ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
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Kesuvos 73
Questions
1)
(a) According to Rav, someone who betroths a woman on condition that she has
no Nedarim, and then, after he marries her S'tam, he discovers that she has,
nevertheless requires a Get - Shmuel maintains that she does not.
(b) Rav's reason is not due to the fact that his marriage to her S'tam,
indicates that he has foregone his original stipulation - but as Abaye
explains, to the fact that a person does not like to commit adultery, so
presumably, his Bi'ah is for the sake of Kidushin.
(c) The difference between the two reasons - is that, according to Abaye's
explanation, she will not receive her Kesuvah (whereas had the reason been
because he forewent his original stipulation, she would have).
(d) Shmuel maintains - that a person is usually Bo'eil having in mind the
original Kidushin (and not for the sake of a fresh Kidushin).
2)
(a) If a Ketanah whose mother and brothers married her off, failed to make
Miy'un, and then after she grew up, she married someone else, according to
Rav, *she does not require a Get* from the second man - because when they
performed the first Bi'ah after she grew-up, he had in mind to betroth her
afresh.
(b) Shmuel says that *she does* - because, he maintains, his subsequent
Bi'os were based on the first Kidushin, and not performed for the sake of a
new Kidushin.
(c) She is not however, permitted to live with the second man, because, once
she grows-up, she may no longer make Miy'un, though this is only
mi'de'Rabbanan (which explains why she nevertheless requires a Get from the
second man).
(d) According to Rav, since the first husband is subsequently Bo'eil for the
sake of Kidushin, the prohibition to make Miy'un *mi'd'Oraysa*, and the
second man's Kidushin is ineffective.
3)
(a) Despite the fact that Rav and Shmuel already argue over this point ...
1. ... in the case of a Ketanah, they nevertheless need to repeat the
Machlokes here by T'nai - because we would otherwise have thought that it is
only in the case of a Ketanah, where no stipulation was made, that Rav holds
that she is Mekudeshes, but that here, where a stipulation was made, Rav
will agree with Shmuel, that he is Bo'eil on the understanding that she
fulfills it (because he doesn't want to live with a woman who makes
Nedarim).
2. ... in the case of T'nai, they nevertheless need to repeat it by a
Ketanah - because we would otherwise have thought that Shmuel only said that
he is not Bo'eil having in mind a new Kidushin in the case of T'nai,
because he does not want to live with a woman who makes Nedarim, but that in
the case of a Ketanah, he will agree with Rav, and she is Mekudeshes.
(b) Our Mishnah states 'Kansah S'tam ve'Nimtze'u Alehah Nedarim, Teitzei
she'Lo bi'Kesuvah' - from which we can infer that she does not need a
Kesuvah, but she does need a Get.
(c) Assuming that this (the Seifa of the Mishnah) is a continuation of the
Reisha (that Kansah S'tam was preceded by Kidshah al T'nai), from which we
see that he was Bo'eil with the intention of making a fresh Kidushin (a
Kashya against Shmuel who says that he was not).
(d) We reconcile Shmuel's explanation with our Mishnah - by establishing the
Seifa as an independent case, which speaks when the Kidushin took place
without any stipulation.
73b---------------------------------------73b
Questions
4)
(a) Having just concluded that, according to Shmuel, the Seifa of our
Mishnah speaks specifically in a case of 'Kidshah S'tam ve'Kansah S'tam', we
can ask on the Reisha, which speaks about 'Kidshah al T'nai' and stops
there - why the Tana does not rather teach us about 'Kidshah al T'nai
ve'Kansah S'tam', which is a bigger Chidush, and besides, not mentioning
Kansah S'tam implies that if it would be, she would be Mekudeshes (a Kashya
on Shmuel).
(b) We answer - that the Tana in fact, means to say 'Kidshah al T'nai
ve'Kansah S'tam, Einah Mekudeshes'.
(c) We just concluded that, in the Seifa of our Mishnah, according to
Shmuel, the woman requires a Get, but does not receive her Kesuvah. But
surely the reason that the woman does not receive a Kesuvah is because the
man can say 'I cannot live with a woman who makes Nedarim'! - In that case,
by the same token, the Kidushin ought not to be valid either; so why does
she require a Get?
(d) According to Rabah and Rav Chisda, the Get is mi'de'Rabbanan. According
to Rava - the Tana is not sure whether a man (who did not stipulate) can
take living with a woman who makes Nedarim or not (see also Ran).
Consequently, regarding the Kesuvah, we apply the principle 'ha'Motzi
me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah'; whereas with regard to a Get, we go le'Chumra,
and a Get is required.
5)
(a) Rabah contends that Rav and Shmuel argue specifically by *two* women
(when a man betrothed one woman conditionally, and later betrothed and
married a second one). There Rav argues with Shmuel, maintaining that the
man is Bo'eil the second one for the sake of Kidushin (because he never
indicated that he is particular about Nedarim with regard to her); whereas
by *one* woman - even Rav will agree that the man's mind is on the
condition, in which case, she will not require a Get.
(b) We refute this contention however - on the basis of the Kashya that we
asked on Shmuel from our Mishnah (see 3c.), in spite of the fact that the
Mishnah is speaking about one woman. So we see that it is not unanimously
agreed upon that 'Kidshah al T'nai ve'Kansah S'tam' by one woman does not
require a get, like Rabah contended.
(c) We therefore amend Rabah's statement to read - that Rav and Shmuel argue
in the case of one woman like two women (meaning when he betrothed her on
condition and divorced her, then betrothed her again S'tam and marrying her
S'tam). That is where Rav says that the Bi'ah is for the sake of Kidushin
(because he did not mention the condition the second time, indicating that
he is no longer particular [because his fondness for the woman has now taken
precedence], so that it resembles the case of two separate women). By a
regular case of 'Kidshah al T'nai ve'Kansah S'tam', Rav will agree with
Shmuel that she is not Mekudeshes.
(d) The case in our Mishnah from which we asked against Shmuel earlier - is
the case about which they argue: 'one woman like two women'.
6)
(a) Abaye asked on Rabah from a Beraisa, which discusses 'Kidshah be'Ta'us
u've'Pachos mi'Shaveh Perutah (ve'Chein Katan she'Kidshah)'. The Tana says
that even if the man subsequently sends the woman gifts - she is not
Mekudeshes, because he sent the gifts having the first Kidushin in mind (not
in order to effect new Kidushin).
(b) The Tana Kama maintains that if they subsequently perform Bi'ah, he
acquires her. According to Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah Amar Rebbi Yishmael - he
does not.
(c) So we see that Tana'im do argue over whether a man is Bo'eil for the
sake of Kidushin or not - even by one woman. What makes us think 'Kidshah
be'Ta'us' refers to when he stipulated that the woman has no Nedarim - is
the fact that the other possible case of error ('Pachos mi'Shaveh Perutah'),
is mentioned specifically in the Beraisa (immediately after 'Kidshah
be'Ta'us').
(d) To resolve this Kashya - Rabah explains that the case of 'Pachos
mi'Shaveh Perutah' only comes to explain 'Kidshah be'Ta'us' (not to add to
it).
7)
(a) Having established that the Tana Kama and Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah Amar
Rebbi Yishmael argue solely about Kidushin of less that a Shaveh Perutah,
the basis of their Machlokes is - whether or not, a person knows that
Kidushin is effective: the Tana Kama holds that he does (so he is Bo'eil for
the sake of Kidushin), and Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah Amar Rebbi Yishmael
holds that he does not (so he is Bo'eil having the first Kidushin in mind).
(b) In the case of 'Kidshah al T'nai ve'Kansah S'tam' (by one woman) - they
will both agree that he insists on the condition being met, and is not
Bo'eil for the sake of Kidushin, as Rabah explained.
8)
(a) According to the Tana Kama of a Beraisa, if a man stipulates that he is
Bo'eil a woman on condition that her father agrees, then even if her father
does not agree, she is Mekudeshes. According to Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah
Amar Rebbi Shimon - if her father does not agree, she is not Mekudeshes.
(b) From here we see that, even though it is Ta'us Ishah Achas, not everyone
agrees that he is not Bo'eil her for the sake of Kidushin (due to the
condition) as Rabah maintains.
(c) Rabah answers however, that they are not arguing over whether the man
overlooks the T'nai and is Bo'eil for the sake of Kidushin. What they *are*
arguing over is - in a case when her father was silent, whether the
stipulation called for the positive agreement of the father (Rebbi Shimon
ben Yehudah Amar Rebbi Shimon), or whether it is sufficient if he does not
protest (the Tana Kama).
9)
(a) 'A Yesomah be'Chayei ha'Av' is - a girl whose father married her off as
a Ketanah, and who got divorced whilst she was still a Ketanah.
(b) Should the Yesomah's husband then die, the Tana of the Beraisa rules
'Choletzes ve'Lo Misyabemes' - on the grounds that, on the one hand, her
divorce was valid (since as her father accepted it on her behalf), but on
the other, her Kidushin was not (since a Ketanah is unable to effect a legal
transaction). Consequently, the Chachamim decreed that she must make
Chalitzah, but she cannot perform Yibum.
(c) But that is only if he remarried her when she was still a Ketanah and
she was still a Ketanah when her husband died. If he remarried her after
she grew-up, or if she had grown-up by the time her husband died - the Tana
Kama holds that she is permitted to perform Yibum.
(d) Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Choletzes ve'Lo Misyabemes' whether ...
1. ... he remarried her whilst she was still a Ketanah, but she had grown-up
by the time her husband died ...
2. ... or whether he remarried her after she had grown-up - because Chazal
issued a decree on account of a Yesomah be'Chayei ha'Av.
10)
(a) This Beraisa poses a Kashya on Rabah - because here again, it seems that
there *is* a Tana who holds that even by one woman, the man is Bo'eil for
the sake of Kidushin, despite an existing Ta'us, (and we presume that there
is no difference between the mistake of a Ketanah and the condition of
Nedarim?
(b) Rabah explains - that the Tana Kama holds that he is Bo'eil for the sake
of Kidushin specifically in the case of a Ketanah, because a man knows that
the Kidushin of a Ketanah is not valid, but that is not the case when there
is an existing condition, in which case he has the condition in mind when
they are Bo'eil.
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