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1)

(a) Rebbi Avahu learns from the sequence "*ve'Yisru* Oso" (by Motzi Shem Ra); "Ki Yih'yeh le'Ish *Ben* Sorer u'Moreh ... *ve'Yisru*"; "ve'Hayah im *Bin* Hakos ha'Rasha" - that also by Motzi Shem Ra we consider as if the word "Ben" was written together with "ve'Yisru* Oso" (like it is by ben Sorer u'Moreh); then we learn "Ben" there from "ve'Hayah im *Bin* Hakos ha'Rasha" to teach us that "ve'Yisru" means Malkos.

(b) Rebbi Elazar learns the warning for Motzi Shem Ra from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Lo Seilech Rachil be'Amecha". Rebbi Nasan learns it - from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "ve'Nishmarta mi'Kol Davar Ra".

(c) Rebbi Elazar uses the Pasuk "ve'Nishmarta mi'Kol Davar Ra" for the D'rashah of Rebbi Pinchas ben Ya'ir - who learns from there that a person should take great care not to think unclean thoughts by day so as not to become Tamei at night (because the next Pasuk speaks about someone who has an emission at night).

(d) Rebbi Nasan uses the Pasuk "Lo Seilech Rachil be'Amecha" as a warning to Dayanim - not to be soft to one of the litigants and hard on the other (Rachil is the acronym of 'Rach Li').

(a) If the husband did not invite the witnesses to testify, but they came of their own volition - he will not be Chayav to pay, nor will he receive Malkos.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah learns from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "ve'Sam Lah Alilos Devarim" (by Motzi Shem Ra) "Lo Sesimun Alav Neshech" (by Ribis) - that the husband is only Chayav if he actually hires the witnesses (but not if he invites them to testify without paying them).

(c) The Isur of Ribis does not apply to a loan of land or to one of less than a Shaveh P'rutah. This prompts Rebbi Yirmiyah to ask - whether the Dinim of Motzi Shem Ra will nevertheless apply, according to Rebbi Yehudah, if the husband paid his hired witnesses with land, or less than a Shaveh-P'rutah or if he rented the two witnesses for a P'rutah between them.

(a) Rav Ashi asked two She'eilos. The first She'eilah (whether the husband receives Malkos and has to pay if, after they divorced and remarried, he accuses his wife of not having been a Besulah when they married the first time) remains unanswered. His second She'eilah is - whether a Yavam claims that his wife was not a Besulah when his brother married her will be punished for Motzi Shem Ra.

(b) We resolve the She'eilah from Rebbi Yonah in a Beraisa - who Darshens from the Pasuk "es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh" - 'la'Zeh ve'Lo le'Yavam'.

(a) We already cited the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer ban Ya'akov and the Rabbanan on the previous Amud. The Rabbanan state that if witnesses testified that the girl committed adultery whilst they were betrothed, she receives a Manah. This statement cannot be correct however - because what she ought to receive is S'kilah, not a Manah.

(b) So we amend it to read that if witnesses testified that the girl committed adultery whilst they were betrothed, she is stoned, but if they testified that she had relations with a man prior to her betrothal, then she receives a Kesuvah of a Manah.

(c) From this Beraisa there emerges the important Halachah - that if a man marries a woman on the understanding that she is a Besulah, and she turns out to be a Be'ulah, she receives a Kesuvah of a Manah (and not nothing, on the grounds that it was a Mekach Ta'us [a false sale]).

(a) The Rabbanan of Rebbi Eliezer ban Ya'akov do not differentiate between 'Ba'al' and 'Lo Ba'al'. They then interpret the Pasuk ...

1. ... "u'Ba Eilehah ... va'Ekrav Eilehah" - to mean "u'Ba Eilehah (ba'Alilos - to libel her)", "va'Ekrav Eilehah (bi'D'varim - with false accusations)".
2. ... "Lo Matzasi le'Vitcha (Kishrei) Besulim" (witnesses to disprove the first set of witnesses who condemned her).

(b) The Rabbanan explain "u'Farsu ha'Simlah" to mean - that they must bring their witnesses to clarify the issue.

(c) Rebbi Eliezer ban Ya'akov explains it - literally, that they should spread out the cloth with the bloodstains, to prove that she was a Besulah.

(a) According to the Rabbanan, a husband who slanders his wife is Chayav whether he consummated the marriage or not, Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov requires Bi'ah - ke'Darkah, otherwise, how will he be able to claim that she was not a Besulah?

(b) Rebbi Yochanan is quoted as differentiating between adultery and incest (where the Torah does not make a distinction between Bi'ah ke'Darkah and Bi'ah she'Lo ke'Darkah) on the one hand, and on the other, Motzi Shem Ra, where he requires (even) Bi'ah she'Lo ke'Darkah on the part of the husband, but that the slander pertains specifically to Bi'ah ke'Darkah. In light of what we just learned, we are forced to amend this statement - to read that Bi'ah ke'Darkah is required in both regards.

(a) Our Mishnah states 'ha'Av Zakai be'Vito be'Kidushehah, be'Kesef, bi'Sh'tar u'be'Bi'ah'. 'be'Bi'ah' means - that the father has the right to hand over his daughter for Kidushei Bi'ah to anyone he sees fit (and she cannot refuse).

(b) The daughter must be less than twelve and a half (the minimum [and usual] age at which she becomes a Bogeres) for the father to be Zocheh all these things.

(c) Her father also receives her Get (provided she has been betrothed but not married), should her husband decide to divorce her.

(d) Her father will no longer have jurisdiction over her with regard to receiving her Get and in other regards - from the moment she either marries or becomes a Bogeres.

8)

(a) A girl's father also has jurisdiction over her - regarding her findings, the produce of her hands and the nullification of her vows.

(b) When the Tana says that he does not eat the Peiros in her lifetime - he is referring to benefiting from anything that she inherits from her mother's side of the family. In fact, the money is placed into a fund which she will receive in the event of her father's death.

(c) In addition to the above, a husband may also eat the Peiros in her lifetime.

(d) When a man marries his wife - he adopts the responsibility to feed her, to redeem her (in the event of her capture) and to bury her when she dies.

(a) We learn Kidushei Kesef from the Pasuk "ve'Yatz'ah Chinam Ein Kasef" (written in connection with a Jewish maidservant going free after six years) - "Ein Kesef" (which is superfluous) 'le'Adon Zeh, Aval Yesh Kesef le'Adon Acher' (there is *no* money by the Yetzi'ah from the domain of her master back to her father after six years have expired, but there *is* money by the Yetzi'ah from the domain of a father to that of a Chasan).

(b) We learn from the Pasuk (in connection with Motzi Shem Ra) "es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh" - that a father has jurisdiction over his daughter's betrothal (to betroth her to whoever he pleases).

(c) If the father is the one to arrange the betrothal, it is obvious that he is also the one who will receive the money.

(d) We establish the Pasuk "es Biti ... " by a Ketanah, who has no Yad to be Mekadesh herself, but not by a Na'arah. We do so, in spite of the fact that the Torah specifically writes "Na'arah" by Motzi Shem Ra - because, although she is a Na'arah at that point, when the father says "es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh" he is referring to the betrothal that took place some time earlier, whilst she was still a Ketanah.

(a) We initially learn from the Pasuk "bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avihah" (written in connection with the Din of Hafaras Nedarim) - that all benefits that come from a Na'arah (incorporating all rights, including monetary ones) belong to her father.

(b) Rav Huna Amar Rav learns from the Pasuk "ve'Chi Yimkor Ish es Bito le'Amah" - that the produce of a man's daughter's hands belongs to him, in the same way as that of a maidservant belongs to her master.

(c) This refutes the D'rashah of 'Kol Sh'vach Ne'urim le'Avihah' - because if that D'rashah could be extended to cases beyond Hafaras Nedarim, why would we need Rav Huna Amar Rav's D'rashah?

(a) So we conclude that "bi'Ne'urehah Beis Avihah" is confined to the Din of Hafaras Nedarim. We cannot learn from there that a father also receives the rights to betroth his daughter even when she is a Na'arah and to receive the money (and that the produce of a girl's hands belongs to her father) - because we can never learn Mamon from Isur.

(b) Nor can we learn it from ...

1. ... K'nas (which goes to the father) - because we cannot learn Mamon from K'nas either.
2. ... Boshes and P'gam (which also go to the father) - because they are different, inasmuch as the father also shares this with his daughter, seeing as he had the right to betroth her to an ugly person or to a leper when she was a Ketanah - see Tosfos 40b. DH 'de'I' and Tosfos Yeshanim there).

(a) So we revert to the Pasuk "ve'Yatz'ah Chinam Ein Kasef". By 'de'Chi Mema'et Rachmana, Yetzi'ah de'Kavasa ka'Mema'et', we mean - that we do not only learn from there that there is money by Kidushin, but that, like (in the case of the maidservant) the money would have gone to the master whose jurisdiction she is leaving, so too, here, the money goes to the father whose jurisdiction she is leaving.

(b) That D'rashah cannot be confined to a Ketanah (but not to a Na'arah) - because we already know that from "es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh".

(a) We query this on the grounds that, whereas the Yetzi'ah of a Jewish maidservant from her master is total, a girl's Yetzi'ah from her father is not - seeing as he still inherits her when she dies and receives the produce of her hands whilst she is alive.

(b) Chupah takes her out of his jurisdiction completely.

(c) We resolve this problem however, by pointing out that she does leave his jurisdiction in one regard (creating the possibility to compare it to the Yetzi'ah of a maidservant's from her master) - namely, with regard to Hafaras Nedarim, which the father may no longer perform singlehandedly (only in conjunction with the Chasan).

(d) We know that a father also has jurisdiction over his daughter regarding Kidushei Sh'tar and Kidushei Bi'ah - from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "ve'Haysah", which compares all forms of Kidushin to each other (in which case, we will learn Kidushei Sh'tar and Bi'ah from Kidushei Kesef).