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1)

(a) What does Rav Chiya bar Avin Amar Rebbi Yochanan learn from the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki li'V'nei Lot Nasati es Ar Yerushah"?

(b) On what grounds ...

1. ... is Rav Chiya bar Avin forced to discard the initial source for this (the Pasuk in Devarim "Ki Yerushah le'Eisav Nasati es Har Se'ir")?
2. ... does he decline to learn it from Rava's source ("ve'Chishav Im Koneihu" ... )?
3. ... does Rava decline to learn like Rav Chiya bar Avin?

(a) Is there anything which sets free an Eved Ivri but not an Ivriyah?

(b) How does Rav Sheishes therefore establish the Beraisa 'Yesh be'Ivri she'Ein be'Ivriyah ... she'Hu Yotze be'Shanim, be'Yovel u've'Miysas ha'Adon, Mah she'Ein Kein be'Ivriyah'?

(c) If the Tana is speaking when the master performed Yi'ud ...

1. ... why might we have thought that she does go out at all (without a Get)?
2. ... how can the Tana then go on to say that she goes out with Simanim (which the Eved Ivri does not)?

(d) What must we infer from the Seifa of the Beraisa, which states that an Amah Ivriyah cannot be sold twice?

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa makes three D'rashos from "ve'Nimkar *bi'G'neivaso*". He Darshens "bi'G'neivaso", 've'Lo bi'K'feilo' and "bi'G'neivaso", 've'Lo bi'Z'mamo'.
What is the third D'rashah?

(b) Rava reconciles the previous inference with this Beraisa by differentiating between one theft and two thefts.
What does he mean?

(c) On what grounds does Abaye disagree with him?

(d) Then how does *he* explain the discrepancy? Is the distinction between one and two people crucial to the answer?

(a) What does the Tana Kama of a Beraisa rule in a case where ...

1. ... someone stole a thousand Zuz, and his assessed value is only five hundred?
2. ... he stole five hundred Zuz, and his assessed value is a thousand?

(b) What does Rebbi Eliezer say?

(c) What caused Rava to declare that Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is more powerful than the Chachamim's?

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa quoted earlier, listing the differences between an Amah Ivriyah and an Eved Ivri, states 'u'Mefadin Osah Ba'al-Korchah'. On what grounds does Abaye dismiss Rava's interpretation of 'Ba'al-Korchah de'Adon'? What must Rava have meant?

(b) Then how does Abaye interpret it?

(c) Why do we not force the members of the Eved Ivri's family to redeem him?

(d) What is ultimately the difference between the Eved Ivri and the Amah Ivriyah? Who is the author of the Beraisa which differentiates between them?

(a) The Tana Kama permits a man to sell his daughter for Ishus after Ishus and for Shifchus after Shifchus.
What does he say with regard to ...

1. ... Ishus Achar Shifchus?
2. ... Shifchus Achar Ishus?

(b) What does Rebbi Shimon say?

(a) Rebbi Akiva holds that once the father spreads his Talis over his daughter, he is no longer permitted to sell her.
What exactly is he saying? Like which of the previous Tana'im does he hold?

(b) What does Rebbi Eliezer say?

(c) Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yesh Eim li'Mesores' (we go after the way the word is spelt, not pronounced).
How does this explain his interpretation of the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Lo Yuchal le'Mochrah *be'Vigdo Vah*"?

(d) In which point does Rebbi Akiva argue with Rebbi Eliezer?

(a) What does Rebbi Shimon now hold?

(b) How will we reconcile this with his opinion in Sukos (in connection with "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", "ba'Sukos", where he Darshens 'Yesh Eim le'Mikra' (and not 'li'Mesores')?

9)

(a) We ask whether Yi'ud makes Nisu'in or Eirusin.
What are the ramifications of this She'eilah?

(b) What do we extrapolate from Rebbi Akiva, who says in the above Beraisa 'Keivan she'Piresh Taliso Alehah, Shuv Eino Rashai le'Mochrah'?

(c) Why is this not a proof that Yi'ud must make Eirusin, because otherwise, how could her father then betroth her after Yi'ud? How does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak establish 'Keivan she'Piresh Talisah Alehah'?

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Eliezer permits a father to sell his daughter to relatives.
Why does the Tana Kama ...

1. ... forbid it?
2. ... concede to Rebbi Eliezer that he is permitted to sell her if she is an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, or a Gerushah or a Chalutzah, to a Kohen Hedyot?

(b) Why can the Almanah just referred to not speak when she arranged her own Kidushin?

(c) What is the problem with saying that her father arranged the Kidushin?

(d) Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak therefore establishes the case when she became an Almanah following Yi'ud, according to Rebbi Yossi be'Rebbi Yehudah.
What does Rebbi Yossi be'Rebbi Yehudah say?

(a) What do we prove from Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak's explanation?

(b) What is the problem with 've'Shavin she'Mochrah ... ' even if we say that Yi'ud makes Eirusin?

(c) Seeing as, at the end of the day, we differentiate between Eirusin which the father arranges (where we say 'Ein Adam Mocher es Bito ... ') and Eirusin which she herself arranges (where it does not apply), then why can we not make the same distinction between Nisu'in which the father makes and Nisu'in which she herself makes (refuting the proof that 'Yi'ud Eirusin Oseh')?

(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak disagrees with Rav Amram Amar Rebbi Yitzchak. In his opinion, Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah concedes that 'Ma'os ha'Rishonos le'Kidushin Nitnu' (as will be explained later).
How will he explain the Beraisa's concession for the father to sell his daughter who is an Almanah le'Kohen Gadol ... (seeing as it is a case of 'Shifchus Achar Ishus' (which Rebbi Akiva forbids).

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