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1)

(a) They found a Get in Sura on which there was written 'I, Anan bar Chiya the Neherdean divorced my wife', and there was nobody else with that name from Sura to Neherda'a, except for Anan bar Chiya from Chigra. Witnesses testified however - that Anan bar Chiya from Chigra was with them in Neherda'a.

(b) Abaye said that even *he* would concede that, in this case, the Get would be Kasher - since they *had* searched, and the only other person with the name Anan bar Chiya was now known to have been in Neherda'a at the time when the Get was written in Sura.

(c) Rava, on the other hand said that - even he would concede that, in this case, the Get would not be Kasher, since they now knew that there *was* another Anan bar Chiya.

(d) Rava contends with the possibility that he may have flown from Neherda'a to Sura on a flying camel, or that he may have jumped from Neherda'a to Sura - by uttering one of Hashem's Name.

(a) Alternatively, 'he may have handed him words' - meaning that he may have instructed the Sofrim in Neherda'a to write the Get in Sura when they got there.

(b) Rav and Rav Huna used to tell the Sofrim, that when they were in Shili - they should describe the divorce as having taking place in Shili, even though, they received their instructions in Hini, and vice-versa?

(c) Regarding the case with the sesame-seeds, Rav Yeimar does not contend with the contents of the box having been changed, Ravina does. The Halachah - is like Ravina (in which case Shimon was Patur - like Rava ruled earlier).

(a) We refute Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who explains the quarrel between the husband and wife in our Mishnah as being when she asks him for a divorce - on the grounds that all women say that (and that it does not therefore constitute a quarrel).

(b) We therefore amend Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel. What he really said was - that she claimed that her husband had divorced her (and he denied it).

(c) Rav Hamnuna rules that if a woman claims that her husband divorced her, she is believed - because she would not have the Chutzpah to make such a claim if it was not true.

(d) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who just explained the quarrel in our Mishnah regarding this very point (and it is clear there that she is not believed) - he is speaking when the witnesses before whom she claims her husband divorced her, deny it.

(a) According to Rav Chanina, the reason that we do not believe the woman when they have been quarreling is because she will lie - according to Rav Shimi bar Ashi, it is because she testifies inaccurately.

(b) Rav Chanina means - that seeing as they quarreled, she hates him and will deliberately lie in order to become forbidden to him; whereas Rav Shimi bar Ashi means - that she will easily jump to the conclusion that he is dead, without verifying it.

(c) The difference between the two reasons - will be when it is *the husband* who initiated the quarrel. She will not lie, because, since it was not she who initiated it, she does not hate him as much as to lie; she will however, still be sufficiently put-off to testify that he is dead, even when she is not a hundred-per-cent sure.

5)

(a) We ask whether one witness is believed when the husband and wife quarreled. The She'eilah is - whether one witness is believed because he will not lie over something that is destined to become revealed (in which case, the fact that they quarreled *will not make a difference*); or whether it is because we rely on the extensive enquiries that the woman will make before remarrying, in which case, it *will*.

(b) The outcome of the She'eilah is - Teiku.

(c) Rebbi Yehudah permits a woman to marry by her own testimony only if she enters the Beis-Din weeping and with rent clothes. The Chachamim object to Rebbi Yehudah's explanation - on the grounds that, if that it so, a Shotah (a simple woman) will not be able to remarry, since, whereas a Pikachas will put on a show for the sake of Beis-Din (this is what *they* maintain) she will not be smart enough to do that. (Tosfos Yom-Tov).

(d) Despite the fact that, according to Rebbi Yehudah, one gauges whether a woman is telling the truth or not, by the way she enters Beis-Din, they nevertheless instructed that woman who was on her way to the Beis-Din of Rebbi Yehudah to put on the whole 'Spiel' - because they held like the Rabbanan, in whose opinion the whole thing is a 'Spiel' anyway.

(a) Beis Hillel initially restricted the concession of believing the woman that her husband died - to a woman who returned from the harvest, and only if her husband died in the country in which the Beis-Din is situated.

(b) Beis Shamai say that Chazal only mentioned those details - because the case that sparked off the Halachah happens to have occurred in those circumstances.

(c) The Halachah is like Beis Shamai in this particular case - because Beis Hillel themselves yielded to Beis Shamai.

(a) Beis Shamai try to prove to Beis Hillel that Chazal cannot have confined their concession to the same country - because if everything had to conform with the original circumstances, then the concession should also be restricted to harvesting a *wheat*-field. How did they know that it would apply even when she returned from harvesting barley, grapes, olives, dates or figs.

(b) Beis Hillel insist that they nevertheless did restrict the concession - because as long as the woman remains in the same country, she will be afraid to lie or to give inaccurate testimony (due to the fact that there are always people around who will testify the truth); whereas that is not the case from one country to another.

(c) Beis Shamai counter their argument however - on the grounds that there are regular caravans traveling from one country to another, so that, even there, she will be afraid to lie.

(d) The original story on which Chazal based their ruling (as related by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel) - took place at the end of the wheat-harvest, when ten men went to reap the wheat. After one of them was bitten by a snake and died, his wife came and informed Beis-Din, who sent a messenger to check on her testimony, which they found to be correct. That is when they declared that a woman is believed (to permit herself to marry or to perform Yibum).

(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa in Chagigah forbids carrying Mei Chatas or Eifer Chatas even by throwing them, or handing them across a stretch of water. The prohibition - extends to carrying them ...

1. ... riding on the back of his friend or of an animal.
2. ... on foot across a bridge.

(b) Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya says there - that Chazal confined the decree to the Jordan River and to transporting the Mei Chatas by boat.

(c) What happened there (as related by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel) - was that someone was transporting Mei Chatas and Eifer Chatas by boat across the Jordan River - when a k'Zayis of human corpse was found sticking to the floor of the boat.

(d) We try and establish ...

1. ... the Rabbanan - like Beis Shamai (who, in similar vein, extend the concession to all circumstances).
2. ... Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya - like Beis Hillel (who also restrict it to the circumstances in which the original episode took place).

1. ... the Rabbanan with Beis Hillel - by pointing out that Beis Hillel restrict the concession because, whereas in the same country she is afraid, from one country to another she is not (as we explained earlier), whereas in the case of the Mei Chatas, where there is no reason to differentiate between different kinds of transport or different rivers, even Beis Hillel will agree with the Rabbanan.
2. ... Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya with Beis Shamai - because there, we believe the woman on account of the S'vara that a woman makes extensive enquiries before remarrying (which applies equally if she came from a distant land as to when she came from the same country); whereas in the case of Mei Chatas, which they decreed because of the episode that took place, even Beis Shamai will agree with Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya.

(a) According to Beis Hillel, the woman may marry by her own testimony, but does not receive her Kesubah. Beis Shamai disagree with them on the basis of a 'Kal va'Chomer' - if she is believed to permit the stringent Isur of Eishes Ish, she should certainly be believed to extract her Kesubah from her husband's estate.

(b) Beis Hillel counter the 'Kal va'Chomer' - by pointing out that she is not believed to permit the brothers to inherit their father's property either (because it is only to permit her to remarry that Chazal believed her, but, as far as extracting money is concerned, two witnesses are required).

(c) Beis Shamai have the last word however, and here too, Beis Hillel yield to their opinion. They refer to the wording on a woman's Kesubah, where it specifically states that whenever a woman remarries, she received her Kesubah, and that incorporates our case.