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1) [line 1] SHEMI'AS KOL (SHEVU'AS HA'EDUS)
(a) One of the litigants in a court case has the right to force a person to take an oath when he feels that the person is concealing testimony about the case. The oath that the alleged witness takes to claim that he is not harboring any testimony is called a Shevu'as ha'Edus (Vayikra 5:1).
(b) For example, a person asks two witnesses to testify on his behalf, in order to oblige the opposing litigant to pay him. The witnesses deny all knowledge of the case and even swear in court to that effect. If they admit afterwards that they did know testimony, they must bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored. If they are wealthy they each bring a female sheep or female goat. If they cannot afford the animal, they may each bring two turtledoves or two common doves, one as a Chatas and one as an Olah. If they cannot even afford birds, they may each bring an offering of 1/10 of an Eifah of flour as a Minchas Chatas (ibid. 5:5-13).

2) [line 4] AD D'MAISI KORBAN KAVU'A - [it is not sufficient to atone for the sin of entering the Mikdash while one is Tamei] until one brings a normal Korban Chatas

3) [line 5] DOLEH MAYIM MI'BOROS AMUKIM - one who draws water from deep wells (based upon Mishlei 20:5)

4) [line 19] KELAL / PERAT (KOL DAVAR SHE'HAYAH BI'CHELAL V'YATZA MIN HA'KELAL L'LAMED)
(a) In the Introduction to the Sifra (the Halachic Midrash to Vayikra), Rebbi Yishmael lists thirteen methods that Chazal use for extracting the Halachah from the verses of the Torah. One of them is "Kol Davar she'Hayah bi'Chelal v'Yatza Min ha'Kelal l'Lamed, Lo l'Lamed Al Atzmo Yatza, Ela l'Lamed Al ha'Kelal Kulo Yatza." Accordingly, if an action or object was included in a general category of Halachah and was then singled out by the verse in order to tell us that certain Halachos apply to it, the Halachos that apply to that object are applicable to everything in the general category. There are three applications of this rule:

1. When a new Halachah is explicitly written in the Parshah discussing the object that was singled out.
2. When there is no new Halachah written there, then we look for some new law that the Torah may be teaching us by the fact that it singled it out (for example, l'Chalek -- to differentiate all of the actions so that each one will be Mechayav a separate Korban).
3. If we cannot say that the object was singled out to teach us l'Chalek, we say that it comes to *limit* the general category only to those members that are similar to and share the characteristics of the object that was singled out (this is similar to the rule of "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal" -- see Background to Shavuos 4:13).
(This rule should not be confused with Davar she'Hayah bi'Chlal v'Yatzah li'Don b'Davar he'Chadash (see Background to Yevamos 7:6), which refers to a case where the new law that is mentioned with regard to the object that was singled out is in *contradiction* to the general rule of the Klal.)

5) [line 29] KOL SHE'EINO KAREV AL MIZBE'ACH HA'CHITZON KI'SHELAMIM - any sacrifice that is not offered on the outer Mizbe'ach like the Korban Shelamim (the offering of which is described in Vayikra 3:1-17 and 7:16-18)

6) [line 30] PIGUL
A sacrifice that was slaughtered (or any of the other three main actions involved in offering a sacrifice: Kabalas ha'Dam, Holachas ha'Dam, Zerikas ha'Dam -- see Background to Sanhedrin 82:65:a) with the intention of eating it or offering it Chutz li'Zemano (after its allotted time) becomes disqualified. It is forbidden to eat such a Korban, as the verse states, "v'Im He'achol Ye'achel mi'Besar Zevach Shelamav ba'Yom ha'Shelishi, Lo Yeratzeh, ha'Makriv Oso Lo Yechashev Lo, *Pigul* Yiheyeh." - "If [the person offering the sacrifice plans] to eat it on the third day, [the sacrifice] will not be accepted. It is considered Pigul (putrid, rejected) and it will not be counted in his favor" (Vayikra 7:18).

7) [line 3] NIVLAS OF TAHOR - the carcass of a Kosher bird
(a) Normally, items that are Tamei spread Tum'ah through touching them or carrying them ("Maga" or "Masa"). The only object that is Metamei mid'Oraisa *while being eaten* is Nivlas Of Tahor. Nivlas Of Tahor is a kosher bird that died or was killed without Shechitah. (This includes a bird that is unfit to be brought as a Korban upon which Melikah -- see Background to Kidushin 53:7 -- was performed.) It is *only* Metamei while in the Beis ha'Beli'ah (throat), during the process of being swallowed.
(b) A Nivlas Of Tahor is Metamei the person eating it, as well as any clothes or utensils that he is touching at the time that it is in his throat, giving them the status of "Rishon l'Tum'ah." (Once it is swallowed, the person remains Tamei, but is only Metamei food and drinks, i.e. he is a Rishon l'Tum'ah).

8) [line 7] EIN MI'UT ACHAR MI'UT ELA L'RABOS
(a) When a Mi'ut (text that excludes a particular case or item) is followed by another Mi'ut, the law is that "Ein Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut Ela l'Rabos." That is, when one limitation of the law appears after another limitation, the Torah's intent is to *extend* the law, rather than limit it.
(b) This rule of Biblical interpretation interprets the occurrence of two Mi'utim regarding an identical point as *extending* the Halachah they describe, rather than limiting it to include fewer items or to apply in fewer cases. That is, even though a single Mi'ut limits the Halachah to specific items or cases, a double Mi'ut teaches to *extend* the Halachah and not to interpret it in a limiting sense.
(c) The logical derivation for this rule is as follows: If we already know to apply the Halachah under discussion to a particular item (or case), it would not be necessary for the Torah to again teach that the Halachah applies only to that item. It is therefore evident from the second Mi'ut that the first one was *not* meant to limit the law to fewer items or cases. Likewise, the second Mi'ut cannot have been written to exclude those cases, for the Torah could have taught to exclude them by writing *only* the first Mi'ut. It must therefore be concluded that the double Mi'ut means to teach that we should *not* learn to exclude items or cases in the Halachah under discussion. (This rule is closely related to the rule of "Shenei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdim" -- see Background to Kidushin 58:13 and to the converse rule of "Ein Ribuy Achar Ribuy Ela l'Ma'et -- see Bava Kama 45:19.)
(d) In all cases of Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut, the obvious question is why did the Torah write even a single Mi'ut? Let the Torah write neither Mi'ut and we would know by ourselves not to exclude items or cases from the law, since there is no Mi'ut to exclude it! (Obviously the item would not be excluded without a Mi'ut, since we originally found it necessary to interpret the first Mi'ut as excluding that item.) TOSFOS (to Yoma 60a DH Trei) asks this question and answers that perhaps we would have excluded that item without the first Mi'ut, through a Binyan Av (see Background to Sanhedrin 30:18) or a Kal va'Chomer (see Background to Bava Basra 111:13). The first Mi'ut was not really necessary, but we would have justified the Mi'ut as "Milsa d'Asya b'Kal va'Chomer Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra" - "the Torah troubles itself to write out explicitly that which can be learned from a Kal va'Chomer" (see Kidushin 4a, Chulin 118b). The second Mi'ut teaches not only to ignore the first Mi'ut, but also to ignore the Binyan Av or Kal va'Chomer as well.

9) [line 9] "V'CHIPER AL HA'KODESH MI'TUM'OS BENEI YISRAEL [UMI'PISH'EIHEM L'CHOL TUM'OSAM...]" - "And he shall make an atonement for the Kodesh (the holy place), because of the Tum'os of the people of Yisrael, [and because of their transgressions in all their sins...]" (Vayikra 16:16)

10) [line 14] "U'SHMARTEM ES MISHMARTI L'VILTI ASOS ME'CHUKOS HA'TO'EVOS... V'LO SITAM'U BAHEM" - "Therefore you shall keep my ordinance, that you do not commit any one of these abominable customs, [which were committed before you,] and that you do not Metamei yourselves with them" (Vayikra 18:30)

11) [line 16] "V'LO SETAMEI ES HA'ARETZ" - "And you shall not Metamei the land" (Bamidbar 35:34)

12) [line 22] MI'MEKOMO HU MUCHRA - from its context it is evident (lit. decided)

13a) [line 26] CHATA'IM - unintentional sins
b) [line 26] PESHA'IM - intentional sins
14) [line 33] BAR KETALA HU - he liable to the death penalty

15a) [line 34] B'MEZID V'LO ASRU BEI - intentional transgression, for which he did not receive a proper warning (Hasra'ah -- see Background to Makos 4:14)
b) [last line] B'SHOGEG V'LO ISYADA LEI - unintentional transgression that never became know to the sinner

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