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Kidushin, 70

1) HALACHAH: MARRYING FOR MONEY

QUESTION: The Gemara says that "anyone who marries a woman for the sake of money will have children who do not act properly." RASHI (DH Banim Zarim) explains that the Gemara is not referring to one who marries a woman solely for the sake of gaining money, but rather it is referring to one who marries a woman *who is Pasul to him* for the sake of gaining money. The Gemara is discouraging a man from transgressing an Isur for the sake of monetary gain.

The REMA (EH 2:1) quotes our Gemara according to Rashi's explanation and states clearly that "when the woman is not Pasul to him and he is marrying her for the sake of money, it is permissible."

The Rema continues to discuss a case in which the parents of the Kalah promised to give the Chasan a certain sum of money, and then the parents of the Kalah retracted their promise. The Rema rules that the Chasan should not start a quarrel or delay the wedding because of monetary considerations, and one who makes an issue out of the money that he is not receiving will not have a successful marriage, "because the money which a man receives by virtue of his wife is not rightful money ('Mamon Shel Yosher'), and anyone who does this is called 'one who marries a woman for the sake of money.'" These words seem to contradict the earlier ruling of the Rema, in which he states that the Gemara's prohibition applies only to one who marries a woman who is Pasul, while there is nothing wrong with marrying a woman for the sake of money. How are these two statements of the Rema to be reconciled?

ANSWERS:

(a) The BI'UR HA'GRA explains that the Rema is quoting two conflicting opinions. The first opinion that the Rema quotes is that of Rashi and the RIVASH. Indeed, according to that opinion, there is nothing wrong with marrying a woman for the sake of money, or delaying a marriage because of money matters.

The Rema, though, then quotes a second opinion, that of the BEIS YOSEF in the name of the ORCHOS CHAIM, who understands our Gemara differently than Rashi and explains that marrying a woman "for the sake of money" refers to any case in which the man is marrying for monetary gain (even if the woman is completely permitted to him). The Vilna Ga'on adds, though, that even according to this explanation, the prohibition applies only if the man would otherwise not have been interested in marrying this woman. If, however, he would have considered marrying her even without the monetary incentive, there is nothing wrong in taking money that might be offered to him as part of the Shiduch.

(b) The CHELKAS MECHOKEK (EH 2:1) explains that the two statements of the Rema complement each other and do not argue.

Everyone agrees that the Gemara is teaching that one should not transgress an Isur for the sake of monetary gain (as Rashi explains). The first statement of the Rema, in the name of the Rivash, is expressing the Isur to marry a woman who is Pasul for the sake of money. The second statement of the Rema, in the name of the Orchos Chaim, is teaching that *delaying* one's marriage because of monetary concerns is also akin to transgressing an Isur for the sake of money. The delay of marriage is prone to lead to the man having sinful thoughts (Hirhurim Ra'im), which itself is a sin. If he delays his marriage in order to gain money, he is effectively transgressing an Isur (of Hirhurim Ra'im) for the sake of gaining money, and thus he is considered like one who marries a woman who is Pasul for the sake of monetary gain.

2) HALACHAH: THE PROHIBITION AGAINST A LEADER DOING MENIAL LABOR
OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that "from the time that a person is appointed as a leader over the community, it is prohibited for him to perform labor in front of three people." What is the reason behind this prohibition?
(a) RASHI explains that this Halachah is in order to protect the dignity of the *community*. The leader of the community is the one who has authority and power to rule over the people. It is below the dignity of the community to be subservient to someone who must perform menial labor himself and does not have servants to do the work for him.

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Sanhedrin 25:4) explains that this Halachah is to protect the dignity of the *leader*. If he is seen doing labor like a common citizen, the people will look down upon him. This causes not only a disgrace for the leader, but for the position of authority which he represents.

The Rambam goes on to explain that it goes without saying that a Dayan or Nasi should take no part in the frivolous activities of the Amei ha'Aretz, for doing so would cause a terrible disgrace for the Torah.

3) "KOL B'ISHAH"
QUESTION: Rav Nachman told Rav Yehudah to bring greetings to Yalsa, Rav Nachman's wife. Rav Yehudah refused, responding that Shmuel ruled that "Kol b'Ishah Ervah," and if he brings greetings to Rav Nachman's wife, she will return the greeting and it is prohibited for him to listen to her voice.

The Halachah of "Kol b'Ishah Ervah" appears in a different context in the Gemara in Berachos (24a). There, the Gemara teaches that it is prohibited to recite Keri'as Shema in the presence of Ervah. The Gemara adds that since the voice of a woman is also considered Ervah, one may not recite Keri'as Shema when the sounds of a woman's voice is heard. When citing this Halachah, the TALMIDEI RABEINU YONAH states that a *singing* voice of a woman is an Ervah, and this is how the SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 75:3) rules as well: "One must avoid hearing the sound of a woman's voice singing at the time of reciting Keri'as Shema." The Poskim point out that only the sound of a woman's voice singing is considered Ervah. Ordinary speech, though, is not considered Ervah.

This seems to contradict Shmuel's ruling in our Gemara. Rav Yehudah's fear was not that he would hear Rav Nachman's wife *singing*, but merely that he would hear her *talking*, when she would respond to his greeting. Why should "Kol b'Ishah" be prohibited in such a situation, if the prohibition applies only when hearing a woman's voice *singing*?

ANSWER: The BEIS SHMUEL explains that there is no contradiction between our Gemara and the Gemara in Berachos (as explained by the Talmidei Rabeinu Yonah and Poskim). The reason why only a singing voice, and not a talking voice, is considered Ervah is because it arouses the Ta'avah of a man. In normal cases, speech does not arouse such Ta'avah. The case of our Gemara, though, involved She'eilas Shalom -- bringing greetings to a woman. Asking another person about his or her welfare engenders a certain degree of intimacy between the two people; it expresses the existence of a relationship. Hence, if a woman responds to such a greeting, even in a regular tone of voice, there is reason to be concerned that it might arouse the man's Ta'avah.


70b

4) HALACHAH: ASKING ABOUT THE WELFARE OF ANOTHER MAN'S WIFE
OPINIONS: Shmuel rules that one may not inquire about the welfare of another man's wife, even by sending the inquiry to the woman via the woman's husband.

What is the reason behind this prohibition, and in what circumstances might it be permissible to inquire about the welfare of a woman?

(a) RASHI (DH Ein Sho'alin b'Shalom Ishah Klal) says that asking a woman about her welfare is prohibited because one thereby "makes her heart and mind familiar with him," creating a feeling of affection within the woman which could, Chas v'Shalom, lead to sin.

According to this reasoning, it would be permitted for a man to inquire about a woman's welfare from her husband, since the woman herself is not aware of it and thus she will not feel affection towards the other man.

Indeed, this is the way RASHI seems to rule in Bava Metzia (87a, DH Al Yedei Ba'alah). The Gemara there explains that the reason why the Mal'achim were permitted to ask Avraham Avinu about the welfare of his wife is because they asked only her husband. Rashi there explains that it is only prohibited to ask the woman herself about her welfare, but it is permitted to ask her husband how his wife is doing. (According to the BACH (EH 21, DH v'Ein), for this reason it is permitted to ask any other person, and not only her husband, how the woman is doing. The CHELKAS MECHOKEK (EH 21:7) argues and says that it is only permitted to ask her husband, as the Gemara in Bava Metzia implies, for her husband specifically avoids relating the man's inquiry to his wife, while any other person will not be so particular.)

(b) The RITVA, however, implies that the reason a man may not inquire about the welfare of another man's wife is because the *man* will feel close to the woman and might, Chas v'Shalom, have sinful thoughts. (This also seems to be the view of the ME'IRI.) The Ritva writes that if a man knows himself well and he knows that he has subjugated his Yetzer ha'Ra and he is in complete control of his thoughts such that he never allows sinful thoughts into his mind, it is permitted for him to ask a married woman about her welfare.

According to the Ritva, the Isur is because of the man's tendency to have sinful thoughts, and is not because the woman will feel affection towards the man. Consequently, it is permitted for a man who is in complete control of his thoughts to ask a woman about her welfare. According to Rashi, such a man would still be prohibited from asking a woman about her welfare. On the other hand, according to the Ritva, it would *not* be permitted for a man to ask a husband about his wife (when the wife will not know about it), since there still exists the concern that he will have sinful thoughts.

How, though, does the Ritva explain the Gemara in Bava Metzia, that says that the Mal'achim were permitted to ask Avraham Avinu about his wife? The DIVREI SHALOM (2:14) explains that the Ritva learns like TOSFOS in Bava Metzia (87a, DH Al Yedei). Tosfos says that the Mal'achim were permitted to ask only "where is Sarah" (in order to make her more beloved to her husband, by emphasizing how Tzanu'ah she was, or because of the requirement to act with Derech Eretz and ask a man about his wife), but not to ask about her welfare.

HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (EH 21:6) rules like Shmuel, who says that it is prohibited to ask a married woman about her welfare, even via a messenger, and even via her husband.

The Shulchan Aruch rules like Rashi's understanding of the Gemara in Bava Metzia and says that it is permitted to ask a husband about his wife's welfare.

It is interesting to note the comments of the BEN YEHOYADA to the Gemara here. The Ben Yehoyada suggests that this Isur applies only a man who is completely unknown to the woman; by inquiring about her welfare, he creates a bond of affection. If, however, the man is a relative of hers, or is a frequent guest in her home, it is not prohibited to inquire about her welfare, because it is clear that his intention is not to form a bond of affection, but rather to express to her his gratitude for her hospitality, and, on the contrary, it is a proper act of Derech Eretz to express concern about her welfare.

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