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1)

(a) Our Mishnah rules - that women, relatives and Pesulei Eidus are precluded from Shevu'as ha'Eidus.

(b) The source for this Halachah is the Pasuk - "ve'Hu Eid", implying people who are fit to testify (precluding those who are not).

(c) Rebbi Meir includes Shevu'as ha'Eidus even outside Beis-Din - provided it is 'mi'Pi Atzmo' (as we learned in the previous Sugya).

(d) We learn from the Pasuk (in connection with Shevu'as ha'Eidus) "Im Lo Yagid ... " - that 'mi'Pi Acherim' (which the Pasuk is talking about) is Patur from Shevu'as ha'Eidus outside Beis-Din (where Hagadah is invalid).

(a) The Chachamim rule - that Shevu'as ha'Eidus is invalid outside Beis-Din (even if it is 'mi'Pi Atzmo').

(b) When the Tana says 've'Chayavin al Zadon ha'Shevu'ah ve'al Shigegasah Im Zadon ha'Eidus', he means that the Nishba forgot the Chiyuv Korban, and that he is Chayav a Korban Olah ve'Yored.

(c) He is Chayav, even though he was Meizid on the Eidus - because the Torah does not write "ve'Ne'elam" in connection with the Eidus.

(d) And the Tana exempts him in a case where he was a Shogeg on the Eidus as well - because then, based on "ha'Adam", he is A'nus on the Shevu'ah (as we have already learned).

(a) From the Pasuk "Ve'amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim Asher Lifnei Lahem ha'Riv ... " the Beraisa learns - that women are disqualified from testifying.

(b) The Tana knows that the Pasuk is referring to the witnesses and not to the litigants - because of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Sh'nei" "Shnei" (from "al-Pi Sh'nei Eidim").

(c) According to this Beraisa, we would otherwise have thought that the Pasuk is referring to the litigants - because the Pasuk writes "Ve'amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim Asher Lahem ha'Riv ... " (without a 'Vav'), and not "Ve'amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim *va*'Asher Lifnei Lahem ha'Riv ... ", implying that the two men are the litigants.

(a) In a second Beraisa, the Tana originally establishes the Pasuk by the witnesses, based on the fact that the Torah adds the word "Sh'nei'', because if it referred to the litigants, who says that there were only two litigants, and not three? We nevertheless justify the need for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' to preclude the litigants - by interpreting "Sh'nei" as the claimant/s and the defendant/s (irrespective of how many people are actually involved).

(b) And in a third Beraisa, the Tana originally establishes the Pasuk by the witnesses from the fact that the Torah adds the word "ha'Anashim", because if it referred to the litigants, who says that at least one of them was not a woman? We nevertheless justify the need for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' to preclude the litigants, interpreting the Torah's use of the word "Anashim" (not to preclude women Halachically, but) - because it is uncommon for them to appear in Beis-Din.

(c) The source for this theory is - the Pasuk in Tehilim "Kol Kevudah bas Melech Penimah" (which teaches us that ideally, a woman's place is in the home).

(a) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "Ve'amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim ... " - that the litigants are obligated to stand in court.

(b) The Tana knows that the Pasuk is referring to the litigants as well as to the witnesses - because of the missing 'Vav' in "Asher Lahem ha'Riv" (as we just explained).

(c) Rebbi Yehudah rules - that if both litigants are invited to sit, then they may.

(d) Rebbi Yehudah's reason for this ruling is - so that the one litigant should not feel inferior (which is likely to render him tongue-tied, incapable of presenting his case properly).

(a) The Beraisa learns Rebbi Yehudah's statement from the Pasuk "be'Tzedek Tishpot Amisecha". A second Beraisa however, learns from there - that one is obligated to judge a fellow-Jew who appears to have sinned, to the scale of merit.

(b) And a Beraisa quoted by Rav Yosef Darshens the word "Amisecha" - as the acronym of 'Am she'Itcha be'Torah u've'Mitzvos' (meaning that one should give Talmidei-Chachamim precedence with regard to dealing with their case first).

(a) When Rav Ula B'rei de'Rav Ila'i came before Rav Nachman for a Din Torah, Rav Yosef sent to Rav Nachman - that he belonged to the above category.

(b) Rav Nachman was initially startled - because he thought that Rav Yosef meant him to flatter him.

(c) Besides in the way that we just explained ('Am she'Itcha be'Torah u've'Mitzvos'), Rav Nachman resolved the problem, by assuming that Rav Yosef was speaking in a case that might lead to 'Shuda de'Dayni' - where two people with the same name, for example, both claim that to be the recipients of a gift, or where two documents of sale that are both dated on the same day selling the same property are produced in Beis-Din, and the Dayanim have no way of knowing which of the two is authentic. 'Shuda de'Dayni' means the most likely candidate in the eyes of the Dayanim (see also Tosfos DH 'I Nami').

8)

(a) The Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan, says Ula, is confined to the litigants. Both Tana'im will hold however - that the witnesses are obligated to stand (since the Torah writes "ve'Amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim ... ").

(b) Rav Huna (or Rava) learns from the Pasuk "Va'yeishev Moshe Lishpot es ha'Am, Va'ya'amod ha'Am" - that at the time of the G'mar Din (when Beis-Din issue the final ruling), even the litigants are obligated to stand.

(c) The alternative source cited by Rav Huna for his ruling is - the fact that the witnesses (whose testimony [with regard to them] is akin to the G'mar Din) are obligated to stand.

(a) The quandary that faced Rav Nachman when Rav Huna's wife appeared before him for a Din Torah was - whether to rise when she entered (in which case he might cause the second litigant to become tongue-tied), or not (in which case he would not be showing the respect that is due to the wife of a Talmid-Chacham).

(b) Rav Huna could not appear in Beis-Din so that his wife could remain at home, as we learned above - because he was no longer alive (see also Tosfos DH 've'ha'Amar').

(c) He solved the problem - by instructing his Shamash to let loose a goose that would fly around him, and cause him to rise from his seat, without the litigant realizing his true motive (see Tosfos DH 'Afrach Alai').

(d) We reconcile this with what we learned earlier that at the time of the G'mar Din, the Dayanim are obligated to sit (see Toras Chayim), and the litigants to stand - by establishing that when Rav Nachman sat down for the G'mar Din, he remained in a half leaning position, like someone who leans over to tie his shoe-lace (See Tosfos DH 've'ha'Amar').

(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna rules that if a Talmid-Chacham and an Am ha'Aretz appear in Beis-Din together for a Din Torah - Beis-Din seat the Talmid-Chacham and offer the Am ha'Aretz a seat too. Should he decline to sit down, that is his business.

(b) When Rav Sh'ravyah appeared before Rav Papa for a Din Torah with an Am ha'Aretz, Rav Papa carried out the previous Halachah. When the Sheli'ach Beis-Din caused the second litigant to stand up by giving him a kick - Rav Papa remained silent.

(c) He was not afraid that the litigant might become tongue-tied - because he figured, seeing as he had offered him a seat, it was on the whim of the Sheli'ach, that he made him stand, and he would not attribute it to the Beis-Din (in which case, he would not become tongue-tied).

(a) In the previous case, Rabah bar Rav Huna forbids the Talmid-Chacham to sit down before the Am ha'Aretz arrives in Beis-Din - on the grounds that this will cause people to suspect the former of having discussed the matter with the Dayan in the absence of the second litigant (thereby transgressing the La'av of "Lo Sisa Sheima Shav" (Mishpatim).

(b) This will be permitted however - in a case where the Dayan was the Talmid-Chacham's Rebbe, and they had had a fixed Shiur before the Din Torah was due to begin.

(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna permits a Talmid-Chacham to decline to appear in Beis-Din to testify for one of the litigants - if he is superior to the Dayan in Torah-learning, in which case it is degrading for him to do so.

(b) The Mishnah in Bava Metzi'a which Rav Shisha B'rei de'Rav Idi cites in support of Rabah bar Rav Huna is - the ruling that if a Talmid-Chacham finds a sack or a box which he finds degrading to carry through the street, he is Patur from the Mitzvah of Hashavas Aveidah.

(c) This concession will not apply however - to a case of Isur, for example, to testify that a certain man is still alive, if his wife, believing him to be dead, intends to get married.

(d) This stringency is based on the principle - that when it comes to an Isur 'there is no Chochmah ... before Hashem', and that one does not show a Talmid-Chacham respect, in face of a Chilul Hashem.

(a) The source for the Mitzvah to show a Talmid-Chacham respect is - the word "es" in the Pasuk in Re'ei "es Hashem Elokecha Tira" ('Lerabos Talmidei-Chachamim').

(b) When Rav Yeimar came to Beis-Din to testify on behalf of Mar Zutra, Ameimar caused Rav Ashi to raise an eyebrow - by offering both the litigants and the witnesses a seat.

(c) Ameimar vindicated his ruling however - by referring to the above Asei, which overrides the Asei of "ve'Amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim", because a Mitzvas Asei that entails Kavod ha'Torah has priority over other Mitzvos Asei.

(a) When the Beraisa rules that a Dayan should not make 'Sanigron' to corroborate his words, the Tana means - that if, after coming to a certain conclusion, a Dayan feels that he has erred, he should not force the issue by attempting to prove his point.

(b) The source for this ruling is - the Asei in Mishpatim of "mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak".

(c) A Dayan may not place a Bur (an ignoramus) before him to discuss his learning with him - based on the same Pasuk (because the latter is likely to cause him to err).

(d) The dual Halachah cited by the Tana with regard to a Dayan and a witness is - that neither may join with an Am ha'Aretz, even in their quest for the truth.