Previous daf

1)

(a) If a Kohen divorces a woman, assuming the Chatzer belongs ...

1. ... to him - *she* is obligated to move out of the Chatzer.
2. ... to her - *he* is obligated to move out.
3. ... to neither but they are both renting - *she* is obligated to move out.

(b) We learn from the Pasuk "Hinei Hashem Metaltelecha Taltelah Gaver" - that it is harder for a man to move from place to place than for a woman. We use this S'vara to resolve our She'eilah (as to who has to move when the Chatzer is owned by both of them) to rule that it is the woman who has to move out of the Chatzer.

(c) The woman claims her debts from her husband if the divorce took place ...

1. ... after the marriage - via a Sh'li'ach, because we are afraid that direct communication will lead to intimacy.
2. ... after the betrothal - directly, because they are not sufficiently familiar with each other to warrant such a fear.

(d) In light if what we just learned, Rava explained to Rav Ada bar Masna that, in the case of a Kohen who divorced his former wife to whom he had been betrothed, he ordered him to pay his debts through the services of a Sh'li'ach - because he noted from the signs and hints that passed between them, that they were more familiar than most betrothed couples.

3)

(a) The cases in our Mishnah of a man testifying on his father's or his Rebbe's signature or that a woman married in the manner that proves she was a Besulah, all have in common - that a grown-up is believed to testify that he saw them when he was a child.

(b) Besides that of his father and of his Rebbe - he is also believed to testify on the signature of his brother.

(c) Besides that he would be taken from school to be Toveled and to eat Terumah - the above list includes where he testified that his friend would receive a portion of Terumah at the Goren.

(d) The Tana incorporates in his list regarding ...

1. ... Tum'ah - that a certain location is a Beis-ha'P'ras.
2. ... Shabbos - how far they used to walk on Shabbos.

(a) A Gadol is not believed when he testifies that he remembers how so-and-so owned a path leading to his field - because such a weak testimony is insufficient to extract money (which requires a strong proof).

(b) Neither is he believed when he says 'Ma'amad u'Misped Hayah li'P'loni ba'Makom ha'Zeh' - meaning that he had the right to eulogize his deceased, and to stand and sit seven times, as they were being taken to be buried (for the same reason).

(c) In all of the cases where he *is* believed, he is not believed in the capacity of a single witness - only together with another witness.

(a) In spite of having taught us that we believe ...

1. ... the man when he attests to the signature of his father, the Tana nevertheless needs to add that he is also believed when he attests to the signature of his Rebbe - because a child spends more time with his father than with his Rebbe, so we might have otherwise believed him on his father's signature, but not on his Rebbe's.
2. ... the man when he attests to the signature of his Rebbe, the Tana needs to add that he is also believed when he attests to the signature of his father - even though his fear of his father is not as intense as that of his Rebbe.
3. ... the man when he attests to the signature of his father and of his Rebbe, the Tana needs to add that he is also believed when he attests to that of his brother - even though neither of the above reasons applies there.

(b) The reason that we believe him in such an important issue as verifying a Sh'tar (particularly as it involves extracting money) from the debtor is - because the verification of a Sh'tar (Kiyum Sh'taros) is only mi'de'Rabbanan. Min ha'Torah, the witnesses who sign on a Sh'tar are considered as if their testimony has already been corroborated (as we learned above on Daf 18b.).

(c) And he is believed when he testifies that a woman was a Besulah when she married, despite the fact that, there too, it is a matter of extracting money from her husband - because, since the majority of women are Besulos when they marry, we consider the testimony no more than a 'Giluy Milsa' (a revelation) on something that is destined to become known anyway.

(d) In spite of the fact that the slave of a Kohen is permitted to eat Terumah, we know that the school-friend about whom the witness testifies (to permit him to eat Terumah), is not the slave of a Kohen - because otherwise, he would not have been in school learning Torah, since, as Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi teaches, a man is forbidden to teach his son Torah.

(a) An Eved who lent his master money, or whose master appointed him as an administrator or who put on Tefilin in his master's presence - all have in common the fact that this is not an indication that their master has set them free.

(b) Included in this list is an Eved who read even just three Pesukim in the Torah in Shul, which speaks when the Eved did so of his own accord - whereas Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi (whom we just quoted - in 5d.) is speaking about his master teaching him Torah (or arranging for him to study in the same way as he does for his son).

7)

(a) The Tana does not in fact, accept the testimony of the witness in our Mishnah to allow someone to eat Terumah d'Oraysa - only Terumah de'Rabbanan.

(b) He also accepts the testimony of the same witness when he testifies that his friend used to receive Terumah at the granary together with him. We know that he is not the Eved of a Kohen - because otherwise, he would not be permitted to receive a portion of Terumah at the granary unless he was accompanied by his master.

(c) In the opinion of Rebbi Yossi - an Eved is indeed permitted to accept Terumah even when his master is not present.

(d) In the town of Rebbi Yossi therefore, they would not elevate someone to the Kehunah on the basis of the fact that he received Terumah at the granary (in case he was an Eved) - in Rebbi Yehudah's town however, they would.

(a) Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Yossi stated that on the sole occasion that he testified that someone was a Kohen, the Beis-Din permitted an Eved to the Kehunah on the basis of his testimony. This statement however, is unacceptable - because Hashem does not place a stumbling-block to Tzadikim (to bring about sin through them).

(b) The donkey of Rebbi Pinchas ben Yair refused to eat the un'Ma'asered food that its captors fed it.

(c) So what he really testified was - that when he testified in the town of Rebbi Yehudah that he had witnessed how a person (who was actually the Eved of a Kohen) received a portion of Terumah at the granary in Rebbi Yossi's town, they wanted to accept his testimony, but realized his mistake in time.

(d) We permit the witness in question to testify regarding the border of T'chum Shabbos - only because we hold Techumin mi'de'Rabbanan.

(a) A Beis ha'P'ras - is an area of one hundred Amos in all directions from the spot where a grave was plowed over.

(b) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel permits blowing one's way through a Beis ha'P'ras in certain instances (see Tosfos DH 'Menafei'ach'). Chazal were not concerned that one may walk over Tamei bones (and become Tamei be'Ohel) - because the bones that are only the size of a barley-grain render Tamei through touching and carrying (and which he will avoid through blowing), but not through Ohel; and bones that are sufficiently large to render Tamei through Ohel, can be easily seen and avoided.

(c) When Rav Yehudah bar Ami Amar Rav Yehudah said 'Beis ha'P'ras she'Nidash Tahor' - he meant that once that area had become well-trodden, the area was considered Tahor (because any bones that were there, would have been ground into pieces that are smaller than a barley-grain).

(d) All these leniencies come to prove - that Beis-ha'P'ras is only mi'de'Rabbanan.

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa believes a grown-up who testifies that his father told him when he was a child that one family is Tamei and another family, Tamei. What he meant was - that one family was Kasher (from the point of view of Yuchsin) and one was not.

(b) And when he said 've'she'Achalnu bi'K'tzatzah shel bas P'loni' - he was referring to a custom that was prevalent in those days: that if one of the brothers married below his status, they would break a fruit-filled barrel in the middle of the street, and announce publicly that they did not want their families to join with his.

(c) He also accepts his testimony when he recalls how they used to carry Chalah and Matanos to so-and-so - but we restrict this to when the witness himself was involved in the carrying, and not if he testified that someone else used to do so.

(a) In all of the above cases - if the grown-up was a Nochri who converted or an Eved who was set-free and who was now testifying what he saw before the conversion and the setting-free respectively, he is not believed.

(b) Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah maintains - that in this regard, he is believed, too.

(c) We know that Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah does not come to argue with the Tana Kama's last statement ('Derech Hayah li'Ploni be'Makom ha'Zeh, Ma'amad u'Misped Hayah ... ') - because nobody would believe him to the point of extracting money.

(d) The basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah and the Rabbanan is - whether we take for granted that a Nochri is not careful in his assessment of the details (the Rabbanan), or whether we can presume that his intention to convert causes him to be careful (Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah).

Next daf