Please note that unless otherwise indicated, we follow the explanation of Rashi. Consequently, our notes and comments do not necessarily have any bearing on the practical Halachah.

1)

(a) Our Mishnah discusses a case where Beis-Din issued an erroneous verdict - with regard to a ruling concerning a Chiyuv Kareis (e.g. that Cheilev or Dam is permitted).

(b) The Tana rules that, in a case where ...

1. ... an individual acted on the Beis-Din's ruling, irrespective of whether they transgressed at the same time as he did, after him, or not at all - he is Patur from bringing a Korban Chatas, seeing as he relied on Beis-Din's ruling.
2. ... a member of Beis-Din acted on their ruling in any of those three cases, only he knew that they had erred - he is Chayav, since he not rely on their verdict.

(c) Any Talmid who is 'Ra'uy le'Hora'ah' (eligible to issue rulings) is included in the previous ruling.

(d) The principle that governs this Mishnah is - that whoever relies on Beis-Din's ruling is Patur, whereas whoever relies on his own opinion is Chayav.

(a) Assuming that the Tzibur acted on their ruling, Shmuel requires Beis-Din to say 'Mutarin Atem', before they become Chayav to bring a Korban. And by the same token - a Yachid will not be Patur for relying on Beis-Din, as long as they did not declare 'Mutarin Atem'.

(b) Rav Dimi from Neherda'a disagrees with Shmuel. According to him, Beis-Din need to add the word 'La'asos' - because without it, the ruling is incomplete.

(c) Abaye supports Rav Dimi's opinion from the Mishnah in Sanhedrin (in connection with a Zakein Mamrei) "Chazar le'Iro, Chazar ve'Limed ke'Derech she'Limed Patur - Horeh La'asos, Chayav'.

(d) Whereas Rebbi Aba supports it from a Mishnah in Yevamos (in connection with a woman whose husband died) "Horu Lah Beis-Din Linasei ve'Halchah ve'Kilkelah, Chayeves be'Korban' - which speaks about a woman receiving permission to remarry through the testimony of one witness.

(a) The reason the Mishnah in Yevamos gives for declaring the woman Chayav is - because Beis-Din only permitted her to get married, but not to commit adultery (in which case, whe did not rely on the Beis-Din's ruling).

(b) Ravina's final proof is from our own Mishnah 'Horu Beis-Din La'avor al Achas mi'Kol Mitzvos ha'Amuros ba'Torah ... ' - implying that the Beis-Din actually gave permission to perform such an act, and did not just indicate their opinion.

(c) 've'Su Lo midi' mean - that this is final, and there is nothing more to say on the matter.

(d) In the second Lashon, Abaye, Rebbi Aba and Ravina ask on Rav Dimi from Neherda'a (rather than prove his opinion). The second Lashon simply inverts the Machlokes, so that Shmuel is the one who requires 'Mutarin Atem La'asos' whereas Rav Dimi from Neherda'a holds that 'Mutarin Atem' will suffice.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah "ve'Halach ha'Yachid ve'Asah Shogeg al-Pihem ... Patur'. The problem with this is - why the Tana needs to add the word 'Shogeg'.

(b) According to Rava in the first Lashon - it comes to include (in the P'tur) - someone who not only relies on Beis-Din's ruling in principle, but in addition, he actually intended to eat to piece of Shuman, and by mistake, he picked up and ate, a piece of Cheilev.

(c) According to the second Lashon, the Tana actually comes to preclude this case from the P'tur - and Rava explain 'Shogeg ve'Asah al Pihem' as one phrase, meaning that he is only Patur if he was Shogeg in that he relied on Beis-Din's ruling (but not if he was Shogeg in his own right).

(d) We cite the two Leshonos of Rava again to resolve Rami bar Chama's She'eilah - who asked what Rava took for granted one way or the other. He did not accept Rava's proof - because (depending on the two Leshonos), when Rava explained the Mishnah one way, he coountered the other way.

(a) Rav and Rebbi Yochanan were already involved in this same Machlokes much before Rava and Rami bar Chama. Rav ruled Patur - because at the end of the day, he did rely on Beis-Din's ruling.

(b) Whereas Rebbi Yochanan holds Chayav - because the current error has nothing to do with the Beis-Din's ruling.

(c) The Tana Kama in a Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "me'Am ha'Aretz ba'Asosah" - that a Mumar is precluded from bringing a Chatas.

(d) Rebbi Shimon (ben Yossi) deems this D'rashah unnecessary. He explains the Pasuk "Asher Lo Se'asenah bi'Shegagah ve'Asheim" to mean - that it is only someone who would have desisted had he realised what he was doing, who is a Chayav a Chatas (but not someone who would gone ahead and sinned anyway).

(a) This Beraisa poses a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan - who obligates the sinner to bring a Korban, even though he would not have retracted even if he had known that he was eating Cheilev (seeing as he relied on Beis-Din who permitted it).

(b) Rav Papa explains that 'Horu Beis-Din she'Cheilev Mutar ve'Nischalef Lo Cheilev be'Shuman' is considered 'Shav mi'Yedi'aso' - because the moment Beis-Din are aware of their mistake, they will retract, and so will the sinner.

(c) The Tzibur only bring a Par (He'elam Davar) if the majority of the community followed the ruling of the Beis-Din and sinned. When Rava says that Rav concedes that 'Eino Mashlim le'Rov Tzibur', he means - that the man currently under discussion will not complement fifty per-cent of the Tzibur who ate Cheilev purely on account of the Beis-Din's ruling (in which case, they will remain Patur from bringing a Par He'elam Davar.

(d) And he learns this from ''bi'Shegagah" - which implies that all the sinners share the same Shegagah (precluding our case, where the individual sinner sinned independently, too).

7)

(a) Both the Reisha of our Mishnah ('Horu Beis-Din ... ve'Halach Yachid ve'Asah ... Patur') and the Seifa (' ... ve'Yada Echad Meihen O Talmid ... ve'Halach ve'Asah ... Chayav') specifically mention that they speak irrespective of whether they transgressed at the same time as he did, after him, or not at all. The Tana found it necessary to mention all three cases ...

1. ... in the Reisha - because of the principle 'Lo Zu Af Zu' (meaning that each successive case is a bigger Chidush [i.e. not only is the Yachid Patur in a case where Beis-Din sinned at the same time as he did or at least afterwards, but he is even Patur if they did not sin at all]).
2. ... in the Seifa - because of the principle (which we only apply reluctantly) 'Zu, ve'Ein Tzarich Lomar Zu' (i.e. the Yachid concerned is Chayav there where Beis-Din sinned at the same time as he did, and obviously where they sinned only after him, and there is certainly no need to mention that he is Chayav when they did not sin at all).

(b) Rava explains the fact that the Tana found it necessary to mention in the Seifa both a member of Beis-Din and a Talmid who is eligible to issue rulings, who knew that Beis-Din erred - by describing the former as a 'Gamir ve'Savir' (a Talmid-Chacham who has learned (a Chacham) and who also knows how to apply what he has learned to other cases (a Meivin).

(c) Abaye queries this interpretation of a Talmid who is eligible to issue rulings - in that such a Talmid must be Meivin, too.

(d) What Rava really meant however is - (not that the latter is a Chacham and not a Meivin, but) that from the fact that the case is redundant, we include a Chacham who is not a Meivin in the Chiyuv Korban.

(a) The two examples that Rava gave of 'Talmid ha'Ra'uy le'Hora'ah' are - Shimon ben Azai and Shimon ben Zoma (who are both described in Sanhedrin as 'Yoshvin Lifnei Chachamim), neither of whom had actually received Semichah.

(b) Abaye did not like Rava's examples - because if such Talmidei-Chachamim knew that the Beis-Din had erred, they should surely be considered Meizid (in which case, they would be Patur from a Korban).

(a) To counter Abaye's Kashya, Rava quoted a Beraisa - where the Tana specifically cites Shimon ben Azai as a Talmid ha'Ra'uy le'Hora'ah.

(b) The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "ba'Asosah Achas" - that even a Talmid like Shimon ben Azai who errs in believing that he is obligated to accept the rulings of the Chachamim, even though he knows that they erred, is Chayav to bring a Korban.

(c) Rava therefore explains the fact that even Talmidei-Chachamim of that caliber might still be a Shogeg - inasmuch as they think that they are obligated to listen to the (majority of) Chachamim, even if they erred.

(a) When the Tana concludes with 'Zeh ha'K'lal', it generally comes to include something not already said in the Mishnah. When our Mishnah writes 'Zeh ha'K'lal ...

1. ... ha'Toleh be'Atzmo Chayav' - it comes to include someone who is known not to abide by the rulings of Beis-Din, to obligate him to bring a Chatas even if he sinned following the ruling of the Beis-Din (since we can be rest assured that he sinned, not as a result of that ruling, but in spite of it).
2. ... ha'Toleh be'Beis-Din Patur' - it comes to include someone who followed a ruling of Beis-Din, unaware of the fact that Beis-Din, realizing their mistake, had actually retracted from it.

(b) And this applies - even if they had already brought their Korban.

(c) True, Rebbi Shimon does issue this very same ruling in the next Mishnah - but that is the way of the Tana, to make a vague statement first and then to clarify it later.

(a) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, our Mishnah is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. The Chachamim rule - that a Yachid who acted on the erroneous ruling of Beis-Din is not Patur from a Chatas.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa learns three exclusions from the Pasuk "ve'Im *Nefesh* *Achas* Techeta bi'Shegagah (me'Am ha'Aretz) *ba'Asosah*", one of them - that a Yachid who acted on the ruling of Beis-Din is Patur from a Chatas.

(c) We learn the Rabbanan's opinion from another Beraisa, where the Tana draws a distinction between a sin perpetrated by the minority of the Tzibur - on whose behalf Beis-Din do not bring a Korban, and the majority of the Tzibur - on whose behalf they do.

(d) The Tana therefore learns from "me'Am ha'Aretz" that even the majority (or even all) of the Tzibur who sinned, are obligated to bring a Chatas (in spite of the fact that Beis-Din bring a Chatas on their behalf).

(a) The problem with establishing the entire Beraisa when the sinners erred ...

1. ... without Beis-Din having ruled (Shigegas Ma'aseh) - is the final statement (that Beis-Din bring a Chatas on behalf of the majority of the Tzibur that sinned), which is only true in a case of Shigegas Hora'ah.
2. ... following Beis-Din's ruling (Shigegas Hora'ah) is - the Limud from "me'Am ha'Aretz" (that even the majority (or even all) of the community who sinned, are obligated to bring a Chatas), since this Pasuk is speaking specifically in a case of Shigegas Ma'aseh.

(b) So we establish the basic Halachah by Shigegas Ma'aseh. But when the Tana distinguishes between a Yachid, on whose behalf Beis-Din do not bring a Chatas and a Tzibur, on whose behalf they do - he is referring to a case of Shigegas Hora'ah.

(c) And the Beraisa is coming to teach us that - even though in a case of Shigegas Hora'ah, Beis-Din bring a Chatas on behalf of the majority of the Tzibur who followed their ruling, in a case of Shigegas Ma'aseh, each person of that Rov (majority [or even of the entire Tzibur]) is Chayav to bring an independent Chatas.

(a) Rov Tzibur comprises - seven tribes.

(b) Each person is obligated to bring - a young ewe or she-goat.

(c) We have now proved from here - by inference, that (seeing as Beis-Din do not bring a Chatas on behalf of a Yachid who sinned be'Shigegas Hora'ah), a Yachid must be Chayav to bring his own.

(d) Bearing in mind that we proved our point by inference, Rav Papa tries to refute it by suggesting that perhaps the Yachid is Patur altogether. Perhaps the Tana holds that neither Beis-Din bring a Chatas on his behalf, nor does he bring one himself.

(a) We reject Rav Papa's suggestion however, because it is clear from the Beraisa that a Yachid is Chayav to bring his own Korban be'Shigegas Hora'ah. Otherwise - the Tana should have first set out to prove that a Yachid is Chayav be'Shigegas Ma'aseh (despite the fact that he is Patur be'Shigegas Hora'ah), before going on to prove that a Tzibur is.

(b) The problem with the fact that Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan are not named in the two respective Beraisos is - how do we then know they are the respective authors?

(c) In another Beraisa, Rebbi Yehudah comments - that the Pasuk "Zos Toras ha'Olah Hi" incorporates three 'Mi'utin' ("Zos", "Toras" and "Hi").

(d) We reconcile this with the principle 'Ein Miy'ut Achar Miy'ut Ela Lerabos' - by confining the principle to where there two 'Miy'utin', but not three.

(e) We learn from there - that the Tana of the first of the two previous Beraisos (where the Tana made an exactly similar D'rashah) must be the same author. And once we know that the author of the first Beraisa is Rebbi Yehudah, it is natural to refer to the author of the second Beraisa as 'the Rabbanan' (as we find throughout Shas).