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1)

(a) What does Rebbi Akiva say about a Megadef (someone who curses Hashem) be'Shogeg?

(b) Then why, in our Mishnah, did he say to the Chachamim 'Heichan Matzinu bi'Medaber u'Meivi Korban'?

(c) Why can we also not query Rebbi Akiva from ...

1. ... a Nazir (whose status is caused by speech and), who is obligated to bring a Korban at the end of his Nezirus on the day that he shaves?
2. ... Hekdesh, which one forbids with a Neder, and for which one brings a Korban, should one benefit from it?
3. ... a Konam that one forbade on oneself? Why is that?

(d) We have already learned that by Mefaresh, one is Chayav a Korban even on a 'Kol Shehu'. Besides that, Rava also precluded 'Lo Et'am' from the Din of a k'Zayis.
Seeing as he did not mention 'Achilah', why is this not obvious?

(a) What does Rav Papa say about the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan, concerning someone who makes a Konam?

(b) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa rules 'Sh'nei Konamos Mitztarfin (two loaves each comprising half a Shiur); Sh'tei Shevu'os Ein Mitztarfin'. What does Rebbi Meir say?

(c) What do we try to prove from this Beraisa, that will pose a Kashya on Rav Papa?

(d) How do we establish the case to reconcile Rav Papa with the Beraisa?

(a) In that case, we ask, how can the two loaves possibly combine, seeing as he mentioned each loaf separately.
What do we answer? What did he really say?

(b) What is then the problem with the Seifa 'Sh'tei Shevu'os Ein Mitztarfin'?

(c) How does Rebbi Pinchas answer this Kashya? What basic distinction does he draw between Nedarim and Shevu'os in this regard?

(d) What is the problem with this from Rebbi Meir?

(a) Initially, we answer 'Eipuch'.
What exactly does this mean? What are its implications?

(b) According to Ravina, it is not necessary to invert Rebbi Meir's statement.
If, as he explains, Rav Papa ('Machlokes bi'Shevu'os ... ') refers to Malkos, to what does the Beraisa refer? Why the difference?

(c) On which principle is Rav Papa's opinion now based?

(a) What is the corollary between Me'ilah and Pidyon (redeeming the forbidden article)?

(b) Based on this corollary, what distinction does Rebbi Meir make between redeeming Hekdesh ('Kikar Zu Hekdesh'), and redeeming Konamos ('Kikar Zu Alai Hekdesh')?

(c) What other distinction is based on this corollary?

(d) What do the Rabbanan say?

6)

(a) According to Rav Papa, how do the Rabbanan in the current Beraisa ('Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos') clash with what they themselves said in the previous one ('Sh'nei Konamos Mitztarfin')?

(b) We answer this Kashya with 'Eipuch'.
What are now the respective opinions of Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan?

(c) What problem does this create with Rebbi Meir's opinion ('Konamos ki'Shevu'os') in the earlier Beraisa?

(d) How do we answer this Kashya? Why did Rebbi Meir say 'Konamos ki'Shevu'os', if he doesn't really hold of it?

(e) And what did the Rabbanan answer him?

(a) What did Rava say about someone who declared 'Shevuah she'Lo Ochal', and who then ate dust?

(b) What She'eilah did he then ask about someone who declared 'Shevu'ah she'Lo Ochal Afar'?

(c) Seeing as he said 'she'Lo Ochal ... ', and Achilah normally denotes a 'k'Zayis', why might he nevertheless be Chayav for even less a 'k'Zayis'?

(d) What is the outcome of the She'eilah?

(a) Rava asks what the Din will be if someone made a Shevu'ah not to eat grape-pits and then ate less than k'Zayis.
Why might he be Patur even assuming that he would have been Chayav for a 'Kol Shehu' of dust?

(b) Why then, might he nevertheless be Patur?

(c) Why does Rav Ashi think that even if in the previous case (which remains unresolved) the Nishba is Patur, a Nazir who makes the same Shevu'ah will be Chayav?

(d) Why might the Nazir still be Patur?

(a) We already discussed the Beraisa 'Shevu'ah she'Lo Ochal ve'Achal Neveilos u'Tereifos ... Chayav', which Resh Lakish established when the Nishba specified Chatzi Shiur, according to the Rabbanan of Rebbi Akiva. What would the Din then be according to them, if the Nishba had not specified a Chatzi Shiur?

(b) Which of the above She'eilos can we resolve from here?

(c) Bearing in mind that Neveilah is not edible either, why can we not also resolve Rava's first She'eilah (whether one is Chayav on less than a k'Zayis of dust) from the same point (seeing as, if not for 'Mefaresh'), the Beraisa would have required a k'Zayis?

(a) What distinction does our Mishnah draw between someone who declares a Shevu'ah that he will not ...

1. ... eat and one who declares that he will not eat or drink?
2. ... eat and someone who declares that he will not eat wheat-bread, barley-bread or bread made of spelt?
3. ... drink and someone who declares that he will not drink wine, oil or honey?

(b) And what does the Tana Kama rule in a case where someone declares a 'Shevu'ah she'Lo Ochal' and then eats or drinks ...

1. ... something that is not edible?
2. ... Neveilos u'Tereifos, Shekatzim u'Remasim?

(c) What does Rebbi Shimon say? Why is that?

(d) The Mishnah concludes 'Konem Ishti Nehenis Li Im Achalti ha'Yom, ve'Hu Achal Neveilos u'Neveilos ... , Harei Ishto Asurah'.
What does Rebbi Shimon say about this?

(a) Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Shmuel ascribes the Mishnah's opening ruling both to a Pasuk and to logic.
What is the logic behind the ruling 'Shevu'ah she'Lo Ochal, Ve'achal *Ve'shasah*, Chayav'?

(b) His original proof from the Pasuk is based on a statement of Resh Lakish. What does Resh Lakish try to prove from the Pasuk in Re'ei (in connection with Ma'aser Sheini) "Ve'achalta Lifnei Hashem ... Ma'asar Degancha, Tiroshcha ... "?

(c) We reject this proof however, based on a statement by Rabah bar Shmuel, who defines 'Anigron' as juice, together with the spinach in which it was cooked.
How does he then define 'Achsigron'?

(d) What does this prove?

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