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1)

(a) We just learned from the Din by someone who sold a house in a walled city, who (can redeem it immediately, yet he) cannot redeem it in halves, that someone who declared his house Hekdesh (who can redeem it immediately), should also not be able to redeem it in halves (which is why the Pasuk needs to write "Im Ga'ol Yig'al"). Rav Acha B'rei de'Rava asked Rav Ashi on this Limud however - that we cannot learn the latter from the former which has the distinct disadvantage in that it cannot be redeemed after the first year (whereas the latter can be redeemed any time until the Yovel, provided the treasurer did not sell it to a third party).

(b) Rav Acha Saba explained that, in fact, we learn the Din, not just from someone who sold a house in a walled city, but from a 'Mah ha'Tzad' from it and from someone who sold a S'dei Achuzah. The advantage that someone who ...

1. ... sold a S'dei Achuzah has over someone who sold a house in a walled city is - that he can continue to redeem it, even after the first year, right until the Yovel.
2. ... sold a house in a walled city over someone who sold a S'dei Achuzah is - that he can redeem it during the first year, whereas the latter can only redeem it after two years.

(c) All this assumes however, that between them, they have an advantage over someone who declared a S'dei Achuzah Hekdesh. The problem, Rav Zutra B'rei de'Rav Mari pointed out to Ravina, is that *he* also has an advantage over *them* (dispensing with the need for "Ga'ol Yig'al" to counter the combined Limud) - the fact that he can redeem the field during the second year, which neither of them can.

(d) To answer this Kashya, Ravina brings a third case into the 'Tzad ha'Shaveh' - namely, that of a Nimkar le'Akum, which, like someone who declared a S'dei Achuzah Hekdesh, can be redeemed in the second year, yet he cannot be redeemed in halves (like Rav Sheishes learned above from "ve'Nig'al Kulo", 've'Lo Chetzyo').

(a) Rav Huna bar Chinena asked Rav Sheishes whether a house in a walled city that someone sold can be redeemed by relatives from "Ge'ulaso Ge'ulaso". The She'eilah is confined to the opinion of the Rabbanan, who learns from this 'Gezeirah-Shavah' that by Batei Arei Chomah, Eino Loveh ve'Go'el, ve'Go'el la'Chatza'in'.

(b) Alternatively, the other side of the She'eilah is - that "Ge'ulaso" by Batei Arei Chomah is written specifically in connection with the Din of 'Eino Loveh ve'Go'el, ve'Go'el la'Chatza'in' ("u'Matza K'dei Ge'ulaso"). (c) Rav Sheishes replied - Eino Nig'al (li'Kerovim)'.

(a) The Beraisa explains the (superfluous) Pasuk "u've'Chol Eretz Achuzaschem Ge'ulah Titnu la'Aretz", 'Lerabos Batim ve'Eved Ivri' - with regard to the redemption of relatives.

(b) There is no proof from here that relatives can redeem Batei Arei Chomah (a Kashya on Rav Sheishes) - because 'Batim' refers, not to Batei Arei Chomah, but to Batei ha'Chatzeirim (houses in open cities).

(c) What we know from the Pasuk "u'Vatei ha'Chatzeirim ... al S'dei ha'Aretz Yechasheiv" is - that relatives are permitted to redeem them against the will of the purchaser. "u've'Chol Eretz Achuzaschem Ge'ulah Titnu la'Aretz" teaches us that they are even obligated to do so (if they have the means).

(a) Due to the fact that there is no such thing as a Jew without relatives, Rebbi Yehoshua interprets the Pasuk "ve'Ish Ki Lo Yihyeh Lo Go'el" to mean - that there are relatives, but they do not want to redeem the field.

(b) Rebbi Eliezer explains the Pasuk ...

1. ... "ve'Ga'al es Mimkar Achiv", in conjunction with the Pasuk "u've'Chol ... Ge'ulah Titnu" to mean - that the relatives are obligated to redeem the field.
2. ... "ve'Ish Ki Lo Yihyeh Lo Go'el" to mean - that relatives are not able to redeem it.

(c) The problem that the Rabbanan (asking Ravina [or Ravina asking Rav Ashi]) have with the above explanation of 'Lerabos Batim' from the very Pasuk which it comes to explain ("u've'Chol Eretz Achuzaschem Ge'ulah Titnu la'Aretz") is - that, unless 'Batim' means Batei Arei Chomah, the word "u've'Chol" will be superfluous (seeing as it does not come to include any new case, only to obligate one that is already written).

(a) Another Beraisa learns from the two extra times that the Torah writes "Yig'alenu", 'Lerabos Kol ha'Ge'ulos'. Initially, we explain - that this comes to include Batei Arei Chomah and Eved Ivri regarding Ge'ulas K'rovim (a Kashya on Rav Sheishes).

(b) We refute the Kashya by establishing the two inclusions as Batei Chatzeirim and S'dei Achuzah. However, seeing as the Torah has already included them ("Al S'dei ha'Aretz Yechasheiv"), we explain the Tana's inclusion from "Yig'alenu" like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (with regard to the She'eilah that we are about to discuss) - who explains that the Tana is coming to include, not just that the relatives are obligated to redeem the property, but that the obligation follows the order of the hierarchy (in keeping with the Pasuk "O Dodo O ben Dodo Yig'alenu").

(a) We ask whether an Eved Ivri who is sold to a Yisrael can be redeemed by relatives. This She'eilah was not asked - according to Rebbi, who has already taught 'Mi she'Eino Nig'al be'Eileh Nig'al be'Sheish' (and 'be'Eileh" refers to relatives).

(b) Maybe we learn that he can be redeemed from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Sachir" "Sachir". The side to say that he cannot is - the Pasuk (in connection with a Nimkar le'Akum) "Yig'alenu", implying 'la'Zeh, ve'Lo le'Acher' ('to a Nimkar le'Akum, but not to a Nimkar le'Yisrael').

(c) We ask from the same Beraisa that we asked earlier "u've'Chol Eretz Achuzaschem Ge'ulah Titnu la'Aretz", 'Lerabos Batim ve'Eved Ivri', on the assumption that 'Eved Ivri' refers to a Nimkar le'Yisrael. We ...

1. ... refute the Kashya - by establishing it by a Nimkar le'Akum.
2. ... reconcile this with the fact that we already know this from the Pasuk "O Dodo O ben Dodo Yig'alenu" - by establishing the former as an obligation, according to Rebbi Yehoshua (as we explained earlier).

(d) We ask the same Kashya that we asked above from the Beraisa which learns from the two extra times that the Torah writes "Yig'alenu", 'Lerabos Kol ha'Ge'ulos', assuming that the Tana is referring to Batei Arei Chomah and Eved Ivri ha'Nimkar le'Yisrael.

1. We refute this Kashya - by establishing it by Batei ha'Chatzeirim and S'dei Achuzah.
2. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak reconciles this with the fact that we already know Batei ha'Chatzeirim from the Pasuk "Al S'dei ha'Aretz Yechasheiv" - by establishing the former Pasuk with regard to the order of hierarchy (as we explained earlier).

7)

(a) We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "ve'Ratza Adonav es Ozno ... " - that it is the piercing of the ear which acquires a Nirtza.
2. ... "va'Ava*do*" - that a Nirtza serves his master, but not his master's son in the event of his death.
3. ... "Le'olam" - that he serves until the Yovel.

(b) The Torah writes "ve'Lakachta es ha'Martzei'a" - which Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah explains to mean that one may bore the Nirtza's ear with anything that one takes in the hand (meaning whatever needs to be worked manually).

(c) He incorporates in this Halachah a Sul, a Sira, a Machat, a Makdei'sch and a Michtav. A Sul is sharp peg, a Sira a thorn, and a Machat, a needle.

1. A Makdei'ch a - an awl.
2. A Michtav is - a sharp-pointed pen.

(d) Rebbi learn from "Martzei'a" - that one may only use any metal implement to bore the Eved-Ivri's ear.

(a) In the same Beraisa, Rebbi Elazar quoting Yudan B'rivi rules that the Eved Ivri was pierced in the lobe of his ear. The Rabbanan disagree. They say that an Eved Ivri Kohen could not have his ear pierced because it rendered him a Ba'al Mum, which would not be the case, if the piercing took place in the lobe, as Yudan B'rivi claims.

(b) We learned in the above Beraisa that Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah permits the piercing of an Eved Ivri even using wooden implements, whereas Rebbi permits only implements made of metal. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether throughout the Torah, we Darshen 'K'lal u'Frat u'Ch'lal' (Rebbi), or 'Ribuy, u'Miy'ut ve'Ribuy').

(c) Rebbi learns from ...

1. ... a 'K'lal u'F'rat' - 'Ein bi'Ch'lal Ela Mah she'bi'F'rat'.
2. ... the final K'lal - to include whatever is similar to the P'rat.

(d) He applies this in our Sugya - inasmuch as "ve'Lakachta es ha'Martzei'a" ('K'lal u'F'rat') demand the use of an awl to pierce the Eved Ivri's ear, and "be'Ozno u'va'De'les" (the final 'P'rat') comes to include all sharp metal implements (that are similar to an awl).

(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah learns from ...

1. ... a 'Ribuy u'Miy'ut' - to include whatever is similar to the Miy'ut (like Rebbi learns from a 'K'lal u'F'rat u'Ch'lal'.
2. ... the final Ribuy - to include everything, and the Miy'ut then precludes something that is completely dissimilar to the Miy'ut (ointment, in our case), because, unlike an awl, it pierces by itself, rather than through the force of the piercer.

(b) The above-mentioned Beraisa adds 'Davar Acher "Ha'Martzei'za", 'Lehavi ha'Martzei'a ha'Gadol' - meaning a large awl which cuts rather than bores (see Tosfos ha'Rosh). Note, the Ritva erases the word 'Lehavi'. In his opinion, 'Martzei'a ha'Gadol' (which pierces a large hole) is merely a description of 'Martzei'a.

(c) The basis for this D'rashah is the 'Hey' in ha'Martzei'a, which denotes something special (the most important one), like the 'Hey' in the Pasuk "Al Kaf ha'Yarech" (in connection with the Gid ha'Nasheh), denoting the spoon of the *right* thigh.

(a) The part of the ear that needs to be wounded in order to render a Kohen a Ba'al Mum is - the grizzle (not the lobe).

(b) The Rabbanan forbid an Eved Ivri Kohen to have his ear pierced. The Pasuk that Rabah bar Rav Shiloh quotes according to them, to explain why the Mitzvah of piercing the ear does not override the La'av of a Kohen becoming a Ba'al Mum is the Pasuk in Behar - "ve'Shav el Mishpachto", 'be'Muchzak she'be'Mishpachto' (meaning that at the end of his term, the Eved Ivri must not be disqualified from returning to his previous family Chazakah).

(c) We ask whether the master may give his Eved Ivri Kohen a Shifchah Cana'anis, seeing as permitting a Shifchah Cana'anis is a Chidush, why should a Kohen be any different. On the other hand, a Kohen might well be precluded from this 'concession' - because, due to his extra Kedushah, the Torah has given Kohanin additional Mitzvos (particularly in the area of forbidden marriages), maybe this is another one.

(d) Rav permits it, Shmuel forbids it. Rav Nachman asked Rav Anan (a Talmid of Shmuel) why he did not query his Rebbe from the Chachamim of Yudan B'rivi, who forbade an Eved Ivri Kohen to have his ear pierced because it will render him a Ba'al Mum. Now if he would be forbidden to live with a Shifchah Cana'anis, then we would not need a Pasuk to preclude him from having his ear pierced. The fact that he cannot say "Ahavto es Ishti ve'es Banai" (which is crucial to the ear-piercing ceremony) would be sufficient reason.

(a) Based on the same considerations, we also ask whether a Kohen is permitted to take a Yefas To'ar in battle. Here too, Rav and Shmuel argue - Rav says 'Mutar', Shmuel, 'Asur'.

(b) In the first Lashon, their Machlokes is confined to Bi'ah Sh'niyah, but both agree that a Kohen is permitted to make Bi'ah Rishonah - because the whole point of this concession is to answer to the Yetzer ha'Ra (meaning that if the Torah would not permit her, he would take her anyway).

(c) The reason that ...

1. ... Shmuel forbids Bi'ah Sh'niyah is - because after the Bi'ah, he is obligated to convert her, and a Kohen is forbidden to marry a Giyores.
2. ... Rav nevertheless permits it - because of the principle 'Ho'il ve'Hutrah Hutrah' ('once something becomes permitted, it remains permitted').

(d) In the second Lashon, both agree that Bi'ah Sh'niyah is forbidden for the reason that Shmuel gave in the first Lashon, and Rav holds like Shmuel in the first Lashon. Shmuel forbids even Bi'ah Rishonah - because the Torah writes "ve'Ra'isa ba'Shivyah" (permitting Bi'ah Rishonah), and then "va'Haveisah el Toch Beisecha" (marrying her - Bi'ah Sh'niyah). Presumably, says Shmuel, whoever is permitted to perform the latter, is permitted to perform the former, and vice-versa.

(a) The Torah in Ki Seitzei writes "ve'Ra'isa ba'Shivyah Eishes Yefas To'ar". We learn from ...

1. ... the word "Eishes" - that the concession of Yefas To'ar extends even to a married woman.
2. ... "Yefas To'ar" - that the Torah is not giving a blanket Heter to take a gentile woman in wartime, but is only allowing it in order to counteract the Yetzer ha'Ra (as we explained earlier).

(b) When Chazal say 'Mutav she'Yochlu Yisrael Basar Temusos Shechutos ve'Lo Yochlu Basar Temusos Neveilos', they mean that it is better to eat an animal that was Shechted just as it is about to die (even though it is considered disgusting to eat), than to eat an a Neveilah (that died without being Shechted) and the Mashal of course is self-explanatory).

(c) We learn from ...

1. ... "ve'Chashakta"- that the woman is permitted even though she is not intrinsically beautiful.
2. ... "Bah" - that a soldier may only take one woman and not two.
3. ... "ve'Lakachta" - that Kidushin takes effect, despite the fact that she was converted against her will, even though such a Kidushin (indeed such a Geirus) would normally not be binding.

(d) We learn that a soldier is not permitted to ...

1. ... take two women, one for himself and one for his son - from the word "Lecha".
2. ... afflict her on the battlefield - from the word "va'Haveisah", meaning that he may not make Bi'ah with her on the field, but must take her into his house (Cheishek Sh'lomoh. See also Tosfos). Note, the Beraisa appears to clash with the previous Sugya, which established "va'Haveisah ... " by the second Bi'ah.