Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Nedarim, 82

82b

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses a case in which a woman made a Neder prohibiting to herself the consumption of two loaves of bread. Abstaining from one of them entailed suffering (Inuy Nefesh), while abstaining from the other did not. The Rishonim explain that such a case exists where one loaf was of a fine quality, while the other loaf was of inferior quality.

The Tosefta (Perek 7) states that any Neder that a woman makes prohibiting herself from eating something is considered to be a Neder of Inuy Nefesh, whether the food is good or bad, and even if she had never tasted the specific food that she prohibited to herself.

According to this Tosefta, how are we to understand the case in our Gemara? How can one of the loaves of bread included in her Neder *not* entail Inuy Nefesh? (NIMUKEI YOSEF)

ANSWERS:

(a) The NIMUKEI YOSEF answers that the Tosefta is referring to a situation where the woman feels deprived from not eating that specific food, even though the general public dislikes this particular food. Our Gemara, on the other hand, is discussing a situation where she does not feel deprived at all by foregoing the second loaf, and hence abstention from the second loaf is not Inuy Nefesh, since it is of inferior quality.

The Tosefta is teaching that even when the Neder involves a form of suffering which only this woman experiences from being deprived of the item, and no one else would experience suffering from being deprived of that item, nevertheless it is still considered a Neder of Inuy Nefesh which the husband may annul. We might have thought that this is not considered a Neder of Inuy Nefesh, because the verse says "le'Anos Nafesh" (Bamidbar 30:14), which implies a form of suffering which is common to the general public. The verse does not say "le'Anos *Nafshah*," which would imply a form of suffering which only she experiences. The Tosefta is teaching that Inuy Nefesh is determined by one's personal suffering, and not what the public at large considers to be suffering.

The CHASAM SOFER points out that although this answer reconciles the Gemara with the Tosefta, the ruling of the SHULCHAN ARUCH remains problematic. When quoting the Tosefta, the Shulchan Aruch (YD 234:61) rules that "even if the food *to her is bad*," implying that when she does not like it and has no desire to eat it, the husband may still annul the Neder because it is Inuy Nefesh. The Shulchan Aruch clearly is not learning the Tosefta the same way as the Nimukei Yosef. The Shulchan Aruch learns that the Tosefta means that a Neder prohibiting any food, whether she wants the food or not, is considered Inuy Nefesh. How, then, does the Shulchan Aruch understand the ruling of our Gemara (which he himself cites in YD 234:63), that says that one of the loaves of bread is *not* Inuy Nefesh to her? (See TAZ there, who explains that the Shulchan Aruch means that the food is bad *for her health* and yet she still desires it, and that is why the husband may annul the Neder, while in the case of the two loaves, the second loaf is not only bad for her health, but she also does not desire it. This is similar to the approach of the Nimukei Yosef.)

(b) The SHACH cites the BEIS YOSEF who says that in the case of our Gemara, the woman made a Neder from only two specific loaves. In such a case, the second loaf that she cannot have is not considered Inuy Nefesh, since she can eat all other loaves of bread in the world besides these two loaves of her Neder. The Tosefta, on the other hand, refers to when she prohibited an entire category of food upon herself (like "all bread"), in which case it is Inuy Nefesh even if she does not desire that food, since being prohibited to an entire category of food is inherently considered a form of suffering.

QUESTION: The Gemara discusses a case in which a woman made a Neder prohibiting to herself the consumption of two loaves of bread. Abstaining from one of them entailed suffering (Inuy Nefesh), while abstaining from the other did not. The Rishonim explain that such a case exists where one loaf was of a fine quality, while the other loaf was of inferior quality.

Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel that since the husband is able to annul the Neder insofar as it applies to the loaf which causes her suffering by not being able to eat it, he may annul the entire Neder. The RAN adds that even if he does not expressly specify that he is annulling both parts of the Neder, the entire Neder is annulled.

Rebbi Yochanan argues with Rav Yehudah and says that the husband may annul only the part of the Neder which is causing her suffering.

The Ran explains that the difference of opinion is based on the rule mentioned earlier (87a) that the husband must annul the entire Neder when he annuls his wife's Neder, which is derived from the verse, "v'Ishah *Yefeirenu" -- "... her husband shall annul [all of] it" (Bamidbar 30:14). Shmuel holds that since the husband may annul a part of his wife's Neder that causes her Inuy Nefesh, and there is a rule that he can only annul the entire Neder, it must be that the Torah allows him to annul the entire Neder when part of it is causing her Inuy Nefesh, including the part that does not cause her Inuy Nefesh. (According to this explanation, not only may the husband annul the entire Neder, but he *must* annul the entire Neder if he wants to annul any part of it.)

Rebbi Yochanan, on the other hand, agrees to the principle that the husband may only annul the entire Neder, but he maintains that this principle is limited to the parts of the Neder which the Torah empowers the husband to annul (those parts which are Inuy Nefesh). That is, he must annul *all* of the parts which are Inuy Nefesh, and not only part of the Inuy Nefesh elements in the Neder.

Everyone agrees, however, that this principle applies only to the Hafarah of Nedarim of Inuy Nefesh. Regarding the Hafarah of Nedarim she'Beino l'Beinah, the husband may annul only the parts of her Neder that affect him (see Insights to 79b). (The ROSH deduces this Halachah from the words of the verse, "Bein Ish l'Ishto" (Bamidbar 30:17).)

The KEREN ORAH raises an interesting point. He asserts that although not every Neder she'Beino l'Beinah entails Inuy Nefesh, every Neder of Inuy Nefesh does entail matters she'Beino l'Beinah. This is because a woman who is suffering is likely to lose favor in her husband's eyes, and thus it becomes a matter between the two of them. If so, although we say that the husband may not annul only that part of a Neder that is Inuy Nefesh, the husband should be able to annul that part because it is also a matter that affects him (she'Beino l'Beinah)!

ANSWER: The KEREN ORAH answers that when the verse "Yefeirenu" teaches that the husband must annul the entire Neder when he wants to annul part of it because of Inuy Nefesh, it is teaching that one is not permitted to annul a Neder because of Beino l'Beinah when it is a Neder of Inuy Nefesh. He must annul the entire Neder and he cannot annul only part of it based on the grounds that that part is Beino l'Beinah, when that part is also Inuy Nedesh.