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1)

(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, Mora and Piryah ve'Rivyah are not considered 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in ke'Echad', because both are needed.
We cannot learn ...

1. ... Piryah ve'Rivyah with a 'Mah Matzinu' from Mora - because we would then learn from "ve'Chivshuhah" that a woman, who does not get involved in capturing, is not obligated to perform the Mitzvah of Piryah ve'Rivyah either.
2. ... Mora with a 'Mah Matzinu' from Piryah ve'Rivyah - because we would rather exempt her from Mora Av va'Eim even when she is unmarried, because when she grows up and marries, she will certainly become exempt.

(b) According to those who hold 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in ke'Echad Melamdin', we have a problem ...

1. ... from Matzah and Hakheil (like we asked on the previous Amud) - inasmuch as we ought to learn from there that women are obligated in all Mitzvos Asei she'ha'Z'man Geramah?
2. ... from Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'Ben (according to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, who cannot include Piryah ve'Rivyah in this list) - inasmuch as we ought to learn from there that women are exempt from all Mitzvos Asei she'Ein ha'Z'man Geramah?

(c) Rava cited the Papuna'i who knew the answer to these Kashyos.
He was referring to - Rav Acha bar Ya'akov.

(d) Rav Acha bar Ya'akov ...

1. ... learns from the Pasuk in Bo "ve'Hayah Lecha le'Os al Yadecha ... Lema'an Tihyeh Toras Hashem be'Ficha" - that the entire Torah is compared to Tefilin, all Mitzvos that are similar to Tefilin, (referring to Mitzvos Asei she'ha'Z'man Geramah).
2. ... extrapolates from there - that Mitzvos Asei she'Lo ha'Z'man Geramah, women are Chayav.

(a) The problem with this according to those who hold that Tefilin is a Mitzvas Asei she'Lo ha'Z'man Geramah is - that in that case, we ought to exempt women even from 'Mitzvos Asei she'Lo ha'Z'man Geramah'.

(b) We answer that Rebbi Meir is the Tana who considers Tefilin to be a Mitzvas Asei she'Lo ha'Z'man Geramah - and he holds 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im ke'Echad, *Ein* Melamdin' (whereas the current problem only arose according to those who are of the opinion 'Melamdin').

(c) Rebbi Yehudah, who holds 'Sh'nei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in ke'Echad, Melamdin, and who also considers Tefilin to be a Mitzvas Asei she'Lo ha'Z'man Geramah, will exempt women from all Mitzvos Asei she'ha'Z'man Geramah - from Matzah, Simchah and Hakheil, and, as we have already explained everybody agrees that 'Sheloshah Kesuvim ha'Ba'im ke'Echad, Ein Melamdin'.

(d) We are only able to include Hakheil in this list - because we do not hold like Abaye, who maintains 'Ishah, Ba'alah Mesamchah'.

(a)

1. Rav Yehudah Amar Rav as well as Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael learns from the Pasuk (in connection with the Korban Shevu'as ha'Pikadon by Gezel ha'Ger) "Ish O Ishah Asher Ya'aseh mi'Kol Chat'os ha'Adam" - that a woman has the same Din as a man re. all Malkos and other punishments in the Torah.
2. ... de'Bei Rebbi Eliezer from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ... "ve'Eileh ha'Mishpatim Asher Tasim Lifneihem" - that she has the same Din as a man re. Dinim (all money matters).
3. ... de'Bei Chizkiyah from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ve'Im Shor Nagach Hu ... ve'Heimis Ish O Ishah" - that if others kill her, they are subject to the death-penalty (or to Kofer in this case) as if they had killed a man.

(b) We require three Pesukim because we cannot learn not one from the other. We cannot learn ...

1. ... the second case (regarding Dinim) from the first (regarding Kaparah) - because the Torah did not wish to deprive a woman of the opportunity to attain an atonement, whereas in matters of Dinim, seeing as it is unusual to find women in the business world, the Torah might have precluded her from the Dinim involved.
2. ... the first from the second - because we might have said that the Torah incorporates women in this area because women, like men, need to earn a livelihood, whereas Kaparah is perhaps confined to men, who are obligated in all the Mitzvos, but not to women (who are exempt from Talmud-Torah).
3. ... the first two cases from the third (of death) - because there we might have thought that the Torah took pity on her because it stands to reason that one is more strict where human life is concerned.

4)

(a) We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Emor el ha'Kohanim B'nei Aharon" - that female Kohanim are not included in the La'av pertaining to Kohanim of not rendering themselves Tamei Meis.
2. ... "Lo Sakifu Pe'as Roshchem ve'Lo Sachchis es Pe'as Zekanecha" - that whoever is included in the latter prohibition, is also included in the former, but not someone who is not.

(b) Apart from the logical outcome of the fact that a woman has no beard to destroy, we attribute the prohibition of 'Lo Sashchis' not applying to women - to the change of Lashon from "Roshchem" (in the plural) to "Zekanecha" (in the singular) from which we then extrapolate "Zekancha", 've'Lo Z'kan Isht'cha'.

(a) We initially establish the Beraisa 'Z'kan Ishah ve'ha'Saris she'He'elu Se'ar, Harei Hein ke'Zakan le'Chol Divreihem' - by the La'av of "Lo Sashchis". The problem this presents is - that it clashes with what we just learned, that a woman is Patur from "Lo Shashchis".

(b) Abaye refutes this interpretation of the Beraisa however, on the basis of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Pe'as" "Pe'as" (see Tosfos DH 'le'Hashchasah' as to why Abaye retracts from the previous D'rashah) - where we preclude women from the La'av by Yisre'elim (in Kedoshim) from Kohanim (in Emor), where the Torah writes "Emor el ha'Kohanim B'nei Aharon" ('ve'Lo B'nos Aharon').

(c) We query the need for this 'Gezeirah-Shavah' on the basis of a 'Kal va'Chomer' - if Kohanos are precluded, even though Kohanim have been given more Mitzvos than Yisre'eilim, then Yisre'eiliyos should certainly be precluded.

(d) We refute the 'Kal va'Chomer' however, and establish the need for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah', based on the argument of 'Hifsik ha'Inyan' - meaning that, if not for the need to Darshen the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (which the Torah must have inserted for a reason), we would have confined the D'rashah "B'nei Aharon", 've'Lo B'nos Aharon', to the La'av of Tum'ah, where it is written, and not to the other La'avin that are written later in the Parshah (such as "Lo Sashchis").

(a) We query this argument however, on the grounds - that we can still apply the S'vara 'Hifsik ha'Inyan', and as for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah', we need it for something else.

(b) Based on the Pasuk "Lo Sashchis" written by Yisre'eilim, and "Lo Yegaleichu" written by Kohanim, we can Darshen from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' - that one is only Chayav if one removes hair in a way that combines shaving with destruction.

(c) One is not Chayav for cutting one's beard ...

1. ... with scissors - because it is not called 'Hashchasah' (it does not destroy the hair down to the root).
2. ... a plane - because it is not called Gilu'ach' (since that is not the way people shave).

(d) We finally discard the S'vara of 'Hifsik ha'Inyan' and still remain with the previous D'rashah from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' - on account of the extra word "Pe'as" (since the Torah could have written "ve'Lo Sashchis es she'bi'Zekeinecha" [and the word "es" would still have been considered a 'Gezeirah-Shavah', as if the Torah had actually written "Pe'as"]). The Torah inserted "Pe'as" to teach us that the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (connected with "B'nei Aharon" 've'Lo B'nos Aharon') extends to the rest of the Parshah too.

(a) So we try to establish the Beraisa 'Z'kan Ishah ve'ha'Saris she'He'elu Se'ar, Harei Hein ke'Zakan le'Chol Divreihem' with regard to Tum'as Nega'im - meaning that the Din of Tum'ah be'Makom Se'ar (e.g. two yellow hairs instead of white ones) applies to the beard of a woman or a Saris (should they grow one), just like it does to a man's.

(b) We initially reject this proposal on the grounds - that the Torah has already incorporated women in the Din of Nig'ei Se'ar, when it begins the Parshah with the words "Ish O Ishah".

(c) So we try to establish it with re. to Taharas Nega'im - meaning that in the event that a woman (or a S'ris) did contract Tzara'as on her beard, then, after completing the Tum'ah process, she will require shaving and bringing birds, just like a man.

(d) We reject this suggestion too however, on the grounds that wherever there is Tum'as Nega'im, it goes without saying that there is Taharas Nega'im. We conclude 'Itz'trich, Salka Da'atach Amina li'Tzedadim' - meaning that we re-establish the Beraisa by Tum'as Nega'im, and that we might otherwise have thought that "Ishah" only pertains to Nig'ei Se'ar of the head ("be'Rosh") which is written next to "Ishah", but not to that of the beard ("O be'Zakan"), which is written after it.

(a) Isi ben Yehudah, quoting a Beraisa, extrapolates from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "*Banim* Atem la'Hashem Elokeichem, Lo Sisgodedu ve'Lo Sasimu Korchah Bein Eineichem la'Meis" - that women are not subject to 'Korchah' either ("Banim", 've'Lo Banos').
2. ... "Ki *Am* Kadosh Atah la'Hashem Alokecha" - that they are however, subject to 'Gedidah' (because women are included in 'Am').

(b) The Tana prefers to include women in Gedidah and to preclude them from Korchah (rather than vice-versa) - because the former applies both to a location on the body where there is hair and to one where there is not, whereas the latter is confined to one of hair.

(c) We ask why "Banim Atem" should not incorporate both Korchah and Gedidah, and "Ki Am Kadosh" include women in the Din of "Seritah" ("ve'Seret la'Nefesh Lo Sitnu ... " [Kedoshim]). The advantage in learning like this (even though "Seritah" is not written in the same Parshah is - that it avoids having to invert the order of the Pasuk in Re'ei, which pairs "Banim Atem" with Korchah, and "Am Kadosh" with Gedidah, even though this is not the way they are juxtaposed.

(d) If we did learn that way, the difference between Seritah and Gedidah would be - one cutting with an implement, the other, using one's hands.

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