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1)

(a) The Tana of a Beraisa cites a case where Reuven asks Shimon to lend him the cow that is standing before them, and Shimon responds by forbidding his cow or all his property on him with a Konem, should he owns any other cows. What is the Din if Shimon is found to possess other cows in his lifetime?

(b) Why is Reuven permitted to have benefit from the cow if Shimon is found to possess other cows and then dies or if he gave the cow to Reuven as a gift, (according to our initial supposition)?

(c) How do we reconcile this with Rava, who, in the previous case, forbade the loaf even after the Madir had given it to the Mudar?

(d) Rav Ashi supports this answer from the Lashon 'Nitnah Lo' (instead of 'Nasnah Lo') used by the Tana.
Considering that 'Nitnah' is spelt the same way as 'Nasnah', how did Rav Ashi know to read it 'Nitnah'?

(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos O Lo?'.
What are the ramifications of Rava's She'eilah?

(b) How did Rav Nachman resolve Rava's She'eilah from our Mishnah ('Makom she'Notlin Alehah S'char, Tipol Hana'ah le'Hekdesh')?

(c) What would the owner have otherwise done with it?

(d) Is Rav Nachman's reply the last word on the matter?

(a) The Chachamim in a Beraisa rule 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'. Rebbi Meir disagrees. He maintains 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos'.
If there is Me'ilah, what concession goes with it?

(b) What distinction does Rebbi Meir make between a Konem K'lali and a Konem P'rati?

(c) Like whom is the Halchah?

(a) Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ivya asked Rav Ashi who will be Mo'el in a case where Reuven forbids a loaf of bread on Shimon and then gives it to him. On what grounds might Reuven not be Mo'el, despite the fact that he is the one who declared the Konem on the loaf?

(b) How is this a disproof to the Rambam? What does the Rambam say about someone who is Madir his friend and then provides him with a meal?

(c) Why might Shimon not be Mo'el?

(d) On what grounds will this case differ from a regular case of Me'ilah, where someone who takes something from the domain of Hekdesh into his own domain may well be Mo'el even though he too, is unaware that it is Hekdesh?

(a) Rav Ashi resolves Rav Acha's She'eilah.
Who is Mo'el in the above case?

(b) Does this absolve Shimon from Me'ilah completely?

(c) What does the Yerushalmi ask about using a loaf as fuel that one forbade on oneself with a Konem?

(d) What does the Yerushalmi rule?

6)

(a) May the Madir ...

1. ... separate T'rumos and Ma'asros on behalf of the Mudar?
2. ... bring Kinei Zavin and Zavos and the Kinei Yoldos ... on his or her behalf, should he (the Madir) happen to be a Cohen?

(b) Why, on principle, is he permitted to teach him Torah?

(c) What restriction exists in this regard?

(a) They asked whether Cohanim who perform the Avodah are the Sheluchim of the people or of the Torah.
What difference does it make whose Sheluchim they are?

(b) Even assuming that they are the Torah's Sheluchim, why is the Madir not forbidden to bring the Mudar's Korbanos anyway, because, as a result of the Cohen's, a Zav and a Zavah ... become permitted to eat Kodshim?

(c) In Kidushin, we conclude that they must be the Torah's Sheluchim.
On what is that conclusion based?

(d) Then why, in our Sugya, do we leave the She'eilah unresolved?

(a) How do we counter the proof (that the Cohanim are the Sheluchim of the Torah) from our Mishnah, which permits the Madir to bring 'Kinei Zavin ve'Zavos ... ' on behalf of the Mudar? Why *does* the Tana mention specifically those Korbanos?

(b) How does Rebbi Yochanan learn from the Pasuk in Shemini "Zos *Toras* ha'Zav" that the Korbanos of a Mechusar Kaparah (as opposed to Korbanos that come to atone) do not require Da'as?

(c) Can we then infer the opposite? Can we infer that the Madir is forbidden to bring other Korbanos (that come to atone) on behalf of the Mudar (because Cohanim are Sheluchim of the people)?

(a) In the Beraisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman, the Tana obligates a Ketanah, a woman who is pregnant and a woman who is feeding to use a cloth during Tashmish.
Why is a Ketanah obligated to do so?

(b) How do we reconcile this with the Sugya in Yevamos, which concludes that she is danger of dying, but not that she is bound to?

(c) Based on the Pasuk (also in Shemini) "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", what Kashya does this now pose on Rebbi Yochanan?

(d) So what *does* he Darshen from "Zos *Toras* ha'Yoledes", if not to include a Ketanah?

(a) We base Rebbi Yochanan's D'rashah on a statement of Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa.
What does Rebbi Yehudah say about a woman who is obligated to bring Korbanos?

(b) Why do we need to quote Rebbi Yehudah in order to establish Rebbi Yochanan?

(a) Bearing in mind that whatever a woman owns belongs to her husband, what sort of Korban is a wealthy husband obligated to bring on her behalf, should she need to bring a Korban Olah ve'Yored?

(b) What is the source of the husband's obligation?

(c) Is he also obligated to bring ...

1. ... her Nedarim and Nedavos?
2. ... the Korbenos Chovah that she was already obligated to bring from before, should he divorce her?

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