Previous daf

1)

(a) Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna lost the keys of the Beis-ha'Medrash in the street.
When he came before Rebbi Pedas on Shabbos to ask for advice - he instructed him to bring children there to play, in the hope that they would find them and bring them home.

(b) We can extrapolate from Rebbi Pedas' ruling - that (he holds) 'Katan Ochel Neveilos, Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lahafrisho'.

(c) The Beraisa states 'Lo Yomar Adam le'Tinok Havei Li Miftei'ach, Havei Li Chosem, Ela Manicho Tolesh Manicho Zorek'. The basic difference between the Reisha of the Beraisa and the Seifa is - that in the Reisha, the child will be doing it for the sake of a grown-up (and the Torah writes in Yisro "Lo Sa'aseh Kol Melachah Atah, u'Vin'cha u'Vitecha'), whereas in the Seifa, he is doing it purely for his own benefit.

(d) There is no proof from the Seifa of the Beraisa for Rebbi Pedas - because it could be speaking about detaching from an pot without a hole, and throwing in a Karmelis (which are both only Asur mi'de'Rabbanan - whereas the Chidush of Rebbi Pedas is that we say 'Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' even by an Isur d'Oraysa.

(a) Rebbi Pedas establishes the Beraisa which demands that one tells a child to desist from extinguishing a fire on Shabbos - when the child wants to extinguish it on behalf of his father.

(b) Under the same circumstances, we permit a Nochri to extinguish the fire - because *he* does so for personal gain (because he expects some sort of reward for his services).

(c) One may not use the services of a Nochri to light a fire or to extinguish one - by asking him specifically to do so (without any mention of remuneration).

(a) There is no proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only permits a Chaver to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is an Am ha'Aretz) to eat, but which does not even require his father to confiscate fruit that he returns with from there (even though he knows that it may not be Ma'asered) - because Chazal are often very lenient by D'mai (and, in any event, we already explained above, that everyone agrees by de'Rabbanan's.

(b) Rebbi Yochanan is the one to establish this Beraisa by D'mai, whereas earlier, he permitted the child even to light a fire or to extinguish one, as long as he was doing it of his own accord - because he is himself uncertain whether 'Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' or 'Ein Metzuvin ... '. Consequently, whatever proof the Gemara brings, Rebbi Yochanan brings a counterproof.

(c) There is no proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only permits a Kohen Chaver to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is an Am ha'Aretz) to eat Terumah, but who does not even require his father to confiscate fruit that he returns with from there (even though his grandfather is not particular about guarding his Terumah against Tum'ah) - because the Tana is speaking about Terumah de'Rabbanan.

(d) We learn from the Pasuk "bi'She'arecha Tochle*nu*, ha'Tahor ve'ha'Tamei Yachdav ... " - that one is permitted to eat *Pesulei ha'Mukdashin* (Kodshim that became blemished and were redeemed) when they are Tamei, but not *Terumah* when it becomes Tamei.

(a) We refute the proof from the Beraisa which does not even demand us to stop a young child from drinking from a Nochris or from a non-Kasher animal - by establishing it by a case of life-danger.

(b) The Tana nevertheless forbids a Gadol to do likewise - because the need to drink milk constitutes life-danger for a small child but not for a grown-up.

(c) Even a Gadol will be permitted to drink from a non-Kasher animal - if a doctor assesses that it is crucial for him to do so. The difference between a Katan and a Gadol in this regard is - that a Katan does not require assessment, whereas a Gadol does.

(a) Aba Shaul testified that they used to drink from a Kasher animal on Yom-Tov - involving the Melachah of Mefarek (extracting), which, in turn, is a Toldah of Dash (threshing).

(b) They ...

1. ... permitted it on Yom-Tov - because drinking directly from the animal is k'le'Achar-Yad (an unusual way of performing the Melachah), for which one is not Chayav. Consequently, Yom-Tov, which is no more than a La'av, Chazal permitted it in order to alleviate pain?
2. ... did not however, permit it on Shabbos - because Shabbos involves a Chiyuv Kareis.

(c) What the following three Pesukim have in common - is that they all come to forbid a Gadol to encourage a Katan to transgress: "Lo Sochlum" (regarding the prohibition of eating insects); "Kol Nefesh Mikem Lo Sochal Dam"; "Emor ve'Amarta" (regarding the prohibition of Tum'as Kohanim).

(d) There is no proof from all these Pesukim that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos, Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' - because it speaks, not about telling the child to desist, but about the prohibition of feeding him the Isur.

6)

(a) Despite having taught us the prohibition of feeding a child ...

1. ... insects, the Torah nevertheless needs to repeat it regarding blood - which is more lenient in respect of Shiur (because the Shiur of the former is a Mashehu (the smallest amount), whereas the Shiur of the latter is a Revi'is (a quarter of a Lug).
2. ... blood, the Torah nevertheless needs to repeat it regarding insects - which is more lenient with respect of punishment (Malkos, as opposed to Kareis for drinking blood).

(b) Despite having taught us the prohibition of ...

1. ... feeding a child insects and blood, the Torah nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat the prohibition with regard to Tum'as Kohanim - which (unlike the former two) is not applicable to all sections of the community, whereas they are.
2. ... being Metamei a young Kohen, the Torah nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat it with regard to feeding a child insects and blood - because we would otherwise have thought that this is just another of the special Chumros pertaining to Kohanim.

(a) The principle 'Katan Ochel Neveilos, Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' applies to a Cheresh, too - seeing as, he, like a Katan, does not have Da'as.

(b) The Tana in the Mishnah (on 112b.) instructs the Cheresh Ba'al Pikachas to divorce his wife (because of the Zikah of her sister the Pikachas whose husband the Pikei'ach, died) - not because of the sin of the Cheresh, but because of that of the Pikachas.

(c) If a Pikei'ach Ba'al Pikachas dies, and his wife falls to the Yavam, a Cheresh who is married to her sister, a Chareshes - he must divorce his wife, and his Yevamah remains Asur to remarry forever.

(d) There is no proof from here that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos ... Beis-Din Metzuvin Lahafrisho' (a Kashya on Rebbi Pedas) - because the reason that the Cheresh is obligated to divorce his wife is due to a decree; we are afraid that (unless we instruct the Cheresh to divorce the Chareshes) people will assume their marriage to be valid in which case, it will push away the Zikah of her sister. Consequently, they will then go on to permit the Yevamah to get married, thinking that she is Achos Ishto.

8)

(a) A woman who returns from overseas and announces that her husband died, is permitted to marry (if she has children) or to perform Yibum (if she does not). She is believed - provided she is on good terms with her husband and that it is not a time of war.

(b) She is not believed if ...

1. ... it is a time of war - because then, due to the prevailing conditions, she testifies inaccurately; she will say, for example, that, since he did not return home for a long time, he must have been killed.
2. ... if they quareled - because then, she hates him, and will lie deliberately in order to become forbidden to him.

(c) Rebbi Yehudah is more stringent than the Tana Kama. According to him, she is believed only - if she comes into Beis-Din sobbing and with rent clothing.

(a) The Tana finds it necessary to tell us in the Reisha that there is peace between the husband and wife and that there is peace in the world - in order to balance with the Seifa, where he wants to tell us what the Din is when there is not.

(b) Rava explains that in time of war, the woman easily presumes her husband dead (as we explained in the Mishnah). In spite of the fact that she loves him, sometimes he may be pierced with an arrow or with a sword, and she is convinced that he cannot possible live.

(c) Initially, Rava thought that famine is not like war (and that the woman is believed) - until one day, when a woman came before him and testified that her husband had died of starvation. To test her, he told her that she was very smart to have run away and saved her own skin, because, in those few extra minutes he was unlikely to have survived. To which she expressed surprise that he knew so accurately what had happened (proving that, in time of famine, a woman *does* speak inaccurately - testifying without actually knowing that her husband has died).

(d) As a matter of fact, Rava went the whole circle, and declared famine to be even worse than war - because, in war, she is believed if she testifies that he died in his bed; whereas in time of famine, she is only believed if she testifies that he died and she buried him.

Next daf