V’kol ha’am yishme’u v’yira’u v’lo yezidun od (17:13)

            When a person is convicted of a capital crime, the execution is carried out in a public manner. Rashi writes that the Sanhedrin waited to carry out the execution until the next Yom Tov, when people would travel to Yerushalayim to fulfill the mitzvah of aliyah l’regel (ascending to the Temple), so that everybody would hear and talk about it. This was to inspire maximum fear in the populace in the hopes that future executions would become unnecessary.

However, the Mishnah in Makkos (7a) quotes the opinion of Rav Elozar ben Azaria, who maintains that a Sanhedrin which carries out one execution in 70 years is considered violent and bloody. If executions were so infrequent, how were they able to accomplish the desired deterrent effect?

Rav Aharon Bakst answers that this question may be asked only by one who has become accustomed and desensitized to the loss of human life. In the times of the Beis HaMikdash, the Jewish nation understood and appreciated the value of every person and every life to the extent that one public execution in 70 years caused such a national trauma that another one became superfluous for at least that long. If we appreciated life with the proper perspective, we would be so shaken up by events like the Holocaust and recent tragedies in Israel that they would remain in our collective memory forever, inspiring us to proper repentance and rendering future reminders unnecessary.

V’zeh devar harotzeach asher yanus shamah v’chai asher yakeh es re’eihu bivli da’as v’hu lo sonei lo mitmol shilshom (19:4)

            The Torah requires a person who accidentally kills another Jew to flee to one of the cities of refuge. In order to be protected from the deceased’s relative and blood-avenger, he must remain there until the death of the Kohen Gadol, at which point he is permitted to return to his community and family. The Meshech Chochmah derives from a verse in Parshas Chukas (20:29) that although this law was applicable during the 40-year sojourn of the Jews in the wilderness, with the accidental killer required to dwell in the camp of the Levites (Rashi Shemos 21:13), an accidental killing never actually occurred during this entire period.

The Torah relates that upon the death of Aharon, every member of the Jewish nation cried and mourned his death. Rashi explains that this was due to his tremendous efforts to make peace between quarreling parties. The Meshech Chochmah notes, however, that had there been even a single accidental murderer during this period, he wouldn’t have cried at the death of Aharon – the Kohen Gadol – but rather would have rejoiced at the event which secured his freedom.

However, the Matamei Yaakov questions this proof. It is entirely possible that there was an accidental killer who was exiled to the Levite camp but who died prior to the death of Aharon, which occurred during the last year of their 40-year sojourn in the wilderness. As such, the fact that at the time of Aharon’s death every living Jew mourned his passing doesn’t constitute an absolute indication that there were no accidental killings during this period.

V’zeh devar harotzeach asher yanus shamah v’chai asher yakeh es re’eihu bivli da’as v’hu lo sonei lo mitmol shilshom (19:4)

The Torah requires a person who accidentally kills another Jew to flee to one of the cities of refuge. In order to be protected from the deceased’s blood-avenger, he must remain there until the death of the Kohen Gadol, at which point he is permitted to return to his community and family. If the king accidentally kills another person, must he flee to a city of refuge?

The Radvaz rules (2:772) that the king needn’t flee in such a case. He bases his opinion on the ruling of the Rambam (Hilchos Rotzeach 7:1) that if a teacher is required to flee to a city of refuge, his yeshiva must come with him so that he may continue teaching them. Similarly, based on the idea that the entire power of a king comes from the people over whom he rules, if a king would be obligated to flee to a city of refuge, the entire nation would be required to relocate and follow him there. Because this would be logistically impossible, it must be that in such a case, the king would be exempt from having to flee.

V’atah t’vaer ha’dam ha’naki mikirbecha (21:9)

If a murdered body is found in a field, the Torah requires the elders of the nearest city to perform a ritual known as eglah arufah (the axed heifer), in which they slaughter a cow in a valley with an axe to atone for the innocent blood which was shed. How does this procedure help rectify the fact that an innocent Jew was murdered?

The Targum Yonason ben Uziel writes that after the elders properly perform this ritual, a large swarm of insects miraculously emerges from the belly-button of the dead cow and flies straight to the house of the murderer of the unidentified corpse. At this point, the Sanhedrin is able to judge him for committing this atrocity.

Rav Menachem Recanati suggests an interesting hint to this concept by noting that the last letters of the words in our verse – which speaks of removing the innocent blood from your midst – spell the word “rimah” (insect). Additionally, the Seichel Tov notes that “ha’agalah” (the cow) has the same numerical value as “ha’toleah ba” – the bug will come.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how the Sanhedrin is permitted to punish a person based solely on the miraculous actions of the insects in the absence of the two required witnesses to the murder. However, this would be resolved according to the version of the Paneiach Raza, who writes that the bugs themselves attack the murderer and put him to death.

Parsha Points to Ponder (and sources which discuss them):

1)     When the Jewish people asked Shmuel HaNavi to appoint for them a king, he viewed the request as inappropriate and it bothered him greatly (Shmuel 1 8:6). If the Jewish people aren’t supposed to be ruled by a king, why does the Torah make provisions for appointing one (17:14-15), and if it was a legitimate request, why was Shmuel so upset? (Rambam Hilchos Sanhedrin 1:2, Abarbanel, Derashos HaRan 11, Meiri Horayos 11b, Ohr HaChaim HaKadosh Kli Yakar, Malbim)

2)     One who kills accidentally is required to flee to one of the cities of refuge and to remain there until the death of the Kohen Gadol (19:4-5). If he himself then proceeds to kill the Kohen Gadol, does this death free him and permit him to leave the city of refuge? (Minchas Chinuch 410, Parshas Derochim Derush 13)

3)     A close relative of one who is killed accidentally serves as the redeemer of his blood (19:6) and is permitted to kill the unintentional murderer if he finds him outside of one of the cities of refuge. If a person is stricken accidentally in a manner which will cause him to die, is he permitted to serve as the redeemer of his own blood and put the killer to death before he himself dies? (Gilyonei HaShas Makkos 11b)

4)     In the event that a set of witnesses is found to be false through the testimony of a second set of witnesses who claim that the first set were in a different location at the time of the alleged incident, the court punishes the first set by inflicting upon them whatever punishment they would have brought on the defendant through their testimony (19:19). Why is the testimony of the second set of witnesses arbitrarily believed more than that of the first set? (Rabbeinu Bechaye)