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Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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Kesuvos, 97
1) ONE WHO SOLD HIS PROPERTY UNNECESSARILY
QUESTIONS: The Gemara discusses the Halachah of a person who sells his
property in order to use the proceeds to purchase a specific item, and after
selling his property he discovers that he no longer needs the money for his
intended purchase (for example, the buyer of the item decided not to sell
it). Is he permitted to retract the sale of his property, since it turned
out to be a mistaken sale? (That is, is it as if there was an unspoken
condition at the time of the sale that if the money from the sale is not
needed, then the sale will be annulled?) Or is the sale final and
irrevocable, because he did not expressly articulate such a stipulation at
the time of his sale?
The Gemara attempts to prove that the seller may retract the sale from a
ruling of Rav Nachman. It happened that there was a sudden, extreme increase
in the price of wheat in Neharda'a due to a drastic decrease in the supply
of wheat. All of the residents of the city sold their houses in order to be
able to buy food. Suddenly, boats arrived carrying wheat and the price
normalized. Rav Nachman ruled that the sales of the houses may be retracted,
and everyone may return the money he received for his house and get his
house back.
The Gemara refutes this proof, saying that perhaps in a case where one does
not need the money from the sale, the sale may not be retracted, and the
case of Rav Nachman was different. In the case of Rav Nachman, the sales
were revoked because there really was wheat on the way to the city at the
time that the sales were made, and therefore the sales were mistaken and
based on a lack of knowledge of the *present* situation. If the wheat, on
the other hand, had been shipped *after* the houses were sold, then the case
would have been similar to the case of the Gemara's question and we would
have been able to bring proof from Rav Nachman's ruling that the sale is
revocable.
The Gemara (according to Rashi's explanation) then brings a dialogue between
Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Nachman to support the refutation of the proof from
Rav Nachman's ruling. Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Nachman, "If you let them
retract the sales, then in the future, the next time there is a famine, no
one will buy the houses, out of fear that the seller will retract the sale!"
Rav Nachman replied that such famines are so uncommon that we do not have to
be concerned for what potential buyers will think. Rami bar Shmuel responded
that in Neharda'a, such famines *are* relatively common, and thus there is a
fear that potential buyers will refrain from purchasing houses if we let the
sales be retracted.
RASHI explains that had the situation in Neharda'a been that the ships with
wheat "came from a nearby place" and thus embarked *after* the sales were
made, or that even if the wheat embarked *before* the sales were made but
the wheat "came only to these certain people alone (and not to others),"
then the case would indeed be similar to the case of the Gemara's question.
However, if that had been the case, it would indeed have been a very unusual
situation even in Neharda'a, and Rav Nachman would have been correct. Since
Rami bar Shmuel criticized Rav Nachman, saying that the situation that arose
from the famine of Neharda'a was relatively common in Neharda'a, it must be
that the wheat was already on its way and was held up by coves and inlets in
the river, which is relatively common and could easily occur again.
There are a number of points in Rashi's explanation that are difficult to
understand.
(a) Rashi differentiates between a case of a "Mekach Ta'us" (a sale made in
error) -- where the people sold their houses not knowing that wheat was
already on the way (which is not the same as the case of the Gemara's
question), and the case of the Gemara's question where either the wheat was
shipped *after* the sale, or it was shipped before the sale but only a few
people in the city received it.
If the wheat was shipped before the sale, though, what difference does it
make if it was enough to supply the whole city, or just enough to supply a
few people (who, as a result, now want to revoke their sales)? In either
case, the food was on its way already and it was their lack of knowledge
that caused them to sell! What does Rashi mean? (RASHASH)
(b) Rashi writes that if the case in Neharda'a was one in which the food was
shipped *after* the people sold their houses, then we would have no concern
that potential buyers might refrain from buying houses in the future during
times of famine, since the only time we revoke a sale is under this highly
unusual circumstance.
Why is that? The Gemara says that we certainly revoke the sale when the
wheat is already on the way, which is a common occurrence, and it is only
questioning whether we *also* revoke the sale when the wheat embarked
*after* the sale, for that might also be considered a "Mekach Ta'us." If we
do revoke the sale under such circumstances, as well as when the wheat was
already on the way, then it is even *more* common for a situation to arise
that will cause the sale to be revoked! How, then, can Rashi say that if we
revoke the sale because the person ended up not needing the money (i.e. the
boats were not yet on the way), than the sale is only revoked in an uncommon
situation? On the contrary, it makes the revocation of sales even more
common if the sale is revoked whether the boats left before *or* after the
sale! (TOSFOS DH Iy Hachi)
ANSWERS:
(a) When only enough food for some of the people was on the way, then no
particular person in Neharda'a could be certain that he would be the one to
receive the food. Therefore, even had he known that food was on the way at
the time of the sale, he still would have sold his house, not being certain
that he would receive the wheat that was on the way. The sale did not take
place due to a lack of knowledge about the present situation.
(b) Rashi is assuming that it is more common for a famine to end due to food
that was already en route than for a famine to end due to food that was
shipped from a nearby place *after* people sold their houses. If the sale is
not revoked when the food was shipped after the sale, then the only
situation in which the sale will be revoked is when the food was already en
route at the time of the sale. The Gemara says that this is a fairly common
situation, and therefore we should be concerned that it might happen again
in the future and thus we should not revoke the sale so that buyers will not
refrain from buying houses.
If, on the other hand, the Halachah is that the deal is revoked even when
the shipment of the wheat embarked *after* the sale took place, then it must
be that such a sale is considered a "Mekach Ta'us," because people do take
such things into consideration when they make a sale, despite its being
relatively uncommon. If so, when people sell their houses when boats are
already on the way, which is a more common situation, then they must
*certainly* realize at the time that boats might be on the way, and even so
they want to make the sale. As such, the sale will not be a "Mekach Ta'us"
at all, since it is something that people consider when they are selling
their property and yet they take the risk of selling anyhow. Therefore, they
will not be able to revoke the sale because of the boats being held up. That
is why the Gemara says that the situation for revoking the sale when the
boats embarked after the sale is uncommon, because the sale will *only* be
revoked in that situation and not when the boats had already embarked before
the sale was made. (M. Kornfeld)
97b
2) A HUSBAND'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS DIVORCED WIFE
QUESTIONS: The Tana Kama of the Mishnah says that a widow may sell the
property of her husband's heirs (the Yesomim) outside of Beis Din, to raise
proceeds to buy Mezonos for herself or even to collect her Kesuvah. Rebbi
Shimon does not permit her to sell their property outside of Beis Din in
order to collect her Kesuvah.
The Amora'im give two reasons why, according to the Tana Kama, the widow is
permitted to sell the property of the Yesomim outside of Beis Din in order
to collect her Kesuvah. Ula says that the Chachamim enacted, for the woman's
benefit, that it be easier for her to collect her Kesuvah even after her
husband dies so that women will not refrain from marrying because of the
potential difficulties that they might encounter when trying to collect the
Kesuvah ("Mishum Chen"). Rebbi Yochanan says that it is because a man does
not want his wife to be disgraced by having to go to Beis Din to collect her
Kesuvah, and thus the husband married her with the condition in mind that
she may sell his property after his death to collect her Kesuvah without
having to go to Beis Din.
The Gemara says that the following Mishnah -- which says that a Gerushah (a
divorced woman) cannot sell the property of Yesomim outside of Beis Din in
order to collect her Kesuvah -- is expressing the view of Rebbi Shimon, who
says that a widow cannot sell the property to collect her Kesuvah outside of
Beis Din. The Gemara asks how can that Mishnah be expressing the view of
Rebbi Shimon? Rebbi Shimon already says in our Mishnah that a Gerushah
cannot sell property to collect her Kesuvah outside of Beis Din, because he
says "Kol she'Ein Lah Mezonos" cannot collect outside of Beis Din, and this
must be referring to a Gerushah!
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah, when it says "Kol she'Ein Lah Mezonos"
is not referring to a Gerushah, but to a *Safek Gerushah* (where the husband
threw a Get to his wife and there is a doubt whether it was closer to her or
closer to him). Rebbi Zeira says that in such a case the husband is
obligated to give her Mezonos while she is married (before he gives her a
full divorce).
RASHI (DH Megureshes) says that according to the Gemara's answer, our
Mishnah is teaching that when a woman's husband dies during Erusin, the
woman does not receive Mezonos from the Yesomim if she was a Safek Gerushah.
Rashi's words are difficult to understand.
(a) How can Rashi say that our Mishnah is saying that a woman who is a Safek
Gerushah from *Erusin* does not receive Mezonos after her husband's death,
implying that as long as her husband is alive she *does* receive Mezonos
from him? A husband during Erusin is not obligated to feed his Arusah! Only
after Nesu'in does a husband become obligated to feed his wife! If he gives
her a Safek Get during Erusin, why should he suddenly become obligated to
feed her? Only a husband during *Nesu'in* who gives his wife a Safek Get
should have to continue feeding his wife since he did not give her a full
divorce and he was already obligated to feed her! (MAHARSHA)
(b) Why does Rashi explain the Gemara in such a forced way by saying that
the Mishnah is referring to a Safek Gerushah from Erusin? Rashi should have
said that it is referring to a Safek Gerushah from Nesu'in!
(c) Rashi says that the Mishnah is teaching that the husband during Erusin
must give Mezonos to his Arusah who is a Safek Gerushah only while he is
alive. After his death, the Yesomim do not have to feed her. Why should the
Mishnah have to teach us that? The only reason a husband must give Mezonos
to a Safek Gerushah is because she cannot remarry because of him, but now
that he is dead she can get remarried! Hence, it is obvious that the Yesomim
should not be obligated to give her Mezonos! (TOSFOS DH la'Asuyei)
ANSWERS:
(a) The TOSFOS HA'ROSH (see also PNEI YEHOSHUA) discusses our first point.
He explains that Rashi apparently holds that even a husband during Erusin
must feed his Arusah if he makes her into a Safek Gerushah, even though he
is not obligated to feed her when she is fully his Arusah and not a Safek
Gerushah.
The reason the Chachamim enacted that he must feed her when she becomes a
Safek Gerushah is because he is the one preventing her from getting married
to anyone else. Normally, a husband during Erusin cannot indefinitely
prevent his wife from marrying someone else. After a certain period of time,
he must either marry her himself, or she can demand that he free her from
her commitment by divorcing her. However, the Safek Gerushah from Erusin has
no assurance that her husband will ever marry her; her husband can say that
since she is a Safek Gerushah, he does not want to perform Nesu'in because
perhaps she is actually divorced from him (and since Nesu'in involves a
monetary obligation, "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah"). On the other
hand, she cannot marry anyone else because she is prohibited as a Safek
Eshes Ish. Therefore, the husband must give her Mezonos right away during
Erusin, since he is preventing her from getting married with no other
options for her to follow.
The Tosfos ha'Rosh adds that a Safek Gerushah during Erusin is comparable to
a situation where a husband refuses to marry his Arusah after twelve months,
in which case he is then obligated to give her Mezonos (or divorce her).
(b) The TOSFOS HA'ROSH (see also PNEI YEHOSHUA) answers the second question
as well. Rashi is forced to explain that the Mishnah is discussing a Safek
Gerushah during Erusin, because if the Mishnah is saying that a Safek
Gerushah cannot collect her Kesuvah nor her Mezonos from the Yesomim, then
why would the following Mishnah have to tell us that a *definite* Gerushah
cannot collect her Kesuvah from the Yesomim (according to Rebbi Shimon)? It
is already implied by the previous Mishnah!
This is why Rashi explains that the first Mishnah is discussing a Safek
Gerushah during *Erusin*, who does not have a claim to "Chen," as the Gemara
explained. The next Mishnah tells us that a *definite* Gerushah from
*Nesu'in* also may not sell property for her Kesuvah outside of Beis Din,
even though she does have a claim to "Chen."
(c) Rashi holds that there is a reason to suggest that a Safek Gerushah
should be able to collect her Mezonos from the Yesomim even after her
husband's death. The reasoning for this is that when a man gives his wife a
Safek Get, the Chachamim want to give the husband an incentive to give her a
valid Get as soon as possible. We might have thought that to this purpose
the Chachamim enacted that if he does not give her a Get before he dies, she
may continue to collect Mezonos from his estate even after his death, until
the Yesomim give her the Kesuvah, just like an widow. Hence, the Mishnah is
teaching that the Chachamim did not impose such a penalty on the husband and
did not have such considerations. (M. Kornfeld)
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