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1)

(a) Rebbi Shimon queries the above 'Kal va'Chomer' (confining Shevu'as ha'Eidus to a monetory claim from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon) with a double Pircha, based on the fact that Shevu'as ha'Eidus posseses two Chumros over Shevu'as ha'Pikadon - 'she'Asah Bah Mushba ke'Nishba u'Meizid ke'Shogeg' (which it did not do by Shevu'as ha'Pikadon).

(b) So he finally learns it from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Secheta" "Secheta" - from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon.

(c) Rebbi Eliezer in the Beraisa learnt this Halachah from the 'O'in' of Shevu'as ha'Pikadon. Rabah bar Ula queries that from Shevu'as Bituy, by which the Torah also writes 'O'in' ("O Nefesh Ki Sishava Levatei, Le'hara O Le'heitiv"), and where it writes "Shevu'ah" but not "Kohen", yet it is not confined to monetary issues.

(d) We counter the argument that it is better to learn Shevu'as ha'Eidus "Secheta" "Secheta" from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon by suggesting that it is closer still to Shevu'as Bituy - since both bring a Chatas, whereas Shevu'as ha'Pikadon brings an Asham.

(a) And we conclude that Rebbi Eliezer would sooner learn Eidus from Pikadon because of 'Chet, be'Meizid, Tav'eih, Kafreih, ve'Avreih' - which means that they are both confined to the past, whereas the basic obligation of Bituy is in the future (as we learned at the beginning of the Masechta).

(b) We counter this with the fact that Shevu'as Bituy is similar to Shevu'as ha'Eidus as regards 'Chatas she'Yardah le'Chomesh'. 'Chatas' means that Shevu'as Eidus and Shevu'as Bituy (as opposed to Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, which is Chayav an Asham).

1. 'she'Yardah' means - that both are subject to a Korban Oleh ve'Yored (whereas Shevu'as ha'Pikadon brings a fixed Korban).
2. 'le'Chomesh' means - that neither of them obligates the owner to pay an extra fifth, like a Korban Asham Gezeilos does.

(c) We conclude therefore - that Shevu'as ha'Eidus is compared to Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (which is confined to monetary issues, because there are more reasons connecting them).

(a) Rebbi Akiva in the Beraisa, learns Tevi'as Mamon by Shevu'as ha'Eidus from "Vehayah Ki Ye'sham le'Achas *me'Eileh*". Bearing in mind that Mamon is not hinted here (in which case, we might as well include Isur and preclude Mamon), his main source is - the 'O'in' of Rebbi Eliezer.

(b) Rebbi Akiva therefore argues with Rebbi Eliezer with regard to Eidei Karka - which Rebbi Eliezer includes but which he maintains, "me'Eileh" comes to preclude.

(c) According to Rebbi Yochanan, it comes to preclude Eidei K'nas. He is forced to say that - because in his opinion, even Rebbi Eliezer precludes 'Mashbi'a Eidei Karka' from Shevu'as ha'Eidus (even without "me'Eileh").

(a) Rebbi Acha rules that if a dead camel is found beside a kicking one - we assume that to be the one that killed it (circumstantial evidence).

(b) 'Gamal ha'Ocher bein ha'Gemalim' might also mean - a male camel that comes to be intimate with a female (back to back, from the word 'Achor'), and which tends to lash out at other camels within range.

(c) Based on the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach, we prove that Rebbi Yossi Hagelili, who Darshens ''ve'Hu Ra'ah O Yada", cannot hold like Rebbi Acha. Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach once ran after someone who was chasing a fellow-Jew. He arrived at the ruin into which they had entered as the man emerged, the sword that he was holding dripping blood and the murdered man breathing his last breath.

(d) He told the man - that although there was nobody else present who could possibly have murdered the victim, there was nothing he could do about it because there were no witnesses. However, Hashem would punish him for what he had done.

(e) The words were barely out of his mouth, when a snake bit the murderer and he died.

(a) We try to extrapolate from the above episode that Rebbi Yossi Hagelili cannot hold like Rebbi Acha - because if he did, we would have a case of Eidei Misah where Eidei Yedi'ah without Eidei Re'iyah is applicable (assuming that circumstantial evidence is acceptable by cases of Misah too).

(b) We answer that even though 'Yedi'ah without Re'iyah' is applicable, 'Re'iyah without Yedi'ah' is not (meaning that the murderer could not possibly be Chayav [and Rebbi Yossi Hagelili requires both possibilities]). A case of 'Re'iyah without Yedi'ah' would be - where the witnesses saw Reuven kill someone without knowing who he was or whether he was a T'reifah or not.

(c) The murderer would not be Chayav in such a case - because as long as the witnesses cannot ascertain that a. the victim was a Yisrael, and b. that he was not a T'reifah (see Tosfos DH 'I T'reifah Harag'), he cannot be Chayav.

(a) Based on what we have just learned, we try to prove that Rebbi Yossi Hagelili must hold 'Mashbi'a Eidei K'nas Patur', because whereas 'Yedi'ah be'Lo Re'iyah' is applicable (if they followed a Besulah into a ruin, and discovered that she was a Be'ulah [Ritva]), 'Re'iyah be'Lo Yedi'ah' is not - because as long as the witnesses cannot ascertain that a. the girl is a bas Yisrael, and b. she is a Besulah, the Bo'el cannot be Chayav.

(b) The ramifications of this ruling are - that if two people witnessed a rape without knowing the above details and then denied having witnessed it, they are Patur from bringing a Korban.

(a) Rav Yehudah asked what the Din will be in a case where Reuven counted out a Manah in front of Shimon in the form of a loan - and the witnesses were watching from outside (without knowing what the money was for [and without Shimon being aware of their presence]).

(b) Rav Hamnuna (his Talmid who was sitting in front of him) commented - that if Shimon denied the claim, he would be proven to be a liar, and Chayav to pay; whereas if he claimed that what he received was his own, then he would be permitted to keep the money, and the witnesses testimony would make no difference. Note, this cannot be compared to Naska de'Rebbi Aba, because here he did not grab the money, but it was handed to him, with a fifty-fifty chance that the money was being returned to him (in which case we will apply the principle 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah'.

(c) Rav Yehudah's response was - to invite Rav Hamnuna to become a member of the Beis-Hamedrash (as a reward for outlearning his Rebbe).

8)

(a) When Reuven claimed that he had lent Shimon money beside a certain pillar, the latter responded - that he had not even passed that pillar (let alone made any transactions there).

(b) Rav Nachman disagreed with Resh Lakish, who, based on the testimony of two witnesses who had seen him urinate at that very spot, ruled that Shimon had lied and that he was obligated to pay - on the grounds that, not having added the word 'ever', his statement was obviously confined to that transaction, and not to other occasions. As for Resh Lakish's ruling, he referred to it as 'Persian justice'.

(c) In a similar incident, but where the defendant specifically claimed that he had *never* stood beside that pillar - Rav Nachman himself ruled like Resh Lakish in the previous case.

(d) Rava disagreed with Rav Nachman - on the grounds that people tend to forget things that they did or saw (in matters of no consequence).

(a) In the Beraisa still currently under discussion, Rebbi Shimon learns (from "Secheta" "Secheta" from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon) that Shevu'as ha'Eidus was confined to monetary issues . The B'nei Eretz Yisrael responded to that - by laughing.

(b) The problem they had with it, based on the fact that Rebbi Shimon himself cites it in response to his own Kashya on his original 'Kal va'Chomer' 'Mah le'Pikadon she'Kein Lo Asah Bo Mushba ke'Nishba ... ' was - that just as he learns Nishba ('Mushba mi'Pi Atzmo') by Eidus, from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' ("Secheta" "Secheta") from Pikadon, why does he not also learn Mushba (mi'Pi Acherim) by Pikadon from the same 'Ge'zeirah-Shavah'?

(c) After refuting the previous Kashya on the grounds that Rebbi Shimon may learn Nishba by Eidus from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Mushba (and not from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah'), we switch the problem to the second part of Rebbi Shimon's Kashya 'Mah le'Pikadon she'Kein Lo Asah Bo ... Meizid ke'Shogeg ... '. The problem with that is - why he does not also learn 'Meizid ke'Shogeg' by Pikadon from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah'.

(d) We attempt to refute Rav Huna's answer that Rebbi Shimon learns Shogeg by Pikadon from Me'ilah (at the same time revealing the cause of the B'nei Ma'arva's mirth) - by countering with the Gezeirah-Shavah "Secheta" "Secheta" (which he already uses anyway), enabling him to learn Meizid ke'Shogeg by Pikadon from there.

(a) When we back Rav Huna on the basis of 'she'Kein Me'ilah mi'Me'ilah', we mean - that seeing as there is a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Me'ilah" ("u'Ma'alah Ma'al" by Pikadon) "Me'ilah" ("Ki Sim'ol Ma'al" by Me'ilah), Rebbi Shimon prefers to learn 'Shogeg' from there.

(b) Faced with "Secheta" "Secheta" (from Eidus), we reply 'she'Kein Me'ilah, ba'Kol, Neheneh, be'Kavu'a, Chomesh ve'Asham'. By ...

1. ... 'ba'Kol', we mean - that (unlike Eidus) it applies even to those who are not eligible to testify.
2. ... 'Neheneh' we mean - that (unlike Eidus), the Korban comes for having derived benefit from something.

(c) We counter this with 'Aderaba, me'Eidus Havah Leih Lemeilaf, she'Kein Chet, Hedyot, bi'Shevu'ah, Tav'eih ve'Kafreih ve'O'in'. By Hedyot, we mean - that (unlike Me'ilah, which comes for having derived benefit from Hekdesh), the Korban by both Eidus and Pikadon comes for one's dealings with ordinary people.

(d) Despite the fact that both *appear* to contain six advantages, we conclude 'Hanach (those of Me'ilah) Nefishan' - because 'Tav'eih' and 'Kafreih' are really one.

(a) So Rav Papa and Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua try afresh to establish the source of the B'nei Ma'arva's mirth. They ask on Rebbi Shimon's initial Kashya 'Mah le'Pikadon she'Kein Lo Asah Bo Mushba ke'Nishba, Meizid ke'Shogeg' - that now that Rebbi Shimon learns the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Secheta" "Secheta", why does he not indeed hold 'Mushba ke'Nishba' and 'Meizid ke'Shogeg' by Pikadon, too.

(b) We attempt to answer this Kashya - by restricting Rebbi Shimon's Kashya to before he established the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (which is indeed where he presents it in the Beraisa)

(c) We answer with a statement of Rav bar Isi - who establishes the Beraisa quoted later which exempts Meizid by Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, like Rebbi Shimon, who holds 'Shevu'as ha'Pikadon Lo Nitan Zedonah la'Kaparah' (as we learned in the current Beraisa, and he is obviously referring to Rebbi Shimon's final opinion [after he learns the Gezeirah-Shavah]).

(a) We finally concede that Rebbi Shimon precludes Shevu'as ha'Pikadon from Meizid from the Gezeirah-Shavah from Me'ilah, as we explained earlier - and he also includes 'Mushba ke'Nishba' by Shevu'as ha'Pikadon from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' from Shevu'as ha'Eidus.

(b) And we pinpoint the B'nei Ma'arva's objection, not to Rebbi Shimon's opinion regarding Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, but rather to his opinion regarding Shevu'as ha'Eidus ('she'Kein Asah bo Meizid ke'Shogeg'). The problem there (that caused the B'nei Ma'arva to laugh) is - why he does not learn Shevu'as ha'Eidus from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, to confine it to Shogeg, just like Shevu'as ha'Pikadon is.

(c) We refute their opinion however, finally justifying Rebbi Shimon on the grounds - that, after inserting the word "ve'Ne'elam" by Shevu'as Bituy and by Tum'as Mikdash ve'Kodashav, the Torah deliberately omitted it by Shevu'as ha'Eidus, to teach us 'Meizid ke'Shogeg'.