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1)

(a) We now know that a son cannot be Yotze with the Korban (even 'min ha'Kalah el ha'Kalah' or 'min ha'Chamurah el ha'Chamurah') or even with the money that his father left.
What do we learn from the Pasuk "Korbano al Chataso" (written in connection with a Chatas Se'irah)?

(b) Now that we know that a person cannot even change his own Korban from one Chet to another, what do we learn from "ve'Chiper ha'Kohen al Chataso" (written in connection with the Chatas Kisbah)?

(c) Why do we need a special D'rashah for money? Why can we not learn this from the case of the Korban itself?

(d) What is the basis of

1. ... the distinction between the animal and the money?
2. ... the link between the Me'ilah and the Kaparah?

(a) What are we trying to prove when we ask (with regard to 've'Eino Megalei'ach al Beheimas Aviv') 'Mai La'av Afilu Ba'alas Mum'?

(b) We answer (like we answered earlier) 'Lo, Temimah'.
What can we infer from there regarding a blemished animal?

(c) What problem do we have with that from the Beraisa 'Ma'os she'Hifrish Aviv'?

(d) What do we answer?

(a) According to the Tana Kama, once the blood of one of the Nazir's Korbanos has been sprinkled, a Nezirah's husband can no longer annul his wife's Nezirus.
What is the significance of the sprinkling of the blood in this regard?

(b) Why does the Tana Kama not contend with the fact that the Nezirah still has to shave her hair, making her ugly?

(c) What are the ramifications of the Mishnah's ruling?

(d) According to Rebbi Akiva, the criterion is not the sprinkling of the blood, but the Shechitah of one of the three animals.
Does it make any difference which animal's blood has been sprinkled, according to ...

1. ... Rebbi Akiva?
2. ... the Tana Kama?

(a) Tosfos is uncertain whether the Nezirus will be annulled Bedieved if her husband nevertheless annulled it.
Why might his Hafarah be effective, even though the Torah forbids it? Who gives the Chachamim tha authority to sanction what the Torah has forbidden?

(b) What is Tosfos conclusion?

(a) Everyone agrees however, that the Nezirah's husbend can still annul his wife's Nezirus if she is Tamei, even *after* the blood of one of her Korbanos has been sprinkled.
Why is that?

(b) Seeing as the reason for this concession is based on 'Inuy Nefesh', why does the Tana talk about 'Nivul' (ugliness)?

(c) As far as the Rabbanan is concerned, Tosfos explains, the Tana would have said 'Mishum Inuy' rather than 'I Efshi be'Ishah Menuveles', and it is because of Rebbi Akiva that he uses the more complicated Lashon.
What does Tosfos mean?

(d) Why else might the Tana Kama have used this Lashon, even according to the Rabbanan?

(a) Rebbi Meir (or Rebbi) is more lenient than the Chachamim. He permits the husband to annul his wife's Nezirus even after the blood of one of her Korbanos has been sprinkled.
Why is that? What is the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi and the Chachamim?

(b) On what grounds does Rebbi Meir (or Rebbi) disagree with the Rabbanan's argument?

(c) Rebbi Eliezer too, permits the husband to annul his wife's Nezirus even after the blood of her Korban Taharah has been sprinkled, but because she is not yet permitted to drink wine.
What is the basis of the Machlokes Rebbi Eliezer and the Chachamim?

7)

(a) What does the Beraisa say about the lambs of Shavu'os, which were Shechted she'Lo Lishman or before or after their specified time? What happens to the blood and to the body of the Korban?

(b) What does she'Lo Lish'mah?

(c) On Shabbos however, the blood should not be sprinkled.
What does the Kohen achieve if he nevertheless does sprinkle it?

(d) What does Rebbi Zeira ask from this Beraisa on Rebbi Akiva, who forbade the annulment of the woman's Nezirus after the Shechitah of one of her Korbanos (because of the loss of her Korban)?

(a) Why did Rebbi Zeira not ask from the Mishnah earlier, which permits the designated Olah and the Shelamim of a Nezirah (whose husband annulled her Nezirus) to be brought she'Lo Lishman?

(b) We prove from the case of the lambs of Shavu'os that in our case too, one should be able to sprinkle the Korban she'Lo Lish'mah.
Does it make any difference that there, both the Shechitah and the Zerikah are performed she'Lo Lish'mah, whereas here, the blood will be sprinkled she'Lo Lish'mah, even though the Shechitah was performed Lish'mah?

(c) How do we then reconcile this with the Sugya in Menachos, where we suggest that one may not sprinkle the blood of the lambs of Shavu'os, which were Shechted Lish'mah, if the bread got lost after the Shechitah, implying that one may only sprinkle the blood she'Lo Lish'mah if the Korban was also Shechted she'Lo Lish'mah?

(a) The Mishnah states that a father can declare his son a Nazir.
Can a mother, too?

(b) Can the son object?

(c) The Tana might mean that, even though the son has the right to object, when his father makes the declaration, he does not need to consult him first.
What else might he mean?

(a) The Tana permits the son himself or any of his relatives to object and stop the Nezirus.
When must they do this?

(b) Why did the Tana find it necessary to present two cases: one, where they shave his head; two, where they object verbally?

(c) What else negates the son's Nezirus?

(d) The Tana may well not have included this in our Mishnah because, unlike the two cases that he does include, it will even stop the Nezirus once it has begun (though, according to some, *they* do too).
Why else might the Tana have omitted it (besides the fact that he does want to get involved in a Machlokes)?

(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, the source that only the father may declare his son a Nazir and not the mother is a Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai. What does Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina Amar Resh Lakish say?

(b) If the source is a Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai, then the same Halachah precludes women from this particular right.
But if is a branch of Chinuch, on what grounds is she precluded?

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