Previous daf

1)

(a) We just cited Rava, who extrapolates from the case brought in the Beraisa that silence after having accepted the money is construed as indifference, but not as consent, that the same applies to Kidushin.

1. The people of Pum Nahara in the name of Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua queries Rava's comparison on the grounds that this Din will not pertain to the latter, even though it pertains to the former - because it is only by a Pikadon that we translate silence as indifference, seeing as (for fear that he would be held liable if he threw the article back at the depositor), the trustee had no option but to remain silent; whereas in the case of Kidushin, the woman (not having undertaken to look after the mat), had the option of throwing it back at the man, in the knowledge that she would be held liable even if it became damaged in the process.
2. Rav Acha'i queried this distinction - on the grounds that one cannot expect all women to be so conversant with the Halachah, and that consequently, Rava's inference was justified.

(b) When Rav Acha bar Rav (presumably, this should read 'Rav Acha bar Rava') asked Ravina what the Din would be in such a case, the latter replied - that since he (Rav Acha bar Rav), and the people of his town, had heard of Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua's query, they should go by it. As far as he was concerned, the people of his town had not heard about it, in which case they would follow the ruling of Rava.

(a) When, instead of returning the bandages that he had grabbed from that woman unconditionally, the man asked her whether she would agree to become betrothed to him in exchange for their return - she greeted his proposal with silence, though she did accept the bandages.

(b) Rav Nachman ruled - that despite the principle 'Shesikah ke'Hoda'ah' ('Silence is construed as consent'), she is not Mekudeshes, because she was only accepting what was rightfully hers (borne out by her initial demand for their return).

(c) Rava queried Rav Nachman from a Beraisa which, in a similar case, rules - that she is Mekudeshes.

(d) The Tana also speaks about betrothing her with Gezel, Chamas or Geneivah. The difference between Gezel and Chamas is - that whereas one retains the former without paying for it, the latter, one retains but pays for.

(a) In order to conform with the Tana - Rav Nachman establishes the Beraisa when the man who grabbed the money from the woman was already unofficially engaged to her.

(b) The Tana of another Beraisa says that when a man said 'Kinsi Sela Zeh she'Ani Chayav Lach', and later added 'Hiskadshi Li Bo', be'Sha'as Matan Ma'os Ratz'sah Mekudeshes, Lo Ratz'sah, Einah Mekudeshes'. By 'le'Achar Matan Ma'os' he rules - 'Afilu Ratz'sah Einah Mekudeshes'.

(c) We cannot interpret 'Lo Ratz'sah' to mean that she declined to accept his offer (insinuating that if she was silent, the Kidushin would be valid) - because that would be obvious, and the Tana should rather have just said S'tam Mekudeshes (and every child would know that if she declined to accept the offer of Kidushin, she is not Mekudeshes).

(d) So 'Lo Ratz'sah' must mean that she was silent, and nevertheless the Tana rules 'Einah Mekudeshes' - because we interpret her silent acceptance to mean that she merely wants her money back (like Rav Nachman).

(a) The Rabbanan gathered to collect the sayings of Rav Asi after his death - in order to preserve them (that they should be forgotten).

(b) A certain Rav Ya'akov quoted Rav Asi Amar Rav as saying - that the same as one cannot acquire a woman with less than a Shaveh P'rutah, so too, can one not acquire Karka with less than a Shaveh P'rutah.

(c) Rav Ya'akov established the Beraisa which rules that Karka can be acquired for less than a P'rutah - by Kinyan Chalipin, but not by Kinyan Kesef.

(a) When the Navi Hoshei'a writes "Alah ve'Chachesh ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov ve'Na'of *Paratzu, ve'Damim be'Damim Naga'u*" - he means 'to add sin upon sin by conceiving children from the wives of their friends' (often the result of people who deal with Gitin and Kidushin without being familiar with the Halachos) as Targum Yonasan translates it.

(b) The significance of the fact that it is Rav Yosef who cited the Targum - is that he was an expert on Targum Yonasan.

(c) Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan extrapolates from the continuation of that Pasuk that dealing with Gitin and Kidushin when one is not conversant with the Halachos is a worse sin than those perpetrated by the generation of the flood - from the fact that the fish there died too, a tragedy that did not occur by the Dor ha'Mabul.

(d) We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Ki Mipnei Alah Avlah ha'Aretz" - that the punishment described by the Navi pertains even to someone who is guilty of contravening even just one of the sins listed in the Pasuk (and not necessarily all of them).
2. ... there " ... ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov ve'Na'of Paratzu" (and not "*u*'Partzu') - that it is not only the sin of a false oath that is punishable on its own, but also any of the others, including that of adultery.

6)

(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Kinin that if a Yoledes brought her Chatas and died, her heirs must bring her Olah. Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel establishes the Mishnah when the woman had already designated the Olah during her lifetime. Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan says - that they have to bring it anyway, whether she designated it or not.

(b) The basis of their Machlokes is - whether Shibuda d'Oraysa (Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan), or de'Rabbanan (Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel).

(c) 'Shibuda d'Oraysa' means - that all the property of a person is automatically Meshubad to pay his debts (irrespective of whether they are self-obligated or Torah orientated).

(d) According to Rav and Shmuel, the creditor can claim from Meshubadim in the case of a written loan - because he specifically designated his property himself (in the Sh'tar).

(a) Rav and Shmuel say - that one cannot claim an oral loan from the orphans or from purchasers.

(b) Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree, and permit claiming from either - because they hold 'Shibuda d'Oraysa; whereas Rav and Shmuel hold 'Shibuda La'av d'Oraysa'.

(c) Shmuel and Rebbi Yochanan seem to repeat their Machlokes twice. They find it necessary to present their dispute in the case of ...

1. ... the Korban of a Yoledes - because we would otherwise have thought that in this case, even Shmuel will agree with Rebbi Yochanan, because it is Torah orientated.
2. ... a loan - because we would otherwise have thought that in this case, even Rebbi Yochanan will agree with Shmuel, because it is not.

(d) In spite of the fact that ...

1. ... in principle, we rule like Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, we nevertheless conclude that one cannot in fact, claim an oral loan from purchasers - because since the debt does not have a Kol, the purchaser has no way of anticipating that he might lose the property after having bought it, the Rabbanan safeguarded him from losing on the deal.
2. ... min ha'Torah, we hold 'Shibuda d'Oraysa', the creditor nevertheless loses his right to claim from the purchaser - because (unlike the purchaser, as we just explained) he has the option of writing a Sh'tar when lending the money.

(a) We know that a woman acquires herself by means of a Get from the Pasuk "ve'Kasav Lah Sefer K'riysus". We repudiate the suggestion that she acquires herself with the death of her husband ...

1. ... because of the S'vara 'Hu Asrah, ve'Hu Sharsah' - by citing the precedent of many instances of Arayos (e.g. Eishes Aviv), who forbid a man on their relatives, yet they do those relatives do not become permitted with the death of the one who forbade them.
2. ... because the Torah writes by a Yevamah that when she has no children she is prohibited to marry - because rather than inferring that if she has children, she is permitted to marry, perhaps we will infer that if she has children, she is even forbidden to the Yavam as well.
3. ... from the fact that the Torah forbids an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, insinuating that she is permitted to others because maybe the La'av becomes permitted, but the Asei of "ve'Shilchah mi'Beiso" (and not through any other means) will remain.

(b) We attempt (unsuccessfully) to reinstate the proof from the latter Halachah - by rejecting the notion that although there is no La'av, there is an Asei, and by arguing that 'mi'Mah Nafshach', if the Torah removes the La'av, then she should be completely permitted!

(c) We substantiate the disproof, from Pesulei ha'Mukdashin which the owner redeemed.

1. The La'av that becomes permitted there is - "Lo Sagoz bi'Vechor Shorecha".
2. The Asei that comes into effect is - "Tizbach ('ve'Lo Gizah') "ve'Achalta" ('ve'Lo li'K'lavecha') "Basar" ('ve'Lo Chalav"), from which we see that it is feasible for the Torah to permit a La'av, but to retain a partial prohibition based on an Asei.

(d) We finally learn that the death of her husband permits her to marry, from the Pasuk (concerning those who are sent home from the battlefront) - "Pen Yamus ba'Milchamah, ve'Ish Acher Yikachenah".

(a) Rav Ashi ...

1. ... explained to Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi that "Ish Acher" referred to in the previous Pasuk does not refer to the Yavam - because a Yavam is not called 'Acher'.
2. ... brings another disproof (apparently to the previous contention that although there is no La'av forbidding an Almanah to remarry, there is an Asei) from the Pasuk there "u'Senei'ah ha'Ish ha'Acharon ve'Kasav Lah Sefer K'riysus ... O Ki Yamus ha'Ish ha'Acharon" - which, by comparing Miysah to Gerushin, permits her completely at the death of her husband.

(b) He does not cite the following Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Ba'alah ha'Rishon Lashuv Lekachtah" (implying that somebody else may marry her) - because there too, it is possible that although there is no La'av, an Asei remains.