THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
Ask A Question about the Daf
Previous daf
Zevachim, 8
ZEVACHIM 8 - dedicated by Mrs. Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving
memory of her husband, Reb Yitzchok Yakov ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Irving
Grunberger helped many people quietly in an unassuming manner and is dearly
missed by all who knew him. His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan.
|
1) THE SOURCE THAT A "SHINUY KODESH" INVALIDATES A "KORBAN CHATAS"
QUESTION: The Gemara asks what the source in the Torah is for the law that
if a Kohen has in mind, during any of the various stages of offering a
Korban Chatas, intent that the animal should be a different type of Korban,
the Chatas is Pasul and may not be offered at all. The Gemara says that the
source that such intent -- during the Shechitah of the animal -- invalidates
the Chatas is the verse, "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" -- "he shall slaughter it
for a Chatas" (Vayikra 4:33), which teaches that it is a valid Chatas only
when it was slaughtered with the intent that it should be a Chatas.
Similarly, the next verse, "The Kohen will take from the blood of the
Chatas" (4:34), teaches that the Kabalas ha'Dam must be done with intent
that the Korban is a Chatas, and it is Pasul if the Kohen has intent that it
be any other Korban. The same law applies to the Zerikas ha'Dam, as we learn
from the verse, "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen me'Chataso" -- "the Kohen will
provide atonement for him for his sin" (Vayikra 5:6). We see that all of the
stages of the Avodah must be done only with intent for a Chatas. All of the
Derashos seem to be based on the fact that the verse emphasizes that the
Korban must be offered for the sake of a Chatas and not with any other
Korban in mind.
The two verses that the Gemara quotes to teach that the wrong intent during
Shechitah or during Kabalah invalidates the Chatas are written with regard
to a normal Korban Chatas. However, the verse that the Gemara quotes that
discusses the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Chatas is written with regard to a Korban
Oleh v'Yored, which is not the normal type of Korban Chatas. Why does the
Gemara cite a verse about Zerikah which is written with regard to an unusual
form of Korban Chatas, when the same verse is written with regard to the
normal Korban Chatas? The verse says, "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen Al Chataso
Asher Chata" -- "The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin which
he transgressed" (4:35)! (TOSFOS DH Zerikah)
ANSWERS:
(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the verse written with regard to the
normal Korban Chatas (4:35) is not referring to the Zerikas ha'Dam of the
Korban Chatas, but rather it is referring to the Kohen who provides
atonement for the sinner "for his sin (Chataso) which he transgressed (Asher
Chata)." TOSFOS adds that, similarly, when the Torah says that the "Kohen
will provide atonement for him from his sin (me'Chataso)" with regard to the
Nasi's Korban (Vayikra 4:26), it is not referring to the Korban Chatas
itself, but rather to the actual sin that was transgressed, as is indicated
by the words "v'Nislach Lo" -- "and it will be forgiven for him." Only in
the verse of the Korban Oleh v'Yored is it written, "The Kohen will provide
atonement for him for his sin (me'Chataso)," without any other modifier to
imply that this "Chatas" is referring to the sin and not the Korban.
Therefore, it is from this verse that we learn that the Zerikas ha'Dam must
not be done with intent for any other Korban other than a Chatas.
(b) TOSFOS, in his first answer, explains that the context of the verse
written with regard to the normal Chatas (4:35) shows that it is not
discussing the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Chatas. The Torah there states that the
Kohen is to put the blood on the Mizbe'ach, and then it states that the fats
must be burned on the Mizbe'ach. Only afterwards does the verse say that the
Kohen will provide atonement for him. Even though atonement is usually
accomplished at the moment of Zerikas ha'Dam, it is not clear that this
verse is referring to Zerikah, because it is separated from the earlier
verse which discusses the Zerikah of a normal Chatas. Therefore, the
Derashah instead is derived from the verse regarding the Oleh v'Yored, which
is clearly referring to Zerikah.
Tosfos has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara later (8b) asks that
now that we have learned that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas for an
ordinary Chatas, from where do we learn that the same applies for an Oleh
v'Yored. What is the Gemara's question? The verse from which the Gemara
derived that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas is written with regard
to the Oleh v'Yored!
Tosfos answers that the Gemara later means to say as follows. The Gemara
earlier (7b) teaches, regarding a Korban Shelamim, that there is no reason
to differentiate between Shechitah and the other Avodos with regard to the
requirement to perform them with proper intent. Similarly, for an ordinary
Chatas, all that is necessary is a verse teaching that the *Shechitah* must
be done l'Shem Chatas and not for the sake of any other Korban, and then we
would know that all of the other Avodos also have this requirement. In
contrast, in the case of a Korban Oleh v'Yored, the only verse that implies
that it must be l'Shem Chatas is the verse regarding Zerikah. The law of
Zerikah cannot teach us anything about the other Avodos, since the Zerikah
is the main part of the atonement and thus what applies to it might not
apply to the other Avodos! Therefore, we still need other sources to teach
that the other Avodos of an Oleh v'Yored cannot be preformed with another
Korban in mind.
(c) The KEREN ORAH has difficulty with the approach of Tosfos. He suggests
instead that the correct text of the Gemara should read that the verse from
which we derive the law of Zerikah *is* the verse of an ordinary Chatas.
Accordingly, the Gemara later (8b) is certainly justified in asking for the
source that the Zerikah of an Oleh v'Yored must be done with the proper
intent. (Y. Montrose)
8b
2) A "KORBAN PESACH" SLAUGHTERED WITH INTENT TO BE ANY OTHER "KORBAN"
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach
that was slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban
Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intention that it should
serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage says that this law can be
derived from the verse, "If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hashem, is
from the flock..." (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of "Kelal u'Ferat
u'Chelal," the words "l'Zevach" and "la'Hashem" are general terms, and the
word "Shelamim" is a specific term. Accordingly, we learn that just as a
Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it
is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of
Korban, with the except of one; the only time it should not be valid is when
it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it
be a Korban Pesach.
The Gemara asks that if we are learning a law from the "Perat," then we
should learn only that if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban
which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is
slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered
voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word "l'Zevach" is a "Ribuy"
(inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?
ANSWERS:
(a) RASHI (DH Ela) explains that the Gemara, in its answer, is giving an
entirely different approach which has nothing to do with "is starting an
entirely new train of thought, which has nothing to do with "Kelal u'Ferat
u'Chelal." The Gemara retracts the application of "Kelal u'Ferat" here,
because it determines that the word "l'Zevach" is not a "Kelal" (a general
term) but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive word). A "Kelal" in this context
would be the word "Behemah," for example, which would include all animals.
The word "Zevach," however, is not only a general term, but it is also
apparently unnecessary, since it is connected to the next word of
"Shelamim." Hence, the Gemara decides to derive the law through a "Ribuy"
instead of through the principle of "Kelal u'Ferat."
(There are three different opinions regarding the correct Girsa of Rashi's
words in explaining what "l'Zevach Shelamim" means. Our text in Rashi is
that of the TZON KODASHIM. See other texts of Rashi in the SHITAH MEKUBETZES
and CHOK NASAN quoting the PANIM ME'IROS.)
The verse could have said merely "l'Shelamim." Since the word "l'Zevach" is
extra and therefore inclusive, we cannot use it to derive a "Kelal u'Ferat
u'Chelal." The Gemara is explaining that we do not use "Kelal u'Ferat
u'Chelal" here, but instead we derive from the extra word "l'Zevach" that
regardless of the what Korban it was slaughtered for, it will remain a valid
Korban.
The Shitah Mekubetzes (in Hashmatos) says that Rashi does not mean that a
word used in a "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal" cannot be inclusive. Rather, Rashi
means that in this verse, there are two consecutive words that are both
inclusive. The verse states, "v'Im Min ha'Tzon Korban, l'Zevach Shelamim
la'Hashem" -- both the word "Korbano" and the word "l'Zevach" are general
terms. Two consecutive general terms in a verse teaches us that anything is
considered valid. In this context, this means that a Pesach brought in the
name of any Korban is valid, including a Chatas and an Asham as well.
The Shitah Mekubetzes has difficulty with his explanation of Rashi. If
everything is learned from the words "Korbano l'Zevach," then how can the
Gemara immediately ask that this Korban Pesach should acquire the Halachos
of whatever Korban for which it was intended? This certainly cannot be the
case, because the word "Shelamim" in the verse tells us that the Pesach
should have the Halachos of a Shelamim!
(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes concludes that the correct explanation is that of
TOSFOS (DH Ela). Tosfos explains that the word "l'Zevach" is not a Kelal (a
general term), but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive term). There is a similar
principle, known as "Ribah u'Mi'et v'Ribah," when there are two inclusive
terms and one exclusive term. This principle tells us to include everything
possible besides one thing, regardless of whether or not all of the things
being included are similar to the exclusive word or not. Now that the Gemara
tells us to learn the verse as teaching a "Ribuy" from the word "l'Zevach,"
the question that Chatas and Asham are not similar is no longer a problem,
since they do not have to be similar. The only thing that the verse excludes
is a Korban Pesach slaughtered on any day other than Erev Pesach in the name
of a Pesach, which is indeed unfit. (Y. Montrose)
Next daf
|