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Sotah, 23

1) A FATHER WHO MAKES HIS SON A NAZIR

QUESTION: The Mishnah lists a number of Halachic differences between a man and a woman. One of those differences is that a man may obligate his minor son to observe an oath of Nezirus, while a woman may not. RASHI (DH ha'Ish; see also BARTENURA here) writes that when the father makes his son into a Nazir, the son remains a Nazir even if he reaches adulthood during the Nezirus. Why does Rashi find it necessary to point that out here?

ANSWER: Rashi might be trying to answer an obvious question that arises on the Mishnah. What significance is there to the Nezirus of a Katan? A Katan is not obligated in Mitzvos, so how can the Torah require him to observe his Nezirus! The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nezirus 2:13) answers this question by stating that the obligations of the child's Nezirus apply to the *father*. The father must treat his son like a Nazir, keeping him away from wine, haircuts, and Tum'ah. This also appears to be the intention of the ROSH (Nazir 28b) who writes that the consequence of the Halachah of the Mishnah is that the father must bring all of the Korbanos Nezirus for his son.

Rashi is answering that even the child himself is affected by the Nezirus and not just the father, because -- if he becomes an adult and becomes obligated in Mitzvos -- he will become obligated in all of the laws of Nazir due to the Nezirus that took effect on him while he was a Katan. (Even though Mitzvos do not apply to a Katan, a change of status such as the status of Nazir does apply to a Katan, like the status of Tum'ah and Taharah.)

RASHI in Makos (22a, DH Nazir Shimshon) and the MEFARESH in Nazir (30a, DH Ka'im, and DH Hachi Garsinan) also seem to be of the opinion that if the father makes the son a Nazir, the Nezirus remains even after the son becomes an adult.

However, TOSFOS in Nazir (28b, DH v'Ein) and the ROSH and other Rishonim (ibid.) cite a Tosefta (Nazir 3:9) which states clearly that just like Macha'ah (the objection of the son or other relatives) ends the son's Nezirus and prevents him from bringing the Korbanos of a Nazir, so, too, reaching adulthood (the growth of two Se'aros) ends his Nezirus and prevents him from bringing the Korbanos of a Nazir. This is clear as well from the Gemara in Nazir (beginning of 30a) which, according to these Rishonim, is basing its question on the fact that once the son reaches adulthood, the Nezirus that his father made for him is no longer valid (and he must make himself a Nazir if he wants to observe a full Nezirus).

How does Rashi explain the Tosefta? It is possible that Rashi maintains that when a son reaches adulthood after his father made him a Nazir, although he still must observe his Nezirus, nevertheless he does not bring the Korbanos at the conclusion of the Nezirus. The reason is because the Korbanos are part of the obligation that a person accepts when he first accepts Nezirus upon himself (see Nedarim 4a). Since the father accepted the obligation of the Nezirus on behalf of his son, it becomes the *father's* obligation of Korbanos. When his son leaves the father's domain upon reaching adulthood, the son does not acquire the obligation of Korbanos from his father, and nor does the father have to bring the Korbanos, because his son is now out of his domain. The Tosefta means only that the Nezirus of the son is no longer applicable with regard to bringing Korbanos, and therefore the laws of a Korban that was separated for a purpose for which it cannot be brought (Nazir 28b) apply to a son who reached adulthood after his father made him a Nazir (that is, if his father set aside for him an animal before he became a Gadol, it is a Chatas Mesah, etc.).

The Gemara in Nazir (beginning of 30a) also might mean to say that the son does not have the full laws of Nezirus when he reaches adulthood, since he does not bring Korbanos. (This also answers the questions of the KEREN ORAH there on the Mefaresh.)

QUESTION: The Mishnah lists a number of Halachic differences between a man and a woman. There are, however, a number of important differences that the Mishnah omits! Why does the Mishnah not mention that a woman is not obligated to fulfill time-related Mitzvos (Mitzvos Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama), or that a woman is not bound by the Lavim of Hakafah and Gilu'ach (shaving the head and shaving the beard), like the Mishnah mentions in Kidushin (29a)? In addition, why does our Mishnah not mention the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, and Pidyon ha'Ben, from which a woman is exempt (Kidushin 34b), and the Mitzvos that only a father is responsible to do for his child, such as Milah (Kidushin 29a)?

The Tosefta (2:8) cited by TOSFOS (23b, DH Mah) indeed adds to the Mishnah's list the difference of Mitzvos Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama, Hakafah and Gilu'ach. However, even the Tosefta does not count Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and Milah. Why does it omit these Mitzvos?

ANSWER: The Mishnah seems to be listing only ways that men and women differ regarding *details* of Mitzvos, but not regarding obligations or prohibitions that apply in general to every man or woman. The Mishnah mentions only these differences because they are related to the Halachah that the Mishnah discusses regarding the way to sacrifice the Minchah offering of a Kohen. The Mishnah says that if a Kohen donates a Minchah, then there is a difference between the way a male Kohen and a female Kohenes offer the Minchah. This difference is not a general difference between the Kohen and Kohenes. In contrast, all of the Mitzvos we mentioned in the question are general obligations incumbent upon the person, and that is why the Mishnah leaves them out.

The Mishnah's list includes only details of Mitzvos, such as the procedure required by a woman who is a Metzora or a woman who is a Nezirah, the status of a son whose mother attempts to make him a Nazir, how a woman is punished with Sekilah, and how she is treated if she steals, and so on. The Tosefta, in contrast, is discussing general obligations of a man and woman as well.

If the Tosefta is discussing differences relating to the general obligations of a man and woman, why, then, does the Tosefta omit the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and Milah?

The answer might lie in the wording of the Tosefta. The Tosefta says that a woman "may *transgress* a Mitzvas Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama, and not a man." The Tosefta is only listing Mitzvos which one can *transgress* (such as the Isur of Hakafah and Gilu'ach, and missing the time to do the Mitzvah, in the case of a Mitzvas Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama), but not Mitzvos -- like Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, and Pidyon ha'Ben -- which are not limited to a particular time and therefore it is not possible to discuss "transgressing" them; the woman could always do them at a later time.

The reason why the Tosefta lists only Mitzvos that one can transgress perhaps is perhaps because in those cases there is a difference between a man and a woman regarding the details of the Mitzvah. That is, in Mitzvos that are "transgressable" there is a difference between a man and woman with regard to whether he or she receives Malkus d'Oraisa or Malkus d'Rabanan for transgressing it. The Tosefta does not list these Mitzvos Aseh because of the difference in their obligation, but because of the detail that affects them if they violate it. In contrast, the only difference between a man and a woman with regard to the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and Milah, is the *obligation* itself, and not the *details* of the obligation, or the outcome (such as the punishment) of the obligation.

23b