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Shabbos 29

(1) THE ARGUMENT BETWEEN REBBI ELIEZER AND REBBI AKIVA

QUESTION: Rav Hamnuna gives a second explanation for the argument between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva in the Mishnah. He says that the Mishnah is discussing pieces of cloth smaller than three by three Tefachim but larger than three by three Etzba'os. The argument between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva revolves around the dispute between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua in Keilim with regard to "Kulei Matlani'os."

Why does the Mishnah in Maseches Shabbos discuss a topic which seemingly has nothing to do with the laws of Shabbos, and belongs in the Mishnayos of Keilim?

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI explains that the garment under discussion in our Mishnah is a small piece that is still hanging on a hook behind the door, which the person decided that he is going to use as a plug for the bath drain. It could be that it was common to use such scraps for wicks as well, and therefore the Mishnah discusses using such a piece of cloth as a wick. The Mishnah records the argument concerning whether or not the wick needs to be singed before it is lit, because that argument deals with the same type and size of object (i.e. the wick) which the argument concerning Tum'ah discusses. Indeed, our Mishnah could have discussed only the argument about singeing a wick, but it cited the argument concerning Tum'ah because the two topics deal with the same object. (That is, according to Rashi, the Tum'ah discussion has nothing to do with pre-lighting a wick.)

(b) The RITVA explains that the garment or scrap that the Mishnah is discussing is not hanging on a hook, but it *used* to be hanging on a hook. Now the person has designated it as a wick. Such a designation makes it lose the status of a usable garment, the same way that designating it as a plug for a drain does. The Tana'im are arguing whether the act of taking the cloth and using it as a plug, or folding it into a wick, takes away its status of a usable garment or not. The explanation of the argument in the Mishnah, then, is basically the same as it was explained earlier (28b) -- whether or not Kipul (folding a scrap into the shape of a wick) removes from the scrap the status of "usable garment." The difference between the whether they argue over Kulei Matlani'os or Kipul Mo'il, is basically whether the argument in the Mishnah was discussing a cloth less than three by three Tefachim (Kulei Matlani'os), or whether it is discussing any size cloth that is folded up (or perhaps a cloth that is exactly three by three *Etzba'os*, see Rambam).

According to the Ritva, the reason why our Mishnah records this argument is because the question of Tum'ah specifically involves something that is *presently being used* for a wick.

29b

QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Mishnah from Kela'im that states that a garment seller is permitted to wear a garment of Kela'im as long as he does not intend to derive pleasure from it, according to Rebbi Shimon (who maintains that if one does not have intention to transgress a prohibition, his action is not considered a transgression).

Why is that so? Rebbi Shimon agrees that if the transgression will *definitely* occur with one's action, then it is forbidden even if he did not intend for it to occur ("Pesik Reisha"). Here, the person wearing the garment will definitely derive pleasure from it since he is wearing it in the rain and it protects him from the rain! Why is it permitted for him to wear the garment?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (u'Vilvad) answers that the person is wearing the garment with Kilayim on top of other clothes, and therefore it is not certain that he will derive pleasure from the forbidden garment.

(b) The RITVA explains that the seller does not actually wear the garment. He merely places it over his shoulders, and the rain may wet him despite the garment slung over his shoulders.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Kela'im 10:16) also says that the seller places it over his shoulders, but for a different reason. The Rambam is of the opinion that *wearing* a garment of Kela'im ("Levishah") is forbidden even if one derives no pleasure from it. Only when he does not wear it in the normal manner ("Ha'ala'ah") -- for example, if he throws it over his shoulders -- does the prohibition depend on whether he derives pleasure from it. (Hagaon Rav Chaim Kanievsky, in DERECH EMUNAH, p. 75)

(c) The RAN in Chulin (32a according to the pages in the Rif) says that the prohibition of "Pesik Reisha" (doing an act that will definitely result in second outcome -- aside from the intended outcome -- which transgresses a prohibition) applies only to prohibitions that depend on an action being done. Here, though, the prohibition is one of *enjoyment* and involves no real action. Since enjoyment depends entirely on a person's frame of mind, "Pesik Reisha" does not apply. A person cannot enjoy something against his will. (The Ran cites a proof for this. The Gemara teaches that "ha'Mis'asek b'Chalavim v'Arayos Chayav" -- one who unintentionally ate forbidden Chelev or unintentionally participated in forbidden relations is Chayav. Only in those two cases is one Chayav for deriving pleasure without intention to do so, because there the source of the pleasure actually enters the person's body and therefore it does not depend on his intentions. In all other cases of forbidden pleasure, though, one must intend to derive pleasure in order to be Chayav.)