Previous daf

1)

(a) The source for the La'av of Mechamer on Shabbos - is "Lo Sa'aseh Kol Melachah Atah ... u'Vehemtecha" in Yisro.

(b) We try to reject this as a source for saying that an Asei is not Docheh a Lo Sa'aseh - on the grounds that the La'avin of Shabbos are different, because Shabbos is generally more stringent.

(a) A Kohen is not permitted to listen to his father, should he order him to fetch a lost article from the Beis Olam.

(b) We learn this from "Ish Imo ve'Aviv Tira'u, ve'es Shabsosai Tishmoru, Ani Hashem" ('Kulchem Chayavim bi'Ch'vodi' as we learned above).

(c) We learn from here that one can learn Chumros from Shabbos (without arguing that Shabbos is different). In that case - we have re-instated the proof that 'Ein Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh' (from Kibud Av va'Eim and Mechamer of Shabbos that we rejected above - in 1a. and 1b.).

(a) We now reinstate the Beraisa by other Melachos of Shabbos (such as 'Sh'chot Li' 'Basheil Li', rather than by Mechamer - because not having to obey one's father by Mechamer implies 'Ein Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh', which is not Halachically correct.

(b) We nevertheless refute the proof from Kibud Av va'Eim and the Melachos of Shabbos that 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kareis', on the grounds that Kibud Av va'Eim is a Hechsher Mitzvah - meaning that, in the current situation, there is no other way of observing it other than by breaking the Shabbos, whereas in the case of Achos Ishto, one has the option of performing Chalitzah, in which case "Alehah" may well not be required to forbid Yibum.

(a) We learn from the Pasuk "es Shabsosai Tishmoru u'Mikdashi Tira'u, *Ani Hashem*" - that Binyan Beis Hamikdash does not override Shabbos.

(b) We conclude, like we concluded above, that the Chilul Shabbos must be referring to the Melachos of Boneh and Soser (and not to Mechamer). We try and prove from here that 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kareis', even when it is *not* a Hechsher Mitzvah (despite the fact that in this case, it *is*) - because, seeing as we already know that 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kareis' by an Asei that *is* a Hechsher Mitzvah, the second Pasuk comes to extend the principle (by means of 'Im Eino Inyan') even to an Asei that is *not*.

(c) In fact, we learn from the Hekesh of "es Shabsosai *Tishmoru*" to "u'Mikdashi *Tira'u*" - that just as the Shemirah that is said by Shabbos does not obligate fearing Shabbos, only the one who commanded us to keep Shabos, so too, it is not necessary to fear the Mikdash, only the One who commanded us on the Mikdash.

5)

(a) One may not enter the Beis ha'Mikdash with any one of four things, including one's staff and one's shoes - one's money-belt and the dust on one's feet.

(b) Nor may one use the Beis Mikdash as a Kapendarya - a short-cut.

(c) We learn the prohibition of spitting there from a 'Kal va'Chomer - from the prohibition of entering the king's palace wearing sack-cloth, which is *not* disgusting, in the way that spitting *is*.

(d) We know that Mora Mikdash applies even nowadays (when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing) - from the Pasuk "es Shabsosai Tishmoru u'Mikdashi Tira'u"; just as observing Shabbos applies at all times, so too, does respecting the Beis Hamikdash.

(a) According to Rebbi Yossi, the Torah singles out the Melachah of "Lo Seva'aru Eish be'Chol Moshvoseichem" to reduce making a fire on Shabbos from a Chiyuv Kareis to an ordinary La'av. In Rebbi Nasan's opinion, it comes to divide the Melachos into thirty-nine separate Melachos (to be Mechayev S'kilah [or a Chatas - see Chochmas Sh'lomoh] for transgressing even one of them).

(b) "be'Chol Moshvoseichem" means - wherever you live, even in Chutz la'Aretz. The problem with the fact that the Torah mentions "Moshvos" by Shabbos is that Shabbos is a personal obligation (that has nothing to do with the land) which automatically applies everywhere.

(c) When the Talmid in the name of Rebbi Yishmael quoted the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Moshvoseichem" (here) from "ve'Hayu Eileh Lachem le'Chukas Mishpat le'Doroseichem be'Chol *Moshvoseichem"*, he was in fact ruling that the prohibition of 'Lo Seva'aru Eish ... " includes the Mitzvah of Beis-Din putting someone to death by burning, resolving the dilemma of whether the Mitzvah of "ve'Chi Yihyeh be'Ish Chet Mishpat Maves ve'Humas" overrides Shabbos or not.

(a) By establishing this Beraisa like Rebbi Nasan (who holds that burning a fire is an Av Melachah, we can infer that, if not for the Pasuk, Beis-Din would carry out the death-sentence, proving that 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh she'Yeish Bo Kareis'.

(b) In fact, the proof would be valid even if the author was Rebbi Yossi - because even if lighting a fire (in his opinion), is *not* a Melachah, cooking certainly is, and melting the metal file is considered cooking (because 'Mah Li Bishul Pesilah, Mah Li Bishul Samemanim' - 'What is the difference between cooking a metal file or cooking spices.

(c) Rav Shimi bar Ashi rejects the proof. If not for the Pasuk and the 'Gezeirah-Shavah', he says, Misas Beis-Din would override Shabbos, not because of the principle 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh', but because of a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Avodah. We learn from the Pasuk "me'Im Mizbechi Tikachenu la'Mus" - that Retzichah is Docheh Avodah.

(d) We now learn from a 'Kal va'Chomer' that Retzichah (Misas Beis-Din) should override Shabbos - because if Retzichah overrides Avodah, which overrides Shabbos, then it should certainly override Shabbos.