Previous daf

1)

(a) According to Rav Papi ...

1. ... Rebbi Nasan learns from the Pasuk "ve'Chafrah ha'Levanah" (as if it had written "ve'Hafarah Chal Banah" - Rashi) - that the building (i.e. the Bamah, which Rebbi Nasan considers every Noder as having built) can be annulled after it has been built (after it has taken effect), but not before.
2. ... the Rabbanan learn from the Pasuk in Iyov "Meifer Machshevos Arumim" - that the husband can annul his wife's Neder the moment it has been declared.

(b) He also holds that, by Hataras Nedarim, even the Rabbanan agree that a Chacham cannot annul a Neder until it has taken effect - and he learns it from the Pasuk "Lo Yachel *Devaro*" (which he understands to mean 'Chalos Devaro' - from the time that it takes effect).

(c) Even assuming that Rav Acha bar Huna (in the story at the end of the previous Amud) might well agree with Rav Papi, Rava nevertheless cites him as saying that they argue by Hatarah in the same way as they argue by Hafarah - because it cannot be proved from the story that he agrees with Rav Papi, seeing as it is possible that he did what he did in order to accommodate Rebbi Nasan (as we explained above).

(d) The Beraisa says 'Konem she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni u'le'Mi she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al ha'Rishon, ve'Achar-Kach Nish'al al ha'Sheini'.' We ...

1. ... try and prove Rav Papi's ruling from here - because otherwise (if not for the fact that the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Nasan by Hataras Nedarim), why should he not first have the second Neder revoked, and then the first one.
2. ... reject the proof - because how do we know anyway which Neder the Tana is referring to when he says 'Rishon' and 'Sheini' (in other words, the first Neder might mean whichever one he revokes first and the second one, the remaining Neder).

(a) We bring a similar proof from another Beraisa ''Konem she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni, Hareini Nazir le'che'she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al Nidro, ve'Achar-Kach Nish'al al Nizro'. If Rebbi Nasan and the Rabbanan even argued by Hatarah, then, according to the Rabbanan, why does the Tana require the Hatarah specifically in that order? Why should he not invert the order?

(b) We reject this proof - by establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Nasan.

(a) Mereimar told Ravina that his (Ravina's) father, quoted Rav Papi differently than we quoted him earlier. According to him, he learn from "Lo Yachel Devaro" - that it is Rebbi Nasan who concedes to the Rabbanan that Hataras Nedarim can be annulled before the Isur has been effective (and not vice-versa), because according to him, "Lo Yachel *Devaro*" implies the Neder at its inception, and not after it becomes effective.

(b) We repudiate this interpretation of Rav Asi however, from the Beraisa ''Konem she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni, Hareini Nazir le'che'she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al Nidro, ve'Achar-Kach Nish'al al Nizro', (because a Chacham cannot annul a Neder before the Isur takes effect) - and if Rebbi Nasan agrees with the Rabbanan that a Chacham can annul Nedarim before the Isur takes effect, who will then be the author of the Beraisa?

(a) We rule like the Rabbanan of Rebbi Nasan, because Rebbi Akiva in the previous Sugya holds like them, and so does the Sugya of 'Im Erchatz Im Lo Erchatz' at the beginning of the Perek. But the most basic reason of all to follow their opinion is - that of 'Yachid ve'Rabim, Halachah ke'Rabim'.

(b) There no proof from Rava (who was Rav Papi's Rebbe, and who praised Rav Acha bar Rav Huna) that the Halachah is like Rebbi Nasan - because his praise was due to fact that he did what he did to avoid getting involved in Machlokes, and not because he held like Rebbi Nasan (and because of the adept way in which he went about it).

(c) Despite the fact that we rule like the Rabbanan, in whose opinion a husband can annul a Neder even before the Isur has taken effect, we nevertheless ask the Kashya (at the beginning of the Perek) 'Lamah Lah Hafarah, Lo Tirchatz ve'Lo Litseran' - because the concession of annulling Nedarim before the Isur is effective is confined to Nedarim which his wife would otherwise be bound to contravene (such as not giving Hana'ah to his or her parents), but not to Nedarim which she can easily avoid breaking, such as 'Lo Erchatz'.

(a) The Halachah regarding Hataras Nedarim is like the first Lashon of Rav Papi - that even the Rabbanan concede that a Chacham is not permitted to annul Nedarim, before the Isur has taken effect.

(b) If someone declares a Neder connecting it, not to an event, but to a number of days - a Chacham may annul it even before the time-period elapses, because it is bound to materialize (although some disagree with this ruling).

6) Our Mishnah lists three women whom initially, Chazal permitted to demand a Get and to receive their Kesuvah. This Mishnah belongs in Nedarim - because the woman is believed only on account of the Neder that accompanies her statement.

7)

(a) The first of the three women is one who claims that she was raped. This can only be speaking about the wife of Kohen - because the wife of a Yisrael would not be forbidden to her husband is she was raped, and would not receive a Kesuvah if she participated willingly.

(b) She may claim her Kesuvah, despite the fact that *she* was the one who wittingly or otherwise, caused the divorce - because she can argue that, as far as she is concerned, the wife of a Yisrael is permitted to remain with him after she has been raped, and the fact that her husband happens to a Kohen is due to his Mazel, not her's.

(c) The second woman is one who claims that her husband is responsible for their childlessness (because his Zera does not 'shoot like an arrow' - which a woman perceives more than a man). Despite the fact that a woman is not obligated to have children, she can force him to divorce her - provided she claims that she wants children to look after her when she grows old, and to bury her when she dies.

(a) The words 'ha'Shamayim Beini le'Veinecha' mean - 'Hashem is a witness that I am telling the truth'.

(b) Despite the fact that is no indication there that Sarah Imeinu was worried about the future, her statement to Avraham in Lech-Lecha "Yishpot Hashem Beini u'Veinecha", which Chazal interpret 'Ha'Shamayim Beini u'Veinecha' is nevertheless justified - because *there* the words adopt the more literal connotation of the distance between Avraham and herself being as far as the distance between heaven and earth (because it seemed to Sarah that after marrying Hagar, Avraham kept his distance from her).

(a) The third case is when a woman claims 'Netulah Ani min ha'Yehudim' - a Neder that she does not want any Hana'as Tashmish from anyone ever again (because Tashmish is painful to her).

(b) Chazal retracted however, in all three cases - because they were afraid that the woman might exploit her rights (presumably women were already doing so) by making her claim in Beis-Din (even when it was not genuine), taking her Kesuvah and then moving (together with the man on whom she had set her sights) to a place where she and her Neder were unknown, and remarrying.

(c) Therefore, if a woman claims ...

1. ... 'Temei'ah Ani Lecha' - we ask her to bring witnesses to that effect.
2. ... 'ha'Shamayim Beini le'Veinecha' - we pacify her by arranging a party for her and her husband, and then try and talk her into remaining with him, in spite of her protests.
3. ... 'Netulah Ani min ha'Yehudim' - we allow her husband to annul his part of the Neder, in which case she must continue to live with him as before, and she remains forbidden to everyone else (even after she becomes divorced or widowed).

(a) The problem with Chazal's Takanah, with regard to the first case (a woman who claims 'Temei'ah Ani Lach') is - that, seeing as the Torah forbids her on her husband, how can Chazal permit it?

(b) We ultimately resolve the problem - by pointing out that the Mishnah Rishonah originally believed a woman who claimed 'Temei'ah Ani Lach', not strictly according to Din Torah (for how can we absolve a woman from her marital duties on the basis of her own testimony?), but mi'de'Rabbanan (because she would not make such an embarrassing statement if it was not true). Consequently, the Mishnah Acharonah was perfectly justified in reinstating Din Torah (on the basis of the fact that women had become suspect of deliberately lying, in spite of the shame), and no longer believing their testimony.

(c) What is wrong with the initial answer given by some (that Chazal permitted her to her husband, despite the Torah's prohibition, seeing as they have the right to make Takanos when there is good reason to) is - that this right is confined to 'Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh' (Takanos that stop one from fulfilling Mitzvos Asei), but do not extend to 'Kum va'Asei' (Takanos that permit contravening Mitzvos Lo Sa'aseh).

(d) Chazal do have the authority to enact positive Takanos, even though they entail contravening a La'av - provided it is on a once only basis (like Eliyahu, who built a Bamah on Har ha'Karmel, even though Bamos were prohibited).

12)

(a) They asked a She'eilah whether the wife of a Kohen who claims that she was raped is permitted to continue eating Terumah. Rav Sheishes permits her to do so - on the grounds that otherwise, people will think that she must really be guilty, and the rumor will spread that children that she subsequently bears from him are Pasul.

(b) Rava counters Rav Sheishes' argument - by pointing out that what they will really think is that she is not eating Terumah because she does not possess any, only Chulin.

(c) Even Rav Sheishes will concede however, that once she is widowed or divorced (having had children from her husband), she may no longer eat Terumah - because people will think that the rape only occurred after she attained her new status, and the compelling reason permitting it no longer applies.