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Kesuvos, 93
KESUVOS 93 (28 Sivan) - dedicated to the memory of Hagaon Rav Yisroel Zev
[ben Avrohom Tzvi] Gustman ZT'L (author of "Kuntresei Shi'urim" and renowned
Dayan of pre-war Vilna) on his Yahrzeit, by Rav Avraham Feldman, who is
privileged to have been his talmid.
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1) CHANGING ONE'S MIND WHEN BUYING A FIELD
QUESTION: The Gemara says that when Shimon agrees to buy a field from Reuven
and then complaints of claimants are heard about the field, Shimon may
withdraw from purchasing the field as long as he has not yet taken ownership
of it with a Chazakah. Once he has taken ownership, though, he cannot cancel
the sale. RASHI explains that Shimon did not yet give any money to Reuven for
the land. If Shimon did give money, then he has already performed an act of
acquisition and he cannot rescind the Kinyan.
The Gemara then asks what form of Chazakah constitutes the buyer's taking
ownership of the field, and it answers that his Chazakah occurs from the time
he treads upon the boundaries of the field ("Dayish a'Mitzri").
There are a number of unclear points in this Gemara.
First, if Shimon did not yet perform an act of acquisition (such as giving
money to Reuven), then it is obvious that he may cancel the sale, because he
has not yet taken ownership!
Second, why is the Gemara here asking what constitutes a Chazakah? The
Mishnah in Bava Basra (42a) clearly lists the forms of actions necessary to
make a Chazakah of ownership on a field: "Na'al" (locking), "Gadar" (fencing
in), and "Paratz" (making a breach in a fence to create an entrance), or any
act that is done to enhance the land such as digging. Moreover, why does our
Gemara give a different form of Chazakah (treading on the boundaries, which
is a lesser form of denoting taking title to the field) than the Mishnah in
Bava Basra says? (TOSFOS DH ume'Eimas)
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS answers that in the case to which our Gemara is referring, Shimon
already gave money to Reuven for the field, but where they live it is the
practice to transfer ownership of a field by writing a Shtar besides paying
for the field. Even though paying for the field does not transfer ownership
of a field in such a place (Kidushin 226a), it does enable the buyer to take
possession by using a weaker form of Chazakah. Thus, the Gemara here is
asking what forms of Chazakah are needed when a buyer *has already given
money* for the field, whereas the Mishnah in Bava Basra is discussing the
forms of Chazakah needed for someone who has not yet given money for the
field.
(b) Tosfos cites the RIVAM who answers that our Gemara is not asking what
form of Chazakah is needed in order to *take possession* of the field.
Rather, the acquisition of the land has already taken place, but the buyer
still has the right to cancel the sale. Our Gemara is asking what act
demonstrates to us that the buyer is forfeiting his right to cancel the sale.
According to the Rivam, the acquisition of the field was not done with money
and with a Shtar, because if it was, then the acquisition would have been
complete and final, and the buyer would certainly not be able to change his
mind and cancel the Kinyan. Rather, the acquisition of the field was done
through a Kinyan Sudar, a.k.a. Chalifin (SHITAH MEKUBETZES). In such a case
the Rabanan instituted that although the transfer of ownership occurred, the
buyer may still back out of the sale upon hearing complaints of claimants
("Asikin") on the field, until a certain point. (Rivam compares this to the
enactment of the Rabanan that after a Kinyan Sudar, a buyer is allowed to
back out of a deal "all the time that they are involved in the matter.")
Kinyan Sudar is not a display of absolute intention to finalize the Kinyan
under all circumstances, until it is followed by an act denoting some form of
permanence.
(c) The RITVA explains in a manner similar but not quite identical to the
Rivam. He explains that regardless of what form of Kinyan is used to acquire
the field, the buyer may revoke the sale upon hearing the complaints of
claimants until a certain point. He explains that this is not because the
buyer has not completely finalized the sale and may still back out. The
reason the sale can be revoked is because if claims are made to the field
before the purchaser even has a chance to tread the boundaries of the field,
the purchase is like a "Mekach Ta'os." That is, the buyer can say that her
certainly did not intend to buy the field under such circumstances, and the
seller misled him about the details of the field.
TOSFOS in Bava Kama (9a, DH mi'she'Hichzik) answers similarly to the Ritva,
but Tosfos adds that if the buyer has not only made a Kinyan Shtar or
Chazakah but has even given *money* to the seller, then he certainly cannot
change his mind, even if he has not yet "tread upon the boundaries." The
buyer can retain the right to revoke the Kinyan only until the entire process
is complete -- which happens when the buyer gives the money to the seller and
the seller is no longer dealing with the buyer. At that point, even if the
buyer has not yet "tread upon the boundaries," he cannot revoke the Kinyan.
2) RELINQUISHING ONE'S SHARE AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER
QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses the case of a man who was married to three
wives and died without enough money to pay each one her full Kesuvah. The
Kesuvah of the first wife was 100 Zuz, the Kesuvah of the second wife was 200
Zuz, and the Kesuvah of the third wife was 300 Zuz. If the man died leaving
only 100 Zuz, all three women divide it equally, each taking 33 1/3 Zuz.
RASHI explains that they divide it equally because they each have a claim to
that 100 Zuz.
If, however, he left 200 Zuz, the Mishnah says that the first wife receives
50, and the second and third wives each receive 75. If he left 300 Zuz, then
the first wife receives 50, the second wife receives 100, and the third wife
receives 150.
The Gemara immediately asks that it does not make sense to give the first
wife 50 Zuz when the husband died leaving 200 Zuz. Since the Kesuvah of the
first wife is only 100 Zuz, she only has a claim to the first 100 Zuz that
her husband left (so that she receives 33 1/3 of that money); she has no
claim to the second hundred Zuz that he left! Why, then does she receive 50
Zuz?
Shmuel answers that the Mishnah is referring to a case where the second wife
relinquished her claim to the first one hundred Zuz. Hence, only the first
and third wives divide it, so that each gets 50 (see Chart). The Gemara then
asks that if the second wife relinquished her claim to the first one hundred
Zuz, then why does the Mishnah say that when the husband left a total of 200
Zuz, both the second wife and the third wife receive 75 Zuz? The third wife
should receive 100 (50 from the first hundred Zuz which she split with the
first wife, and 50 from the second hundred Zuz which she split with the
second wife), and the second wife should receive only 50! The Gemara answers
that when the second wife relinquished her claim to the first one hundred
Zuz, she did so only with regard to the first wife; she did not want the
first wife's portion to be decreased because of her, and therefore she
relinquished her claim. However, she does not want to relinquish her claim to
that money when it comes to dividing it up with the third wife. Hence, of the
remaining 50 Zuz (from the first hundred), she receives 25 and the third wife
receives 25.
(a) It is not clear how the Gemara's answer works out mathematically. Since
each woman is supposed to get an equal share of the first 100 Zuz, or 33 1/3
each, when the second wife relinquished her share with regard to the first
wife, it should not affect the *third* wife's portion. She should still
receive her 33 1/3 from the first 100 Zuz, leaving the second wife only 16
2/3 Zuz. Why do the second and third wives both receive 25 Zuz out of the
first 100?
(b) Why does the Mishnah give such unusual cases to demonstrate the
distribution of limited assets? The Mishnah should say the simple case where
no one relinquished anything to anyone!
ANSWERS:
(a) The RITVA explains that the Gemara is giving the gist of the answer, but
is leaving out a detail. Not only did the second wife relinquish her share of
the first 100 Zuz to the first wife, the *third* wife *consented* to the
second wife's statement, and agreed that the first wife should come away with
an entire half of the first 100 Zuz. Because the third wife also agreed to
this, part of the amount that the first wife is getting beyond her due share
is coming from the third wife's share. (That is, instead of the second wife
giving the full 16 2/3 from her own share to the first wife, half of that (8
1/3) is coming from the third wife's share. Hence, out of the first 100 Zuz,
the first wife gets 50 (33 1/3 + 8 1/3 + 8 1/3), the second wife gets 25 (33
1/3 - 8 1/3), and the third wife gets 25 (33 1/3 - 8 1/3).)
(b) The RITVA writes that the Mishnah prefers to list cases of distribution
of limited assets where those assets are divided into *whole numbers*. The
simple cases, where no wife relinquished her shares, involve divisions of the
assets into non-integers (such as 33 1/3).
93b
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