were presenting testimony that will
obligate the seller to pay as a result of the Shi'abud when not in the
presence of the seller.
The Gemara that allows a Shtar that was lost to be rewritten without the
consent of the seller only allows the Shtar to be written without Achrayus.
Such a Shtar -- which only pertains to what already happened (i.e. the field
was already sold or given), but which does not obligate the seller in any
future obligations (such as a Shi'abud) -- may be written even when not in
the presence of the seller. In our Gemara, it would be permitted for the
buyer to write a Shtar which does *not* include Achrayus, without the
consent of the seller.
(e) The RAMBAN, RASHBA, and RAN go one step further than Rabeinu Yonah. They
write that even a Shtar Ra'ayah (a Shtar used only as proof), which does not
involve Achrayus, cannot be written without the consent of the seller. The
reason for this is because the Torah teaches that written evidence is not
accepted in court ("mi'Pihem v'Lo mi'Pi Kesavam," Kesuvos 20a). Indeed, for
this reason *no* Shtar should be valid as proof in court! However, when the
person whom the Shtar is obligating requests that a Shtar be written and
signed by witnesses, the signed Shtar serves as a form of Hoda'as Ba'al Din
in court. The signatures simply confirm that the person admitted to his
obligation by requesting that the Shtar be written. Accordingly, when the
seller does not request that a Shtar be written, any testimony in the Shtar
is not valid because of the rule of "mi'Pihem v'Lo mi'Pi Kesavam."
The Gemara later (171a) allows witnesses to rewrite a Shtar that was lost
because the witnesses are able to testify that they were asked by the seller
(or giver) to sign on a Shtar. In our case, in which the giver tells the
witnesses not to sign on a Shtar, their signatures on the Shtar are not
valid testimony.
TOSFOS (39b, DH Macha'ah) presents the same approach to explaining the
validity of a Shtar. Why, then, does Tosfos here allow a Shtar to be written
without the consent of the seller, if the seller suffers no harm from it?
Perhaps it is because in the case in our Gemara, the seller allowed the
Shtar to be written at the time that the buyer acquired the field. The
Gemara (40a) tells us that a Kinyan made in front of witnesses is meant to
be written down in a Shtar ("Stam Kinyan l'Kesivah Omed"), and the giver
does not need to request from witnesses to write it down, as the Rashbam
here cites. Because the Kinyan was already made with the seller's permission
to commit it to writing, the seller may no longer retract his permission.
Although the Rashbam disagrees with this and writes that a Kinyan includes
only *implied* consent, but if the seller later specifies that he does not
consent to having a Shtar written he may retract his original implied
consent, the RAMBAN (in Kidushin 27a) argues and writes that the Gemara
means to say more than this. The Gemara means to say that a Kinyan gives the
buyer permission to write the Shtar, and the seller cannot change his mind
once the Kinyan was already made. That is why Tosfos maintains that in the
case of our Gemara, it would have been permitted to write the Shtar even
after the seller retracts his consent if not for the fact that the Shtar
could harm the seller, and therefore the Kinyan -- from the start -- was not
meant to be committed to writing.