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1) Our Mishnah rules that if a woman married through the testimony of one witness, and her husband returns, she is Patur from bringing a Korban - because, since she married though the ruling of Beis-Din, it is the Beis-Din who must bring a bull as a Chatas (and not her, whose Chatas would have been a she-lamb or a she-goat).

2)

(a) Ze'iri maintains that the Halachah is in fact, like Tani Bei Medrasha, who consider the ruling of Beis-Din a Ta'us (an error), and not a Hora'ah (a ruling). Tani Bei Medrasha says that if Beis-Din mistakenly ruled that it was already nightfall, following which the people broke Shabbos, and then the sun shone - this is not called a Hora'ah, but a Ta'us, and everyone must then bring their own Chatas.

(b) Rav Nachman maintains that the Halachah is indeed like the Tana of our Mishnah - because, throughout the Torah, one witness is not believed, whereas here he is, proving that it must be a Hora'ah (i.e. it is the Beis-Din whose ruling we are following, not the testimony of the witness).

(c) Rava, on the other hand, supports Ze'iri, who says that it is a Ta'us and not a Hora'ah - on the grounds that if Beis-Din would permit some form of Cheilev or blood, and then discover a sound reason to forbid it, would it become permitted if they subsequently found a weak reason to permit it again? Yet here, after two witnesses have disproved the first witness, and Beis-Din have forbidden the woman, they accept the testimony of a 'third' witness who testifies that her husband just died, which they would not be able to do if their initial ruling had been considered a Hora'ah.

(d) Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa says 'Yikov ha'Din es ha'Har ve'Tavi Chatas Sh'meinah'. This must be because he holds 'Ta'us' (like Ze'iri) and not because he holds like those who say that a Yachid (as opposed to a community) who followed the instructions of the Beis-Din is *always* Chayav to bring his own Korban Chatas - because then he would not have said 'Yikov ha'Din es ha'Har', which implies that had we not gone carefully into the matter, we would have exempted her from the Chatas.

(a) According to Rebbi Elazar, when the Tana of our Mishnah concluded 'Horuhah Beis-Din Linasei ve'Halchah ve'Kilkelah Chayeves be'Korban ... , he means that she had illicit relations with another man. Rebbi Yochanan says - that it refers to an Almanah le'Kohen Gadol or a Gerushah ve'Chalutzah le'Kohen Hedyot (which would be forbidden even if she was permitted to marry le'Shuk).

(b) If, as Rebbi Elazar says, she is obligated to bring a Korban for committing adultery even when there is *no La'av*, then she is certainly obligated when there *is* (like Rebbi Yochanan).

(c) Rebbi Yochanan, on the other hand, certainly disagrees with Rebbi Elazar - because, where there is no La'av, he will hold, she can say to the beis-Din 'You declared me to be a P'nuyah'.

(a) In a Beraisa which supports Rebbi Yochanan, Rebbi Elazar obligates a Chatas for each and every Bi'ah (even assuming that he did not discover in between one Bi'ah and the other that it was forbidden) - because he holds that the Bi'os divide (with regard to Chata'os).

(b) The Chachamim say - that he is only Chayav one Chatas, because it is comparable to someone who ate two k'Zeisim of Cheilev in one period of forgetfulness.

(c) The Chachamim will concede to Rebbi Elazar however, that if she went and married five men, that she is Chayav one Chatas for each one - because even if the Bi'os do not divide, the bodies do.

(a) If they informed a woman that first her husband and then her son (both of whom were overseas), had died, and, after she remarried, they informed her that they had actually died in the reverse order (in which case, she was really a Yevamah le'Shuk), any children that she has from the second husband are Mamzeirim - according to Rebbi Akiva, who maintains that the children of Chayvei La'avin are Mamzeirim.

(b) It goes without saying that if they initially told her that her son had died first and then, after she had performed Yibum, they reversed the order, the same will apply. If, after they informed her that her husband had died, and she had already remarried, they told her that he had actually been alive when she remarried, but that he was now dead, the Din would differ - inasmuch as any children that she subsequently bore from him would not be Mamzeirim (though she must still leave him).

(c) 'ha'V'lad Rishon ve'Acharon' throughout our Mishnah - means the children that she bore from him before the (second piece of) news, and those that she bore after it, respectively.

(d) In the first cases, the Tana mentioned 'ha'V'lad Rishon ve'Acharon' (and did not just say 've'ha'V'lad Mamzer') - because he wanted to differentiate in the last case, as we just explained.

(a) If her husband returns after she is *betrothed* to another man, but not yet married - she is permitted to return to him (seeing as she did not yet actually sin, as we explained above on 88b.).

(b) If the second man then gave her a Get, she will not be forbidden to marry a Kohen should her husband subsequently die - because the Get was unnecessary.

(c) Rebbi Elazar ben Masya Darshened from the Pasuk "ve'Ishah Gerushah me'Ishah" - that it is only a woman who is divorced from her husband who is considered divorced, but not one who is divorced from somebody else.

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa establishes the author of our Mishnah, which declares the baby of a Yevamah le'Shuk to be a Mamzer, as Rebbi Akiva. The Tana concludes 'Aval Chachamim Omrim, Ein Mamzer mi'Yevamah', and not simply 'Ein Mamzer mei'Chayvei La'avin' - because he is not the Rabbanan of Rebbi Akiva, but the Tana who quotes Rebbi Akiva as saying that a Mamzer results only from Chayvei La'av of She'er (blood-relationship), but not from other Chayvei La'avin.

(b) An example of Chayvei La'avin of She'er is - a Yavam who marries his own Chalutzah (or his brother's), who contravenes the La'av of "Asher Lo Yivneh".

8)

(a) Rav learns from the Pasuk "*Lo Sihyeh* Eishes ha'Meis ha'Chutzah le'Ish Zar" - that, not only does someone who marries a Yevamah la'Shuk contravene a La'av, but the Kidushin is ineffective, too.

(b) Shmuel say that she requires a get, not because he disagrees entirely with Rav - but because he is not sure whether "Lo Sih'yeh" does indeed have that second connotation. Perhaps it is just an ordinary La'av.

(c) Ameimar rules like Shmuel.

(a) Based on Ameimar's ruling, Rav Ashi said that, if the Yavam was a Kohen, he would have to make Chalitzah and the man who betrothed her be'Isur would be permitted to marry her. We reject this version of Rav Ashi's statement however - on the grounds that that would be allowing the sinner to benefit from his sin (so in fact, he will not be permitted to marry her, but will have to give her a Get).

(b) What Rav Ashi really must have said is - that if the Yavam is not a Kohen, the man who betrothed her will have to give her a Get, and the Yavam will be permitted to perform Yibum with her.

(a) Initially, we amend the statement of Rav Gidal Amar Rav Chiya bar Yosef Amar Rav 'Yevamah Kidushin Ein Bah, Nisu'in Yesh Bah' to read - 'Yevamah Kidushin ve'Nisu'in Ein Bah'.

(b) Alternatively, we interpret 'Nisu'in Yesh Bah' to mean bi'Z'nus, like Rav Hamnuna - who says that a Shomeres Yavam who committed adultery becomes forbidden to the Yavam.

(c) In fact, Rav Hamnuna disagrees with Rav Ashi, who, we just saw, permits a Yevamah who married le'Shuk, to return to the Yavam.

(d) We finally reinstate the version of Rav Gidal's ruling, and we justify the statement 'Yevamah ... Nisu'in Yesh Bah' - due to the fact that it is a decree on account of a woman whose husband went overseas, and who is forbidden to return to her husband if she 'married' another man, but not if she was just betrothed to him.

(a) When Rebbi Yanai quoted the ruling that Kidushin does not take effect on a Yevamah (like Rav) - Rebbi Yochanan commented that this was already stated in a Beraisa.

(b) The Beraisa states 'ha'Omer le'Ishah Harei At Mekudeshes Li le'Achar she'Esgayer' or le'Achar she'Tisgayri ... O she'Yachlotz Lach Yevamech, Einah Mekudeshes' - because it is not possible to acquire something now for later, if one cannot acquire it now.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan proves Rav's ruling from the final case of the Beraisa 'O she'Yachlotz Lach Yevamech, Einah Mekudeshes' - a clear proof that Kidushin is ineffective on a Yevamah la'Shuk.

(a) When Rebbi Yochanan pointed this out to him - Rebbi Yanai replied that if he had not removed the piece of clay (made the revelation) Rebbi Yochanan might not have discovered the jewel (learned the Beraisa that way). He might have understood that one could not perform Kidushin now for later even if it *would be* possible to perform it now.

(b) Resh Lakish disagreed with Rebbi Yochanan's observation altogether - because he would have established the Beraisa like Rebbi Akiva, who holds 'Ein Kidushin Tofsin be'Chayvei La'avin' (but according to the Rabbanan, perhaps Kidushin would indeed be effective by a Yevamah la'Shuk).