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Shabbos 142

142b

QUESTION: Even though the Mishnah says that one may lift a barrel and shake off a stone that lies on top of it, that applies only if the stone was mistakenly left on top. If the stone was purposely left there, the Gemara explains, the barrel is a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur.

REBBI AKIVA EIGER, citing the MEKOR BARUCH (#3), questions why the barrel should be considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur. The Gemara makes it clear that the barrel contains wine in it. If so, it should not become a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur, since it is a Basis for a permissible item (the wine) as well! (One of the conditions required in order for an object to be a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur is that it serves only the Muktzah item and no permitted item (Daf 142a, see Background section).

ANSWERS:

(a) The MEKOR BARUCH answers that apparently we view the opening on the top of the barrel, where the stone is resting, as separate from the bottom of the barrel. The permissible item (the wine) is in the bottom part, while the Muktzah item (the stone) is on the top; since the top of the barrel is considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur, the barrel may not be moved.

This answer does not seem to conform to the opinion of the RITVA earlier in Shabbos (44b; see Insights there) who said that if a Muchni (wheel) is attached to a wagon and there is a Muktzah item resting on the Muchni, one *may* move the Muchni, since the Muchni and the wagon are all considered *one* object, and not two separate objects.

(b) It could be that the barrel cannot be considered a Basis for a permissible item since the wine is not accessible at present without lifting the stone on top of the barrel. (That is, the wine is secondary to the stone, and the barrel is presently serving only the stone and not the wine for all intents and purposes.) (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: Rava, on Yom Tov, told his servant to roast a goose and throw the intestines to a cat. The Gemara learns from this that Rava rules in accordance with Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that it is permitted to move something on Yom Tov for the sake of animals even though it was designated for human use before Yom Tov.

How can this be inferred from Rava's ruling? Perhaps Rava agrees with Rebbi Yehudah and not with Rebbi Shimon; Rebbi Yehudah prohibits giving animals an object designated for humans *only* when the object is *no longer fit* to be used by a person. (Because the object is no longer fit for its originally designated use, of feeding humans, it is considered Nolad and Muktzah). But if the object can *still* be used by a person (that is, it is fit for its designated use), then even Rebbi Yehudah agrees that it is not Muktzah and it may be given to animals! Why, then, does the Gemara say that Rava's action shows that he rules like Rebbi Shimon? The goose intestines were still fit for humans!

(The type of Muktzah that our Sugya is discussing is usually referred to as "Muchan l'Adam Eino Muchan l'Behemah." It is important to note that there are two distinct types of Muktzah which are included in this expression.

(1) If the laws of Shabbos or Yom Tov prevent man from using an object -- for example, on Shabbos a live animal is not fit for human use since it is forbidden to slaughter an animal on Shabbos. Even though live animals are sometimes fed to dogs, since this animal is not fit for humans at present it is Muktzah (according to Rebbi Shimon) and may not be fed to dogs.

(2) If something happens to an object on Shabbos that makes it unfit for man, it may not even be fed to dogs. (This is a form of Nolad). For example, if the animal was alive before Yom Tov (and was fit for man, since he could slaughter and eat it on Yom Tov) and then it died on Yom Tov, becoming unfit for man.

In Rava's case, the intestines of the animal fit into neither category! There is no law of Yom Tov preventing the intestines from being used by man, and nothing happened to the intestines making them unfit for human use.)

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI explains that goose intestines are not fit for man *not* because any change occurred to them, but because it is Yom Tov, and it is not the manner to eat goose intestines on Yom Tov. Therefore, it is considered as if the laws of Yom Tov prohibit this item from human use (category (1) above), and that it why it would be prohibited to give them to animals according to Rebbi Yehudah.

(b) TOSFOS (Shabbos 29a, DH Achlan, and Beitzah 33a, DH v'Shadi) challenges Rashi's explanation from the Gemara earlier (128a) which states that it is permitted to move raw meat on Shabbos because it is possible for people to eat the meat in such a state. Certainly it is not the normal manner to eat raw meat on Shabbos, and yet it does not become Muktzah! Tosfos therefore explains that goose intestines are edible as soon as the goose is slaughtered (*before* Yom Tov), however, shortly thereafter (*on* Yom Tov) the intestines spoil and become inedible. Since the intestines are no longer fit for man, they become Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Tosfos understands that they fall into the second category (2) above.)

Perhaps Rashi maintained that goose intestines cannot be compared to the raw meat for the following reason. Rava slaughtered the goose because he intended to eat its meat, and the intestines are secondary to the meat. Relative to the meat, the intestines are not fit for use on Yom Tov. Raw meat, though, stands by itself and is not secondary to anything else, and therefore it is not Muktzah. (M. Kornfeld)