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1)

(a) We ask exactly the same She'eilah regarding Yad li'Tzedakah as we asked by Pei'ah. On what grounds do some Rishonim contend that this She'eilah presumes 'Yesh Yad le'Pei'ah'.
Why might we nevertheless hold 'Ein Yad li'Tzedakah'?

(b) And on what grounds do we reject that contention?

(c) So why do we ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah' after the She'eilah whether 'Yesh Yad le'Pei'ah'?

(d) We learned the Hekesh from Pei'ah to Korbanos from "me'Imach".
From where do we learn the Hekesh from Tzedakah to Korbanos?

(a) We also ask whether 'Yesh Yad le'Hefker' or not. We might say that just as Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah, Yesh Yad le'Hefker, since usually, when people declare their property Hefker, they do so for the benefit of the poor (Tosfos DH 'Hefker').
Why on the other hand, might Hefker be different?

(b) Ravina asks whether 'Yesh Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei'.
What is the case? What are the ramifications of the She'eilah?

(c) How do we reconcile this She'eilah with Ravina himself, who elsewhere, is unsure whether Hazmanah is effective by a bathroom in the first place?

(d) Why did Rav Papa not ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Shevu'ah'?

(a) By Kidushin, we rule Yesh Yad, le'Chumra (like every S'feika d'Oraysa). On what grounds do we reject the contention of the Rishonim that by Pei'ah and Tzedakah too, we go le'Chumra, and say Yesh Yad?

(b) What distinction does the Sugya in Yoma make between bakers having to separate Safek Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Ani on the one hand, and Ma'ser Sheini on the other?

(c) What will be the Halachah in the case of ...

1. ... Yad le'Hefker?
2. ... Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei?

(a) 'Menudeh Ani Lach, Rebbi Akiva Hayah Chochech ba'Zeh Lehachmir'.
What does 'Chochech' mean?

(b) Will the Noder receive Malkos if he subsequently transgresses ...

1. ... if he added 'she'Ani Ochal Lach'?
2. ... if he did not?

(c) What important principle can we derive from Abaye's statement?

(a) We establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan by 'Menudeh Ani Lach'.
What is the basis of their Machlokes?

(b) What will they both hold by ...

1. ... 'Nedina Minach'? What must one add for this Neder to be valid?
2. ... 'Meshamtana Minach'? What does this statement imply?

(c) Rav Chisda will soon state that nobody contends with Rebbi Akiva's opinion.
What is the other reason to rule like the Rabbanan?

(d) In that case, which is the sole case of all those in this Sugya where the Neder is valid?

6)

(a) Rav Chisda disagrees with the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan argue.
What Neder had the man who came before him made regarding the property of Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba's son?

(b) What did Rav Chisda rule?

(c) How does this prove that Rav Chisda argues with Rap Papa in the previous Sugya?

(a) Rebbi Ila Amar Rav rules that a Niduy that is made in the presence of the Menudeh, can only be released in his presence. We learn the reason from the Yerushalmi, which gives the same reason for a similar case.
What reason does the Yerushalmi give and in which connection?

(b) What reason did we at first offer and then reject?

(c) If one released the Niduy not in front of the Menudeh, is the Niduy released Bedieved?

(d) Under which circumstances will it be permitted even Lechatchilah, to release it when the Menudeh is not present?

(a) According to Rav Chanin Amar Rav, what should someone do if he hears his friend mention the Name of Hashem in vain?

(b) And what does he mean when he says that should he fail to do so, then he himself 'will be in Niduy'?

(c) This is tied up with the fact that the unwarranted mention of Hashem's Name leads to poverty.
How do we learn this from the Pasuk in Sh'mos "Ki Meisu Kol ha'Anashim ha'Mevakshim es Nafshecha"? What has this Pasuk got to do with poverty?

(d) In which connection did Hashem say this Pasuk? How do we know that it was not one of the other three connotations of death that Hashem was referring to here. Perhaps they ...

1. ... had become blind?
2. ... had contracted Tzara'as?
3. ... had no children?

(a) In which other connection do we find poverty compared to death?

(b) How do we reconcile our Sugya, which obligates Niduy for someone who abuses the Name of Hashem, with the Yerushalmi, which obligates Niduy for any form of misconduct performed in front of others (indeed we find cases of Niduy for sowing seeds among the vines [Kidushin], and for hitting one's grown-up son [Mo'ed Katan])?

(a) What did Rav Huna do when he heard a woman taking Hashem's Name in vain?

(b) Besides the obligation to place a Niduy on someone who abuses the name of Hashem, which two other Halachos did Rebbi Aba extrapolate from Rav Huna?

(c) Shmuel in Eilu Megalchin requires a minimum Niduy of thirty days for brazenness. According to the Rif, this is a dispute between the two Sugyos.
How does Tosfos reconcile the discrepancy?

(a) According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, a Talmid-Chacham who places himself in Niduy is also permitted to release the Niduy.
Why might we have thought otherwise?

(b) Mar Zutra the Chasid demonstrated this.
What did Mar Zutra used to do?

(c) The Rashba restricts Rav Gidal Amar Rav's Halachah to cases like that of Mar Zutra, where the Niduy is only Midas Chasidus.
What is the problem with this from the Kashya 'P'shita' (which the Rashba it appears, did not have in his text)? What would have been a more appropriate Kashya to ask?

(a) Why did Mar Zutra release his Niduy immediately upon arriving home? What can we extrapolate from that?

(b) What distinction does the Ra'avad make between the man's wife and the other members of his family?

(c) Why is there no proof for the Ra'avad from the Sugya in Mo'ed Katan, which asks whether Tashmish ha'Mitah is prohibited to a Menudeh (implying that his wife is certainly permitted to approach him)?

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