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Zevachim, 114

1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A "MUKTZAH" AND A "NE'EVAD"

QUESTIONS: The Mishnah (112a) derives from the words, "v'El Pesach Ohel Mo'ed Lo Hevi'u" (Vayikra 17:4) that any type of animal that is not fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed as a Korban is not subject to the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, offering it outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Mishnah then lists various other types of animals, including a Rove'a, Nirva, Muktzah (an animal set aside for Avodah Zarah), and a Ne'evad (an animal worshipped as Avodah Zarah), and says that these animals are also exempt from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, as we learn from the words, "Lifnei Mishkan Hashem" in the same verse. These words teach that any type of animal that is not fit to be brought into the Mishkan is not included in the prohibition.

The Gemara asks the obvious question: why do we need two sources for this law? We should learn from the first phrase in the verse, that excludes from the prohibition anything that cannot be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed, that Rove'a, Nirva, Muktzah, Ne'evad, and the others listed in the Mishnah are excluded from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz!

The Gemara answers that Rove'a and Nirva cannot be derived from the first phrase in the verse, because they could have been designated as Korbanos *before* they became a Rove'a and Nirva, and thus they *were* fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed. Therefore, we need an additional verse to exclude them. However, an animal that was Muktzah and an animal that was Ne'evad could not have been fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed before they became Muktzah and Ne'evad. They must have been used for Avodah Zarah *before* they were designated as Korbanos, because if they were designated as Korbanos first, then the status of Muktzah and Ne'evad could not take effect. There is a rule that a person cannot forbid (in our case, by using the item for Avodah Zarah) something that does not belong to him, and an animal that has been sanctified to be a Korban belongs to Hekdesh and not to any person. Why, then, are these types of animals not excluded from the first verse of "v'El Pesach Ohel Mo'ed?"

The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is referring to Kodshim Kalim, according to the opinion of Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili. Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili says that even after an item is designated as Kodshim Kalim, it is still considered to be the property of the owner. Therefore, the owner is able to cause his animal to become prohibited as a Muktzah or Ne'evad even though it has been designated as a Korban already (and was fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed). That is why the second verse is necessary to exclude a Muktzah and Ne'evad from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz.

Based on this Gemara, the LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Isurei Mizbe'ach 4:5) has difficulty with the ruling of the RAMBAM. The Rambam rules that an animal that has been sanctified as a Korban cannot become prohibited as a Muktzah, because a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him. However, in the very next Halachah, the Rambam writes that an animal that has been sanctified as a Korban, whether it is one's own animal or the animal of someone else, *can* become prohibited as a Ne'evad! Why can a Korban become prohibited as a Ne'evad, if it does not belong to the person? What is the difference between a Muktzah and a Ne'evad?

ANSWER: The MAHARI KURKAS explains that the Rambam's source is the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (54a). The Gemara there quotes Rebbi Yochanan who says that even though one normally cannot prohibit the animal of his friend, he *can* prohibit it if he performs an act of Avodah Zarah with the animal itself. The Gemara gives as an example one who pours wine between the animal's horns as an offering to the animal, making the animal a Ne'evad (see RAMBAN there, and Insights to Avodah Zarah 54:1). This forbids the animal to be used as a Korban even if the animal belongs to someone else. This is the case that the Rambam is discussing. This also appears to be the RA'AVAD's understanding of the Rambam.

However, this is still unclear. If the Rambam is referring to an action that was done to the animal itself, then why does he not discuss such a case with regard to Muktzah as well?

1. The Mahari Kurkas cites a Tosefta in Temurah (4:1) that states the same Halachos that the Rambam records. The Tosefta there presumably understands both cases, that of Muktzah and that of Ne'evad, to be referring to the same type of situation. It seems that the very point of the Tosefta is that an animal of Kodshim can never become Muktzah, even if an action was done to it.

2. The KIRYAS SEFER suggests that there is a difference between Muktzah and Ne'evad. An animal that is Muktzah has no action done to it to designate it for Avodah Zarah until it reaches the idolatrous priests who are going to sacrifice it. An animal that is Ne'evad, on the other hand, usually does have an action done to it to worship it as Avodah Zarah before it reaches the idolaters (see Lechem Mishneh, who proves that the Rambam holds that this is the typical case of Ne'evad). Therefore, the Rambam rules that in the case of a Ne'evad, one can make the animal prohibited even though it does not belong to him, since one usually does some action of idolatry to the animal. (Y. Montrose)

114b

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one who is "Mechusar Zeman" who offers his Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is not Chayav for Shechutei Chutz, since his Korban is not fit to be offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash while he is a Mechusar Zeman. The Gemara here quotes Rav Chilkiyah bar Tovi who says that the exemption of a Mechusar Zeman from the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz applies only when he offers his Korban with proper intention (Lishmah). If, however, he offers his Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash with intention that it should be a different Korban (she'Lo Lishmah), then he does transgress the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz. This is because a Korban that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is a valid Korban, although it does not fulfill the owner's obligation to bring a Korban. The Korban that the Mechusar Zeman slaughters she'Lo Lishmah, therefore, could be offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash, and therefore he transgresses the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz when he offers it outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

RASHI (DH Rav Chilkiyah) explains that Rav Chilkiyah's distinction applies only to an Asham, but not to a Chatas. A Chatas that was slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah, with intention that it is a different Korban, is Pasul, as we learned in the beginning of Zevachim (2a). We know that one violates the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz only when one offers a Korban which could have been brought on the Mizbe'ach in the Beis ha'Mikdash. A Chatas that was slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah cannot be offered on the Mizbe'ach, and thus Rav Chilkiyah cannot be referring to a Chatas, but only to the Asham of a Mechusar Zeman.

The YAD BINYAMIN is perplexed by the words of Rashi. The Mishnah earlier (84a) states that any Korban that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" is subject to the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz. (See TOSFOS to 68b, DH Amar Rav, and Insights there for different opinions regarding what exactly constitutes "Pesulo b'Kodesh." Generally, "Pesulo b'Kodesh" refers to a Korban that became Pasul due to a problem that arose during the Avodah of the Korban, and not due to a pre-existing Pesul.) Hence, a Chatas that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah should also be included in the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz! Moreover, the Beraisa there (84a) explicitly includes a Chatas that was slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah in its list of Korbanos that are subject to the Isur of Shechutei Chutz! How, then, can Rashi say that this Chatas is not subject to the Isur of Shechutei Chutz?

ANSWER: The YAD BINYAMIN answers this question based on a principle that TOSFOS earlier (59b, DH Ad she'Lo Nivneh) teaches. Tosfos explains that when the Mishnah says that things which are "Pesulo b'Kodesh" are included in the Isur of Shechutei Chutz, it means that only actions that are part of the Korban's function of attaining atonement for its owner are subject to the Isur of Shechutei Chutz. The logic behind this is that something that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" is not removed from the Mizbe'ach if it is inadvertently placed upon it, since it retains some Kedushah of a proper Korban. This logic, however, applies only to Avodos that are linked to the atonement of the Korban, such as include Zerikah and Ha'alah, since these actions are done on the Mizbe'ach. In contrast, Shechitah is not an act that is done for atonement or done with the Mizbe'ach in any way. This means that one is Chayav for doing an Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash with an item that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" when he does any Avodah besides Shechitah. Accordingly, the Beraisa (84a) that explicitly states that a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is subject to the Isur of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz means that one transgresses the Isur only when he does Zerikah and Ha'alah, but not Shechitah, outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

This is why Rashi says that Rav Chilkiyah cannot be referring to a Chatas. Rav Chilkiyah is discussing *slaughtering* a Korban with intention that it is a different Korban, and transgressing the Isur of *Shechutei* Chutz. The Korbanos of a Mechusar Zeman are "Pesulo b'Kodesh," and thus the slaughtering of such a Chatas outside the Beis ha'Mikdash would not make one Chayav for Shechutei Chutz. (Y. Montrose)