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Zevachim, 29

1) THE DEFINITION OF A "MAKOM MESHULASH"

OPINIONS: Rav Papa asks what law Rava derives from the word, "Shelishi" (Vayikra 19:7) in the "short" verse discussing Nosar and Pigul. The Gemara answers that Rava learns from this word the requirement of "Makom Meshulash" -- "the place must be valid for three things: blood, flesh, and limbs." To what law does this "Makom Meshulash" refer?

(a) RASHI (DH she'Yehei Meshulash, DH b'Dam) explains that "Makom Meshulash" is a requirement in the laws of an invalidating thought of Chutz l'Mekomo. A thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is effective only if one thinks about eating the Korban in a place which -- during the times when Bamos were permitted -- was fit for performing the Zerikah of the Dam, eating the meat of the Korban, and burning the limbs of the Korban (see Insights to 14:2 regarding the laws of Chutz l'Mekomo in the case of a Bamah). This excludes the Heichal, since the Heichal is not a place where the limbs of Korbanos were burned or the meat of Korbanos was eaten. One who slaughters the Korban with intention to eat the meat in the Heichal has not had a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo and the Korban is not Pasul.

TOSFOS (DH l'Makom) asks a number of questions on Rashi's explanation. The Gemara later (63a) explicitly states that if Nochri attackers surround the Azarah, making it inaccessible, the Kohanim may enter the Heichal and eat Kodshei Kodashim there. That Gemara clearly shows that the Heichal *is* a place that is fit for eating the meat of Korbanos, unlike Rashi's assertion.

In addition, how can Rashi explain that this Halachah applies strictly to Chutz l'Mekomo? The Gemara questions this teaching, asking why Rava does not learn this law from the earlier verse (Vayikra 7:18) which also states "Shelishi?" According to Rashi's explanation, the Gemara's question is not a question at all. The verse there (7:18) is discussing Chutz l'Zemano, and not Chutz l'Mekomo! (It seems that Rashi anticipated this question, and therefore explains (DH Teipuk) that the Gemara's question is that Chutz l'Mekomo is also mentioned in that verse. Tosfos apparently maintains that the mention of Chutz l'Mekomo in a verse that deals primarily with Chutz l'Zemano is not grounds for asking that we should learn from that verse a law which is relevant exclusively to Chutz l'Mekomo.)

(b) Tosfos (ibid.) quotes others who suggest a different explanation. Any thought -- a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo *and* a thought of Chutz l'Zemano -- can make a Korban Pasul only if it is relevant to the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon (and the thought itself occurs in the vicinity of the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon; see CHOK NASAN based on Tosfos 26b, DH Amar Shmuel), which is a place fit for all of these things: blood, meat, and limbs. This excludes the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, which is fit only for the sprinkling of blood. In such a place, a wrongful thought will not invalidate the Korban.

Tosfos challenges this explanation as well. We find in many places that a Korban offered in the Heichal, on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, can become Pasul because of a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo (see 13b, 42b). The verse of "Shelishi" cannot be teaching that the Korban is only Pasul -- but does not become Pigul -- with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano, in a place that is not fit for all three things, because the Gemara later (36a) clearly uses the requirement of "Makom Meshulash" as a reason to consider the Korban to be *valid*!

(c) Tosfos quotes a third explanation. "Makom Meshulash" means that the *person* who has the thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo must be standing in an area where all three things -- blood, meat, and limbs -- may be offered (see YAD BINYAMIN). This excludes a person who is standing outside the Azarah who slaughters (using a long knife) an animal that is standing inside the Azarah. His thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo is ineffective.

Why does this explanation not have the same problem as the previous explanation? According to this explanation as well, the Heichal should not be a place fit for a thought of Pigul, but this contradicts a number of Gemaras! Tosfos explains that this explanation is simply saying that these three things are Kosher if brought there, but not that their procedures are normally done there. Blood and limbs which are taken outside of the Azarah become Pasul. As we mentioned earlier, the Gemara (63a) says that meat of Korbanos technically may be eaten in the Heichal. There are also certain types of Korbanos which have their blood brought into the Heichal. Limbs of Korbanos do not become Pasul when brought into the Heichal. To summarize, all of these things remain Kosher in the Heichal, while blood and limbs become Pasul if they are brought out of the Azarah.

Tosfos, however, remains with a question on this explanation. The Gemara later (36a) says that according to Rebbi Yehudah, if an animal which was supposed to be brought to the Mizbe'ach ha'Chitzon was slaughtered with intent that its blood be placed on the Mizbe'ach ha'Penimi, then the Korban is valid. The reason given by the Gemara is that the Heichal is not a "Makom Meshulash." This contradicts this explanation cited by Tosfos, which seems to maintain that the Heichal *is* a "Makom Meshulash."

(d) RABEINU YOM TOV says that "Makom Meshulash" means that the thought invalidates the Korban only when it involves doing something in a place where blood, meat, and limbs are all *Pasul*. An example of such an invalidating thought would be a thought to perform the Zerikas ha'Dam of Kodshim Kalim outside of Yerushalayim. Even though one is not supposed to do the Zerikah outside the Azarah even inside Yerushalayim, having a thought to do the Zerikah there (outside the Azarah, but inside Yerushalayim) is not a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, because Yerushalayim is not a "Makom Meshulash." This is because one is allowed to eat the meat of Kodshim Kalim in Yerushalayim.

Tosfos questions this explanation as well. (In addition, according to Tosfos' understanding of Rabeinu Yom Tov, the second question that Tosfos asked on Rashi's explanation would apply to this explanation as well.)

(It must be noted that there are different versions of this explanation. The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#20) understands that this explanation also maintains that the law of "Makom Meshulash" applies to Chutz l'Zemano, unlike the simple reading of Tosfos. The KEREN ORAH concludes that the most preferable understanding of "Makom Meshulash" is a variation of this explanation.) (Y. Montrose)

29b

OPINIONS: The Gemara explains that Ben Azai understands that the verse, "v'Hayah Becha Chet" -- "It shall be a sin for you" (Devarim 23:22), is teaching that the Isur of Bal Te'acher, the prohibition of delaying the fulfillment of a vow, affects only the person who transgresses it, and it does not affect his wife. The Gemara asks that this should be obvious, and there should be no need for a verse to teach this. The Gemara answers that since Rebbi Eliezer says that a person's wife dies if people ask him for money and he does not have any (as he derives from a verse in Mishlei), we might have thought that a wife also dies from her husband's sin of Bal Te'acher. Therefore, we need the verse of "v'Hayah Becha Chet" to teach that a wife does not die because of her husband's violation of Bal Te'acher.

To what situation does Rebbi Eliezer refer when he says that a man's wife dies when he has no money to give to those who ask?

(a) RASHI (DH Mevakshin) says that Rebbi Eliezer is referring to one who stole money or other property. When the owner comes to claim his money, the thief has no money to pay back.

(b) TOSFOS (DH Ela) says that Rebbi Eliezer refers to a man who pledged to give a donation to charity and failed to fulfill his pledge. Rebbi Eliezer's statement is consistent with the Gemara in Shabbos (32b) which says that a man's wife dies as a result of his violation of his vows. This seems problematic, though, because Rebbi Eliezer is saying that a woman dies as a result of her husband's failure to uphold his vows, while Ben Azai is saying that a woman does *not* die as a result of her husband's failure to uphold his vows! The answer, as Tosfos points out, is simply that Ben Azai is referring to a sin of Bal Te'acher; the man delayed, but eventually fulfilled, his Neder. Ben Azai's teaching complements Rebbi Eliezer's; he is saying that Rebbi Eliezer's statement applies only when the man does not pay at all, but not when he is late in paying. (See MARGOLIYOS HA'YAM, Sanhedrin 22a, #20.)

According to the explanations of both Rashi and Tosfos, this Gemara needs clarification. Why should a woman die because of her husband's sin?

RAV CHAIM SHMUELEVITZ zt'l in SICHOS MUSAR (5732, #32, and 5733, #1) explains that the woman is punished only when *she also* has sins for which she deserves to die. Why, then, is her punishment related to her husband?

We know that Hashem does not punish an individual if the punishment will significantly affect those who are close to him when those others are not deserving of such punishment. In the case of our Gemara, Hashem would not punish the man by making his wife die as punishment for her sins unless he was also guilty of a severe sin. Rebbi Eliezer is saying that we see from the verse in Mishlei that this sin -- of violating one's vow -- is enough to make a man deserve the suffering of his wife's demise.

Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz continues to explain why the punishment is fitting in this case. He explains that there never really exists a situation in which a person "does not have the money to pay." When a person recognizes his debt, he will always find a way to pay. If he does not acknowledge his debt, then it is a sign that he does not feel that he is a "Ba'al Chov" -- one who is indebted. The punishment for this is that his wife is then punished for her sins and he has to suffer the consequences. This is because the most important person to whom a person is indebted is his wife, because it is she who constantly and ceaselessly stands by his side, serving as his devoted helpmate in life. A man who demonstrates a lack of a sense of indebtedness to others who help him in his business affairs is also most likely to be lacking Hakaras ha'Tov towards his wife as well. Hashem therefore does not prevent his wife from being punished and taken away from him.

(c) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES suggests another explanation. He says that Rebbi Eliezer is discussing a man who owes money, who tells his creditors that he cannot pay them back with the property that he has, because the property is already a lien towards the payment of his wife's Kesuvah. The man's wife supports his claim, and for her involvement in preventing the creditors to collect what they are entitled to collect, she is punished. (See also BEN YEHOYADA in Sanhedrin 22a, and Insights to Rosh Hashanah 6:1.) (Y. Montrose)