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Zevachim, 107

1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SLAUGHTERING A KORBAN, AND OFFERING ITS LIMBS, OUTSIDE THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH

OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the ways in which one transgresses the Isur of slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, and the Isur of offering the limbs of a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Is there a difference between the two Isurim?

(a) The MINCHAS AVRAHAM explains that there is a fundamental difference between the two Isurim, which is evident in our Gemara. Our Gemara says that Rebbi Akiva maintains that slaughtering a bird-offering outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in this prohibition (a bird-offering must be killed with Melikah inside of the Beis ha'Mikdash). The BRISKER RAV writes that the opinion of Rebbi Akiva implies a fundamental difference between the Isur of slaughtering and the Isur of offering limbs. The Torah prohibits the offering of limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, because no Avodah may be done outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash in the manner in which it is done in the Beis ha'Mikdash. This is apparent from the Gemara later (115b), which excludes from the Isur offering anything that is not brought on the Mizbe'ach, such as the meat of a Korban which is supposed to be eaten. This is because the verse describes the meat which is subject to the Isur as an "Olah" (Vayikra 17:8), meaning that it must be something which is fit to be brought on the Mizbe'ach. However, the fact that it is forbidden to slaughter a bird outside the Beis ha'Mikdash demonstrates that the Isur against slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is not the same as performing Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, because a bird is *never* slaughtered in the Beis ha'Mikdash (rather, Melikah is done).

The KEHILOS YAKOV (#43) uses this logic to explain the position of the RA'AVAD (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:17). The Ra'avad discusses the Gemara later (111b) that states that one who slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash at night, and offers the limbs, transgresses both the Isur against slaughtering and the Isur against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Ra'avad understands that this Gemara is referring only to a case in which the person slaughtered the animal at night, and then offered the limbs during the day. If he would have offered the limbs at night, then he would not have transgressed the Isur against offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.

The reason for this difference is not clear. If it is prohibited to slaughter a Korban at night, but doing so outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash still constitutes the Isur of slaughtering outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, then offering limbs at night should also constitute a transgression when they are offered outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash! On the other hand, if offering the limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash does not constitute a transgression of the Isur, since limbs may not be offered at night, then slaughtering at night outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash should also not constitute a transgression of the Isur!

The Kehilos Yakov explains that according to the explanation of the Brisker Rav, the difference between the two acts -- slaughtering at night, and offering the limbs at night -- is evident. Slaughtering outside the Beis ha'Mikdash at night is a transgression because the act is forbidden, and not because one is performing an act of Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Hence, slaughtering at night is not an exception to this Isur. In contrast, offering limbs is forbidden because it is a form of Avodah that may be done only in the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since the Avodah that is done in the Beis ha'Mikdash is done only during the day, performing such an act *at night* outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash does not constitute a transgression of the Isur of performing an Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash!

(The Kehilos Yakov has additional difficulty with the words of the Ra'avad, because offering limbs in the Beis ha'Mikdash *was* done at night! Consequently, offering limbs at night outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash should certainly be a transgression! See also OR SAME'ACH.)

(b) The RASH MI'SHANTZ (in Toras Kohanim 10:10) presents two explanations for the prohibition of slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The two explanations seem to depend on whether or not the Isur of slaughtering is different than the Isur of offering limbs outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Toras Kohanim excludes a number of forms of Avodah, including Kabalas ha'Dam and Kemitzah, from the prohibition of performing Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. It derives these exceptions from the word, "Olah" (Vayikra 17:8), which implies that the prohibition includes only something which is called an Avodah and which is fit to be placed on the fire of the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara later (115b) similarly says that the prohibition includes things that are "concluding Avodah," or final Avodos in the process of offering a Korban. Kabalas ha'Dam is not a final Avodah. The Avodah is finalized with the Zerikas ha'Dam.

The Rash asks why Shechitah is included in the prohibition. We know that Shechitah is not considered an Avodah (see 14b), and yet the Torah explicitly states that it is forbidden to slaughter a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash! The Rash gives two answers. First, he says that Shechitah is considered a "finishing Avodah," since it removes the animal from the prohibition of "Ever Min ha'Chai." Second, he says that Shechitah is indeed an exception to the rule.

The Rash's second explanation is consistent with the aforementioned principle that slaughtering is fundamentally different than offering limbs. However, the first explanation of the Rash places the act of slaughtering into the same category as the act of offering limbs, calling them both "Avodos." (See also TORAS HA'KODESH 1:15:3). (Y. Montrose)

107b

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the exemption from punishment for one who performs Kabalas ha'Dam outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Such an act is not included in the prohibition against performing an Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara asks why would we have thought that a person is liable for such an act. The Gemara concludes that we would have derived through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering and offering limbs outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash that one is also Chayav for Kabalas ha'Dam, just as we would have learned that performing Zerikah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in the Isur. However, we find that the Torah explicitly states a verse that includes Zerikah in the prohibition (exactly *which* verse includes Zerikah is the subject of a Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael on 107a). The fact that the Torah specifically includes Zerikah, and does not rely on deriving it through a Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering and offering limbs, shows us that only the specific acts that the Torah explicitly mentions are included in the prohibition. Since the Torah does not explicitly mention Kabalas ha'Dam, it is not included in the prohibition.

TOSFOS (DH l'Hachi) has difficulty with the Gemara's conclusion. Why does the Gemara accept that we would have included Kabalah in the prohibition based on a Tzad ha'Shaveh if not for the Torah's explicit inclusion of Zerikah in the prohibition? The Gemara later (115b) quotes a Beraisa that derives from the verse, "Asher Ya'aleh Olah O Zavach" -- "... who offers an Olah or a Korban" (Vayikra 17:8), that only "concluding Avodos," the final Avodos in the process of offering a Korban, are included in this prohibition. The Beraisa explicitly excludes Kabalas ha'Dam from this verse, since it is not a "concluding Avodah," but rather it is a preliminary Avodah for the eventual Zerikah. Why does the Gemara here ignore the Beraisa and give a different reason for the exemption of Kabalas ha'Dam from the Isur of performing an Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash

ANSWERS:

(a) The TZON KODASHIM prefaces his explanation with a question on the beginning of the Gemara's discussion. What elicited the Gemara's question? The Gemara was originally discussing the argument between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael regarding the source for including Zerikah in the prohibition to perform Avodah outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Why does the Gemara suddenly ask about the source for the exemption of Kabalas ha'Dam in the middle of its discussion about the source for including Zerikah?

The Tzon Kodashim explains that the answer to this question is that once the Gemara establishes that Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael each include Zerikah in the prohibition from a different verse, we see that they do not agree with the teaching of the Beraisa (115b) that only "concluding Avodos" are included in the prohibition. If they would agree with that teaching, then they would not need a separate verse to include Zerikah, since Zerikah is a concluding Avodah and thus would be included in the prohibition without an explicit verse. Once the Gemara sees that they cite other verses and do not agree with the Beraisa's Derashah, the Gemara now inquires as to their source that Kabalas ha'Dam is not included in the prohibition.

This also answers the question of Tosfos and explains why the Gemara here ignores the Beraisa later and gives a different source to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition of performing Avodos outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

(b) The PANIM ME'IROS answers as follows. The Gemara here records an argument between Rebbi Avahu and Abaye. We see that Rebbi Avahu and Abaye differ with regard to the logic for why Zerikah is included in the prohibition. Rebbi Avahu says that according to Rebbi Akiva, slaughtering the Korban and performing Zerikas ha'Dam outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash count as two different prohibitions. Abaye says that they are both included under the prohibition against slaughtering outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

We said that the fact that the Torah states a verse which explicitly includes Zerikah, instead of relying on the Tzad ha'Shaveh from slaughtering and offering limbs, teaches us that only the specific Avodos that the Torah mentions are included in the prohibition (and thus Kabalas ha'Dam is not included). Rebbi Avahu does not agree with this logic. He maintains that Kabalas ha'Dam would still be included in the prohibition, and that the Torah explicitly mentions Zerikah in order to give it an additional, independent prohibition, in addition to the existing prohibition against slaughtering and offering limbs outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to Rebbi Avahu, the Gemara's reasoning to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the prohibition is not correct; the fact that the Torah explicitly mentions Zerikah only tells us that there is an additional prohibition for Zerikah, and it does not tell us to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the other, general prohibition. The Torah does not mention Kabalas ha'Dam by itself because it is not important enough to merit its own prohibition.

According to Rebbi Avahu, we need the reasoning of the Beraisa later in order to exclude Kabalas ha'Dam from the general prohibition against performing Avodos outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

The logic of the Gemara here is according to Abaye, who says that the Torah could have included Kabalas ha'Dam in the prohibition the same way it included Zerikah. From the fact that it mentions only Zerikah tells us that Kabalas ha'Dam is *not* to be included in the prohibition. According to Abaye, we know that Kabalah is not included from the fact that Zerikah is included. (A similar answer is proposed by the SEFAS EMES.) (Y. Montrose)