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1)

(a) The Torah, in Mishpatim, describing a case where Reuven and Shimon are fighting, and Reuven strikes a pregnant woman and kills the babies, rules "ve'Im Ason Yiheyeh, ve'Nasata Nefesh Tachas Nafesh". Rebbi Elazar interprets "Nefesh Tachas Nafesh" literally, that Reuven is actually Chayav Miysah for killing the woman (even though he did not intend to strike *her*).

(b) The Pasuk must be speaking when Reuven actually intended to kill Shimon, and not just wound him - because otherwise, he would not be Chayav Miysah.

(c) The problem with the continuation of the Pasuk, obligating the man to pay for the babies, should the woman not die is - that since he is 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho, why should he have to pay?

(d) So Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul establishes the Pasuk when Shimon or a third person, was able to stop Reuven by incapacitating him, without actually killing him, in which case he maintains, Reuven is not 'Nitan Lehatziko be'Nafsho' and therefore Chayav to pay.

(a) To reconcile the Mishnah in Kesuvos (which includes Chayvei Kareis in the Din of K'nas), with our Mishnah (which includes them in the Din of 'Matzilin Osan be'Nafshan') even if it speaks about an Anusah (and not by a Mefutah), Abaye establishes it when it was possible to save the woman without killing the rapist, like Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul.

(b) We query Abaye's answer however, on the grounds that maybe in the case of Rebbi Yonasan ben Shaul , the Rodef is Chayav to pay, because his Chiyuv Miysah is to Shimon, whereas his Chiyuv Mamon is to the woman's husband, assuming he is not Shimon (and not because there was another way of saving Shimon). And we reply - that this distinction is unfounded, since it makes no difference whether the two Chiyuvim are to two different people or to the same person. Either way, he would be Patur from paying.

(c) Rava (or Rabah) rules that in a case where Reuven is chasing Shimon and ...

1. ... breaks vessels belonging to Shimon or Levi" - he is Patur (because he is 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho').
2. ... Shimon breaks vessels belonging to Shimon or Levi" - he is Chayav (because, as we learned in Bava Kama, someone who saves himself with someone else's money is obligated to pay).
3. ... Yehudah, who is chasing Reuven, in an attempt to save Shimon, breaks vessels belonging to Shimon or Levi - he is Patur ...

(d) ... mi'de'Rabbanan, so that people should not be discouraged from saving the lives of others whose lives are being threatened.

(a) Rebbi Shimon includes a person who is about to worship idols in 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho', because, he argues - if for P'gam Hedyot, we say 'Nitan Lehatzilo be'Nafsho', how much more so for P'gam Gavohah (where Hashem's Name, Kevayachol, will be stained).

(b) Rebbi Shimon has no problem of 'Ein Onshin min ha'Din' - since he holds 'Onshin min ha'Din'.

(c) And his son Rebbi Elazar includes someone who is about to be Mechalel Shabbos in the same category - because he agrees with his father with regard to the 'Kal va'Chomer', only in addition, he holds of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Chilul" "Chilul" (comparing Shabbos to Avodah-Zarah).

(a) The decision which the Chachamim, quoted by Rebbi Yochanan citing Rebbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak arrived at in the attic of Beis Nitzah in Lod was - that the principle of 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg' applies to all Mitzvos, with the exception of the three cardinal sins, Avodah-Zarah, Giluy Arayos and Shefichus Damim.

(b) The source for the three exceptions we will discuss shortly. The source for the principle is - the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos "va'Chai Bahem" 've'Lo she'Yamus Bahem'.

(c) Based on "Va'Chai Bahem", Rebbi Yishmael - includes Avodas Kochavim in 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor'.

(d) He learns from the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sechalelu es Shem Kodshi ve'Nikdashti be'Soch B'nei Yisrael" - that the above is confined to contravening Avodah-Zarah be'Tzin'ah (in private), but be'Farhesya (in front of ten Yisre'elim), he is obligated to sanctify Hashem's Name in his love for Him.

(a) The Chachamim, we conclude, hold like Rebbi Eliezer, who in turn, learns like Rebbi. Rebbi in a Beraisa, learns from the Hekesh ("Ki Ka'asher Yakum Ish al Re'ehu u'Retzacho Nefesh Kein ha'Davar ha'Zeh") comparing ...

1. ... Rotze'ach to Na'arah ha'Me'urasah - that 'Nitan le'Hatzilo be'Nafsho' applies to the former, just as it does to the latter (as we learned earlier).
2. ... Na'arah ha'Me'urasah to Rotze'ach - that 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' applies to the former, just as it does to the latter.

(b) Rebbi learns 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' by Retzichah - from a S'vara (as we shall now see).

(c) Rebbi Eliezer interprets "u've'Chol Nafshecha" to mean - that one must love Hashem with all one's money.

(d) Rebbi Eliezer learns from the Pasuk "ve'Ahavta es Hashem Elokecha ...

1. ... "u've'Chol Nafshecha" (bearing in mind that the Torah will anyway write "u've'Chol Me'odecha") - that even if his body is dearer to him than his money, he must still give it up for love of Hashem.
2. ... "u've'Chol Me'odecha" (bearing in mind that the Torah has already written "u've'Chol Nafshecha") - that even if his money is dearer to him that his body (like the B'nei Gad and B'nei Reuven), then he must give that to Hashem, too).

(a) Rabah (or Rava) forbade the man who had been ordered by the mayor of his town to murder a fellow-Jew on pain of death - to follow his instructions, on the grounds that - 'Who said that *his* blood was any redder than the other man's?

(b) Ravin Amar Rebbi Yochanan corroborates what we learned earlier in the Beraisa (with regard to the Chumra of be'Farhesya). Rav Dimi Amar Rebbi Yochanan further qualified the Torah's concession of "va'Chai Bahem" 've'Lo she'Yamus Bahem" - by precluding there where the ruling power has issued a decree negating any Mitzvah. In such a case, he rules, one is obligated to give up one life even for a 'minor Mitzvah', and even in private.

(c) Rava bar Rav Yitzchak defines the 'minor Mitzvah' of Rav Dimi - as changing the way that one ties one's shoe-laces (which is no more than a custom), provided there is something Jewish (e.g. to with modesty) in the way we do it (see Tosfos DH 'Afilu').

7)

(a) Rebbi Yochanan learns from the Pasuk "ve'Nikdashti be'Soch *B'nei Yisrael*" - that 'Farhesya' means in front of ten Yisre'elim (and not Nochrim).

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether it was sufficient to have nine Yisre'elim and to complement the ten with one Nochri (see Aruch le'Ner).

(c) Rav Yanai the brother of Rebbi Chiya bar Aba learns from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Toch" "Toch" (from the Pasuk "Hibadlu mi'Toch ha'Eidah ha'Zos") - a. that ten people constitute Farhesya, and b. that they must all be Yisre'elim.

(a) We then ask from Esther - who was Farhesya (seeing as everyone knew about it [see Nesiv Meir]), that regarding other Mitzvos, we apply the principle 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg', even be'Farhesya.

(b) We do not rather ask that it was Giluy Arayos, which should therefore have been forbidden, even if it had been be'Tzin'ah - because Bi'ah with a Nochri is not considered Giluy Arayos (see Tosfos DH 've'Ha').

(c) When Abaye answers 'Esther Karka Olam Haysah' - he means that as long as a woman does not perform any act, but is totally passive, she is not subject to 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor'.

(a) Rava (who does not disagree with Abaye's answer) - adds that since Achashverosh's previous demands (to which Esther was now acquiescing) had been for his own pleasure, and not in order to make her sin, 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor' did not apply. Note, Rava's answer, like Abaye's would not have worked had it been a question of Giluy Arayos.

(b) Rava proves his point from 'Hani K'vaki ve'Dimoniki' - tall copper vessels, which they would fill with burning coals and which they would normally place on the royal table.

(c) In this case - the priests would demand fire from every household for this purpose, but they would place the vessels in front of their idols. Since the Yisre'elim complied and were not Moser Nefesh, Rava proves from here that when the Nochrim's intention is not in order to make the Yisrael sin, 'Yehareg ve'Lo Ya'avor' does not apply (see also Chidushei ha'Ran).

(d) Rava follows his own reasoning. In a case where a Nochri threatens to kill a Yisrael unless he cuts on Shabbos some Aspasta (a grass used for animal fodder) and throws it ...

1. ... to his animals - he rules 'Ya'avor ve'Al Yehareg' (since it is for the benefit of the Nochri).
2. ... into the river - he rules 'Yehareg ve'Al Ya'avor (since the Nochri's sole intention is to make him sin).

(a) They asked Rebbi Ami whether a Nochri is commanded on Kidush Hashem. Abaye try to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa, which lists seven Mitzvos B'nei No'ach - and not eight, seemingly precluding 'Kidush Hashem'.

(b) Rava refuted Abaye's proof with the words 'Inhu ve'Chol Abizraihu', by which he meant - that the seven Mitzvos incorporate all their branches and accessories - of which (assuming that they are Chayav on Kidush Hashem) Kidush Hashem is one.

(a) After having undertaking not to worship idols, Na'aman (the Syrian general) asked Elisha - to forgive him when, in his capacity as general of the army, he would have to accompany the King once a year on his visit to the Temple of Beis Rimon, where he would be forced to bow down to the idol together with the king who would lean on him for support.

(b) Rav Ada bar Ahavah Amri Bei Rav Kahana tries to prove from here - that a Nochri is not commanded on Kidush Hashem, because otherwise, how could Elisha grand him permission to disregard it.

(c) The proof from there lies - in Elisha's blessing, and not in the fact that he did not obligate him to give up his life, since based on the Pasuk "Hoche'ach Tochiach es Amisecha" ('ve'Lo es ha'Ger [Toshav]'), a Yisrael is not Chayav to rebuke a Nochri.

(d) We repudiate Rav Ada bar Ahavah's proof however - on the grounds that Na'aman's act constituted a Davar she'be'Tzin'ah (since the Torah writes "be'Soch B'nei Yisrael", as we learned earlier, and ten Jews were hardly likely to have been found in Beis Rimon), and the She'eilah concerns Kidush Hashem be'Farhesya, and not be'Tzin'ah.