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1)

(a) We quoted earlier Shmuel's ruling that if a creditor who sold a Sh'tar Chov (a document of debt) subsequently absolved the debtor, the latter is Patur from paying the purchaser.
How might an astute purchaser avoid this problem?

(b) There is a Machlokes whether Beis-Din apply 'Dina de'Garmi' or not. What is 'Dina de'Garmi'?

(c) Those who do not hold of Dina de'Garmi say that, in our case, the purchaser may claim the value of the paper.
What do they mean by that?

(d) Rav Ashi, it seems, did not initially hold of 'Dina de'Garmi'.
Who caused him to change his mind?

(a) What did Ameimar in the name of Rav Chama say about someone who died, leaving land and money, and a wife's Kesuvah and a debt that needed to be settled?

(b) If he only left a single field that did not suffice to pay both, it is the creditor who gets precedence.
Why is that?

(c) In which case will the woman nevertheless come first?

(a) What did Rav Chama reply when Rav Papa asked him whether, , he had issued a ruling in the name of Rava, that we force the debtor to sell his land in order to pay the creditor money?

(b) Why would such a ruling have been incorrect?

(c) Then why did Rava rule like that with regard to a case that he had to deal with?

(a) Rav Papa maintains that the repayment of a loan is a Mitzvah.
Which Mitzvah?

(b) Rav Kahana asked Rav Papa what would happen if the debtor refused to perform it.
What did Rav Papa reply?

5)

(a) According to the first Lashon, what did Rav Chisda rule regarding a man who gives his wife a Get that is to take effect in thirty days time, assuming that the Get is then lying at the side of the street?

(b) From which statement of Rav and Shmuel does he derive this? What must he assume to make such a derivation?

(c) Rav Nachman Amar bar Avuhah says that someone who makes a Meshichah on a cow to acquire it in thirty days time, will acquire it even if it standing in a meadow at that time.
How do we try do counter our original proof from Rav and Shmuel with Rav Nachman?

(d) How do we refute this counter-proof?

7)

(a) What does the Tana of our Mishnah say about a man who places his wife in charge of his shop or appoints her to be an administrator?

(b) Rebbi Eliezer adds that he may even make her swear on her knitting and on her dough. Perhaps he is referring to a Gilgul Shevu'ah.
What would he then mean?

(c) What will the Rabbanan hold regarding a Gilgul Shevu'ah in this instance?

(d) What is the alternative interpretation of Rebbi Eliezer's statement?

(a) How do we attempt to resolve the She'eilah in Rebbi Eliezer's statement from the Rabbanan's retort 'Ein Adam Dar im Nachash bi'Kefifah Achas'?

(b) How do we reject this proof? How do we reconcile their statement even if Rebbi Eliezer is referring to Gilgul Shevu'ah?

(c) How do we finally resolve the She'eilah from a Beraisa? How does the Tana there cite their Machlokes?

(a) Once a husband writes for his wife 'Ein Li Neder u'Shevu'ah', he can no longer force her to swear. He can however, demand a Shevu'ah from her heirs or from those who come on her account (unless he specifically includes them in the exemption).
Which Shevu'ah does he demand from her heirs?

(b) What does the Tana mean by 'those who come on her account'?

(c) Under which circumstances will even *his heirs* not be permitted to demand a Shevu'ah from her, from her heirs or from those who come on her account?

(a) The Tana continues that, if she went directly from burying her husband to her father's house or to her home without undertaking to become his heirs' administrator, they cannot make her swear.
In which case is the Tana speaking?

(b) What will be the Din if she did undertake to administrate their affairs?
On what do they have the right to make her swear and on what do they not?

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