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1)

(a) A husband has rights in his wife's property - regarding eating Peiros during her lifetime, stopping her from selling it and inheriting it after her death?

(b) When he ...

1. ... writes for her, 'Din u'Devarim Ein Li bi'Nechasayich' - he can no longer prevent her from selling it.
2. ... adds the word 'u've'Peirosayich' - he continues to inherit her after her death.

(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah, should he add 'u've'Peiroseihen u've'Peirei Peiroseihen ad Olam' - he will be forbidden to eat even the Peirei Peiros.

(d) In order to be forbidden to eat Peiros and Peirei Peiros even after his wife's death, according to him - he must replace 'ad Olam' with 'be'Chayech u've'Mosech'.

(a) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel permits him to inherit the field and to eat the Peiros even after his wife's death - on the basis of the principle 'Kol ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil'.

(b) He learns from the Pasuk "li'*She'eiro* ha'Karov Eilav mi'Mishpachto *ve'Yarash Osah*" - that a man inherits his wife (in which case Yerushas ha'Ba'al is d'Oraysa).

(c) His T'nai is valid regarding the Peiros during her lifetime, due to the fact that the Takanah permitting a husband to eat Peiros is only mi'de'Rabbanan - but not regarding the inheritance after her death, since it is mi'd'Oraysa, and 'Kol ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil', as we just explained.

(a) Rebbi Chiya amends the wording 'ha'Kosev le'Ishto ... ' - to 'ha'Omer le'Ishto'.

(b) The Beraisa states that if someone writes (or says) to the partner with whom he shares a field 'Din u'Devarim Ein Li al Sadeh Zu, ve'Ein Li Eisek Bah ve'Yadi Mesulekes Heimenah', he remains a partner as before - because withdrawal from something that one already owns is ineffective. He would have to actually give it to his partner as a gift.

(c) The Tana of our Mishnah accepts the same Lashon with regard to the Nechsei mi'Lug of one's wife - because, as Rebbi Yanai explained, he is speaking when he withdrew whilst they were still betrothed (and the man did not yet own any rights in the woman's property).

(a) Rav Kahana says 'Nachalah ha'Ba'ah Lo le'Adam mi'Makom Acher, Adam Masneh Alehah she'Lo Yirshenah'. By mi'Makom Acher - he means that it came to him, not in the form of a regular inheritance, which comes automatically, but through the marriage which he initiated.

(b) When Rava himself mentioned 'Kegon Zu', he was referring to a statement by Rav Huna Amar Rav - who permits a woman to say to her husband 'Eini Nizones, ve'Eini Osah', seeing as the main Takanah of Mezonos is for the woman's benefit.

(c) Despite the fact that the ultimate reason behind this is because it is illogical to force someone to accept a Takanah that is made for his benefit, the right to withdraw from his wife's property is restricted to before the marriage - because once they are married, Chazal reinforced his rights, making him a joint owner.

(a) According to Abaye, once a man marries, Chazal reinforced his rights, making him an equal partner in his wife's Nechsei mi'Lug. According to Rava - they gave him even more rights in his wife's property than his wife (making him the stronger partner).

(b) The ramifications of their Machlokes concern a Shomeres Yavam, who dies leaving property that she has inherited. According to Beis Shamai, her father's heirs and her husband's (the Yavam) share it, whereas according to Beis Hillel, it remains in the possession of her father's heirs. Abaye establishes this Machlokes when she inherited the property whilst still married to her husband. In Rava's opinion however - the property would then go entirely to the Yavam, and they argue when she inherited it after the death of her husband, when she was a Shomeres Yavam.

(a) They asked whether a Kinyan would render the Lashon 'Din u'Devarim ... ' effective. This She'eilah cannot pertain to the case in our Mishnah - because the reason that 'Din u'Devarim ... ' is not fully effective there is due to the ambiguity of his Lashon, which, in turn, will not become any clearer through a Kinyan. Consequently - it must pertain to the case in the Beraisa ('Din u'Devarim Ein Li al Sadeh Zu, ve'Ein Li Eisek Bah ve'Yadi Mesulekes Heimenah'), where it is ineffective, not because it is ambiguous, but because the Lashon is defficient. Perhaps we ask, the Kinyan can supplement what the Lashon lacks.

(b) Rav Yosef maintains that the Kinyan comes to reinforce the meaningless withdrawal from the land, and is no more valid than the withdrawal itself - Rav Nachman however, says that the Kinyan pertains to the actual land and is therefore valid.

(c) Abaye establishes Rav Yosef by 'Orer', but not by 'Omed' - meaning that it is only if his partner claimed the field immediately following the Kinyan, that we accept his word that the Kinyan pertained only to the 'Din u'Devarim ... '. But if the partner came at a later date, then we assume that, in reality, the Kinyan was on the actual land, and that he only now argues that he meant to substantiate the 'Din u'Devarim ...' because his friends advised him to say so.

(d) When Ameimar rules that the Kinyan comes to acquire the land - he is referring even to the case of Orer (like Rav Nachman), because he does not agree with Rav Yosef.

7)

(a) In the Reisha of our Mishnah, we restrict 'Din u'Devarim ... ' to where the woman sold the property, and not to the other two rights (Peiros and inheritance) - because, since there is room for doubt as to what he meant, we apply the principle 'Yad Ba'al ha'Sh'tar al ha'Tachtonah'. In other words, since it is the person with the document (in this case, the woman) who is coming to claim, we apply the other principle 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah', to claim the minimum that is implied by the document, placing the onus on him to prove otherwise.

(b) We know that the husband did not mean to withdraw from ...

1. ... the Peiros, despite the fact that it is less than what he stands to lose from the wife's sale - because 'Botzina Tav mi'Kara' ('a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush'), and he currently benefits from the fruits, as opposed to the sale, which will only cause him a loss later (albeit a more substantial one).
2. ... the inheritance (in the event of his wife's death), despite the fact that there is no reason to suspect that she might die - because death is inevitable, whereas the sale of the property is not (so it is from the latter that he withdraws).

(c) Rav Ashi learns all this from the Lashon 'Din u'Devarim ... bi'Nechasayich' - implying 'bi'Nechasayich, ve'Lo be'Peiroseihen'; 'bi'Nechasa*yich, ve'Lo le'Achar Misah'.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah differentiates between Peiros and Peirei Peiros. 'Peirei Peiros' - is the proceeds of the sale of the Peiros.

(b) We are not sure whether the criterion, according to Rebbi Yehudah who mentions both 'Peirei Peiros' and 'ad Olam', is the former or the latter - or whether he requires both.

(c) Assuming that the criterion according to him, is ...

1. ... 'Peirei Peiros', he nevertheless mentioned 'ad sOlam' - to teach us that once he mentions 'Peirei Peiros' it is as if he had written 'ad Olam' (to include 'Peirei de'Peirei Peiros').
2. ... 'ad Olam', he nevertheless mentions 'Peirei Peiros' - to teach us that even if he had written 'Peirei Peiros', it would have been meaningless without 'ad Olam'.

(d) It might also be necessary to mention both. It would not suffice to write only ...

1. ... 'Peirei Peiros' (and not 'ad Olam') - because then we would not have included 'Peirei de'Peirei Peiros' in the prohibition.
2. ... 'ad Olam' (and not 'Peirei Peiros') - because we have would explained that to mean that the fruit is forbidden forever (this year and next year ... ), but not Peirei Peiros.

(a) We ask what the Din will be if a man writes 'Din u'Devarim Ein Li bi'Nechasayich u've'Peirei Peiros (without mentioning Peiros) - whether he specifically omitted to 'Peiros', in order to retain his rights to benefit from them; or whether he obviously intended to include Peiros too (as if to say from the Nechasim to the Peirei Peiros and all that is in between.

(b) We attempt to resolve this She'eilah logically - by pointing out that, if he eats the Peiros, how can there even be Peirei Peiros to discuss?

(c) We counter this proof however, with Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah, who specifically permits the husband to eat the Peirei Peiros (should he not have inserted them into his stipulation). There too, we can ask that, once the woman has eaten the Peiros, where will the Peirei Peiros come from. It must therefore be - that Rebbi Yehudah speaks when the woman left over some Peiros, from which they bought Peirei Peiros. That being so, we can refute our proof in exactly the same way (leaving our She'eilah unresolved).

(a) With regard to the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - Rav stated that the Halachah is like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, though not for the same reason.

(b) We suggest that what he meant was that - whereas Raban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that, should the woman die, her husband inherits her (in spite of his stipulation) because of 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah', Rav holds that a man inherits his wife only mi'de'Rabbanan, and his stipulation is negated, because the Chachamim were more stringent in their own rulings than the Torah was in its rulings.

(c) With regard to 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah' - Rav holds like Rebbi Yehudah: that 'be'Davar she'ba'Mamon, Tena'o Kayam'.

(d) We refute this suggestion - on the grounds that elsewhere, Rav holds 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil', even by money-matters.

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