POINT BY POINT SUMMARY
Prepared by Rabbi P. Feldman of Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Yerushalayim Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
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Shevuos 31
Shevuos 31 - sponsored by Uri Wolfson with warm Mazel Tov wishes to Carey (Kalman)
and Tammy Wolchok on the occasion of their wedding (on 22 Adar I 5763). May they
merit to build together a Bayis Ne'eman b'Yisrael!
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1) FALSE MATTERS (cont.)
(a) (Continuation of Beraisa): We learn the following laws
from "Mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak":
1. If a Talmid in front of the judge sees why the poor
person is innocent and the rich person is liable, he
may not keep quiet;
2. If a Talmid sees that the judge is erring, he may
not wait until a wrong verdict is given and then
show what the verdict should be, in order that
people will say the verdict in his name;
3. If a Rebbi told his Talmid 'You know that I would
not lie for a fortune - Reuven owes me money, and I
only have one witness against him', the Talmid may
not join with him.
4. Objection: "Lo Sa'aneh b'Re'echa Ed Shaker" teaches
this, not "Mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak"!
5. Correction: Rather, even if the Rebbi only asks
'Stand with my witness to make Reuven think that I
have two witnesses (so he will admit)', it is
forbidden.
6. If Shimon owes Levi 100, Levi may not claim 200 in
order that Shimon will (deny half and) have to
swear, enabling Levi to force Shimon to swear
(through Gilgul) about another matter;
7. If Shimon owes Levi 100 and Levi claimed 200, Shimon
may not deny the entire claim in Beis Din and admit
to Levi outside of Beis Din, to exempt himself from
the oath of partial admission (lest Levi force
Shimon to swear through Gilgul about another
matter);
8. If Reuven owes money to three partners and denies
it, one may not claim the entire amount and bring
the others as witnesses (in order to share the money
with them).
9. If Shimon is dressed in rags, and Levi (his opo) is
wearing very expensive clothing, Levi must supply
Shimon with clothing like he is wearing, or must
also dress in rags.
i. Rabah bar Rav Huna would tell litigants to
remove their linen shoes before hearing the
case.
10. A judge may not hear one party before the other
party comes.
11. A party may not justify its claim to the judge
before the other party comes.
i. Rav Kahana explains that the last two
prohibitions are learned from "Lo Sisa Shema
Shav (do not listen to a vain report; this may
also be read 'Lo Sasi', do not give a vain
report).
(b) (Rav): "Lo Tov Asah b'Soch Amav" - this is one who pleads
on behalf of another through Harsha'ah (authorization);
(Tosfos - this is when he accepts Harsha'ah because he is
more likely to win in Beis Din, but if he accepts it
because the litigant is unable to come to Beis Din, he
does a Mitzvah.)
(c) (Shmuel): This is one who buys a contested field
(confident that he will win in Beis Din, because he is
powerful).
2) LIABILITY FOR "SHEVU'AS HA'EDUS"
(a) (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Edus only applies to people
fitting to testify.
(b) Question: What does this come to exclude?
(c) Answer #1 (Rav Papa): It excludes a king (he cannot
testify, because it is below his honor to stand).
(d) Answer #2 (Rav Acha bar Yakov): It excludes a dice-player
(mid'Rabanan, we consider gambling winnings like theft,
because the loser did not firmly resolve to forfeit his
money if he loses).
1. Rav Acha excludes even someone disqualified
mid'Rabanan, all the more so a king who is
disqualified mid'Oraisa;
2. Rav Papa excludes a king, who is disqualified
mid'Oraisa, but he would say that a dice-player, who
is only disqualified mid'Rabanan, is liable for
Shevu'as ha'Edus.
(e) (Mishnah - R. Meir): (When he swears himself) he is
liable in or outside of Beis Din...(Chachamim say,
whether he swears himself or the oath is imposed on him,
he is only liable if he denies in Beis Din).
(f) Question: On what do they argue?
(g) Answer #1 (Rabanan): R. Meir holds 'Dun Minah u'Minah'
(when a matter is learned from another matter, we copy
(learn) the entire framework of the source); Chachamim
hold 'Dun Minah v'Uki b'Asra' (when we learn a law, we
apply it to the framework of the matter being learned).
1. R. Meir learns, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon applies
when he swears himself, also Shevu'as ha'Edus;
i. Also, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon applies in or
outside of Beis Din, also Shevu'as ha'Edus.
2. Chachamim also learn, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon
applies when he swears himself, also Shevu'as
ha'Edus;
i. However, they apply this to the framework of
Shevu'as ha'Edus (the Torah discusses an oath
imposed on a witness, and this is only in Beis
Din).
31b---------------------------------------31b
(h) Rejection (Rav Papa): Chachamim also hold Dun Minah
u'Minah; if they learned Shevu'as ha'Edus from Shevu'as
ha'Pikadon, they would agree with R. Meir;
(i) Answer #2 (Rav Papa): (R. Meir learns as above;)
Chachamim learn from a Kal va'Chomer.
1. One is liable even when the oath is imposed on him,
all the more so if he swears himself!
2. The principle of 'Dayo' says that we cannot learn
more than the source of the Kal va'Chomer: when the
oath is imposed on him, he is only liable in Beis
Din, also when he swears himself.
(j) Objection (Rabanan): Chachamim surely hold Dun Minah
v'Uki b'Asra!
1. (Mishnah - R. Meir): Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (the oath
of watchmen) applies to men and women, to strangers
and relatives, to Kosher and invalid witnesses;
i. When he swears himself, it applies in or
outside of Beis Din; if the oath is imposed on
him, he is only liable if he denies in Beis
Din.
2. Chachamim say, whether he swears himself or the oath
is imposed on him, he is liable (even outside of
Beis Din).
3. Question: What is Chachamim's source that one is
liable if the oath is imposed on him?
4. Answer: They learn from Shevu'as ha'Edus - but they
apply to it the law of Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (to be
liable everywhere)!
(k) Answer (Rav Papa): Indeed, from there you can prove that
Chachamim hold Dun Minah v'Uki b'Asra, but not from our
Mishnah. (Tosfos - and from our Mishnah you can prove
that R. Meir holds Dun Minah u'Minah.)
3) LIABILITY OF "SHOGEG" AND "MEZID"
(a) (Mishnah): One is liable (for intentionally swearing
falsely) when he knows the (punishment for the) oath;
(b) Question: What is the source of this?
(c) Answer (Beraisa): It does not say 'v'Ne'elam' by Shevu'as
ha'Edus, only by the other Parshiyos of Oleh v'Yored, to
teach that one is liable for intentional transgression
just as for unintentional.
(d) (Mishnah): He is liable also if he does not know the
oath, if he remembers the testimony.
(e) Question: What is the case of not knowing the oath, but
remembering the testimony?
(f) Answer (Rav Yehudah): He knows that it is forbidden to
swear falsely, but he does not remember if he is liable
for this.
(g) (Mishnah): He is exempt if he was totally Shogeg.
(h) Suggestion: Our Mishnah proves that Rav Kahana or Rav Asi
(who swore about what he thought Rav said, and was wrong
(26A)) was guiltless. (And it is difficult, why was he
worried?)
(i) Rejection: No - our Mishnah exempts regarding Shevu'as
ha'Edus, by which it does not say 'v'Nelam', therefore he
is exempt if he forgot;
1. Regarding oaths of Bituy, by which it says
"V'Nelam", one might have thought that he is liable
even when he mistakenly swore falsely - Rav had to
tell him that this is not so.
4) THE OATH
(a) (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Edus: Reuven told the witnesses
'Come testify for me'; they *swore*, 'We do not know
testimony for you';
1. Or, if they *said*, 'We do not know testimony for
you', Reuven said 'I impose this on you in an oath',
and they answered 'Amen'';
2. (If they were lying) they are liable.
(b) If Reuven made them swear five times outside of Beis Din,
and they came to Beis Din and admitted that they know,
they are exempt;
1. If they denied knowing, they are liable five times.
(c) If Reuven made them swear five times in Beis Din, they
are liable only once.
(d) R. Shimon: This is because once they swear that they do
not know, they can no longer testify.
(e) If both witnesses simultaneously denied knowing, they are
liable; if one denied after the other, the first is
liable, the latter is exempt;
(f) If one denied and the other admitted knowing, the denier
is liable, the one who admitted is exempt.
(g) If there were two pairs of witnesses, and one pair denied
after the other, both pairs are liable, for either pair
could have testified.
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