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1)

(a) The Tana does not count those cases which are Patur and Mutar. Consequently, we cannot ask why he does not count the four cases where the Ani or the Ba'al ha'Bayis did not even do an Isur, only the cases which are Patur but Asur.

(b) When Shmuel referred to the three cases as being the only ones where Patur means Patur u'Mutar, he was referring to cases where an act was performed, to teach us that nevertheless, the person who performed them did nothing wrong.

(c) The Tana refers only to those cases where the Ani or the Ba'al ha'Bayis made the Akirah and not the Hanachah (but not vice-versa), as we discussed already in the Mishnah, because it is possible for him to complete the Melachah. It does not refer to those cases where he makes the Hanachah only (because there, he can never come to complete the Melachah).

3)

(a) Rav Asked Rebbi whether, if someone started walking with the load already on his back or in his hand, it is called an Akirah - or whether it is only called an Akirah when one actually picks up the object from its current location?

(b) Rebbi answered that it is indeed called an Akirah and that if he walked out with the object on his back, he would be Chayav.

(c) It is not the same as someone whose hand is stretched inside a house (like the hand of the Ani in our Mishnah), and who then carries something which a second person placed into it, out into the street. *He* is Patur, since the hand is not placed in the domain where it is situated - the hand is in the air, and not on the ground of the house. In that case, its location is the same as that of the body to which it is attached.

(d) Rebbi Chiya scolded his nephew Rav for asking Rebbi a Sha'aleh to do with Shabbos, when he was learning a different Masechta.

4)

(a) Abaye learns that a person's hand does not follow his body when it is in the Reshus ha'Rabim, from the fact that when the Ba'al ha'Bayis takes the object from the extended hand of the Ani, he is not Chayav. And he learns that it does not follow the body in the Reshus ha'Yachid, from the fact that the Ani is not Chayav when he takes from the extended hand of the Ba'al ha'Bayis.

(b) Abaye asks whether Chazal did not decree, that if someone extends his hand holding an object into another domain, his hand should not have the Din of a Karmelis, which would mean that he would be obligated to keep his hand there the entire Shabbos, since it is forbidden to move an object (making a Hanachah included) from a Karmelis into any other domain on Shabbos.

(c) 'Karmel' is a type of forest, which is neither a public thoroughfare, nor a private domain.

(d) The air below ten Tefachim in a Reshus ha'Rabim, has the Din of a Reshus ha'Rabim. Therefore the Rabbanan penalized him for attempting to transfer from it to a Reshus ha'Yachid. Whereas above ten Tefachim, it has the Din of a Makom Petur (through which it is permitted to transfer); consequently, Chazal did not penalize him.

(a) Is it not strange to penalize someone who stretches out his hand with an object *after* nightfall, when he is likely to drop it from fatigue some hours later (and be Chayav Kareis or at least a Chatas), and not to penalize him when he stretched it out *before* nightfall, when he can in any event, not become Chayav, even if he does let go of the object? Surely, if anything, the other way round would appear more logical?

(b) It would therefore appear, the Gemara contends, that Chazal are not concerned with the person who has sinned transgressing further (as if to say, their decrees will remain in force, and if he goes on to sin, he has only himself to blame). Consequently, someone who placed bread in the oven, is forbidden to remove it (as this constitutes an Isur de'Rabbanan, as we shall see), in order to spare himself from the Chiyuv Chatas.

(c) The Rabbanan forbade one to remove baked bread from the side of the oven, to which it is sticking. It is not a Melachah, but a Chochmah.

(a) The reason that Chazal did not decree by Shogeg is not in order to prevent him from sinning, but because there is no real Isur - only a penalty, which is not applicable if the transgressor did not intend to sin, whereas removing bread from the oven is a firm Isur de'Rabbanan, which the Rabbanan may well not have waived.
And even if they were strict in decreeing the man's hand a Karmelis (when he stretched it put on purpose), that may be only because he has the option of not dropping the object and of not sinning. Whereas in the case of Rav Bibi bar Abaye, where he is bound to be Chayav, if he leaves the bread in the oven, perhaps they waived their decree to prevent him from becoming Chayav.

(b) Both Beraisos could be speaking when he stretched out his hand be'Shogeg; the one Beraisa however, holds that they decreed Shogeg because of Meizid, whereas the other holds that they did not.

(c) Both Beraisos agree that Chazal did not penalize him be'Shogeg, from withdrawing his hand back to the courtyard where he is standing - and the Beraisa which forbids him to withdraw his hand from the courtyard over which it is now extended, is speaking when he wants to drop the object over a *third* courtyard.

(d) This is forbidden because, even though he is not achieving what he initially set out to do (and is why we might have thought that it should be permitted), he *is* however achieving his original intention of transferring the object from one location to another. Consequently, Chazal permitted him to withdraw the object to the courtyard where he is now standing (where he will have achieved nothing at all) but not to any other courtyard.