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1)

(a) We learned in a Beraisa that if a Nochri claimed one's Eved or a Sikrikun took him, the Eved does not go free.
What is the case of Sikrikun?

(b) Why in these two cases, did the Chachamim not decree?

(c) What does the Tana of another Beraisa say with regard to Ma'asering a granary that the king claimed ...

1. ... for his debt?
2. ... although the owner owed him nothing?

(d) What is the criterion for this?

(a) How will we reconcile the first of the two previous Beraisos, which does not seem to consider an Eved that is claimed against a debt a sale, with the second Beraisa, which does?

(b) Rav rules that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri Forhang, the Eved goes free.
What is a Forhang?

(c) How do we resolve Rav's ruling with the Beraisa that does not obligate the master to set free an Eved claimed by the king for his debt?

(d) Do we have a proof from Rav that if someone sells his Eved for thirty days the Eved goes free (since it was common for the Forhang to return the field after thirty days)?

(a) We ask whether, if a master sells his Eved 'Chutz mi'Melachto', he goes free.
What is the case?

(b) We also ask from 'Chutz min ha'Mitzvos' and from 'Chutz mi'Shabbasos ve'Yamim-Tovim'.
Apart from 'le'Ger Toshav Mahu?' which other two She'eilos do we ask?

(c) The only one of the above She'eilos that we resolve is that of Ger Toshav, of which the Beraisa says 'Harei Hu ke'Oved-Kochavim'.
What do we conclude with regard to a Kuti and Yisrael Mumar? Are they like a Yisrael or like an Akum?

(a) What did they ask Rebbi Ami about an Eved who cast himself upon a a band of robbers and the master is unable to retrieve him either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court?

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah told Rebbi Zerika to look into the matter. Rebbi Zerika quoted a Beraisa.
What does the Beraisa say about someone ...

1. ... who sold a house to a Nochri (in Eretz Yisrael)?
2. ... whose house was taken by force and he is unable to retrieve it either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court? May he accept payment for it?

(c) Is he also permitted to take it to a Nochri court to have the deal substantiated?

(d) Why might we have thought that this at least, would be forbidden at all costs?

(a) Why might the Eved (of our current She'eilah) be more stringent than the house in the latter case?

(b) Rebbi Ami however, was convinced that he knew the Halachah.
What ruling did he send them?

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi states that that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri, we penalise him by forcing him to redeem him up for anything to a hundred times his value.
What do we try to prove from Resh Lakish, who said that if someone sells a large animal to a Nochri (which Chazal forbade in Avodah-Zarah), we penalise him by forcing him to buy it back for up to ten times its value?

(d) On what grounds do we reject this proof? Why might a slave be more stringent that a large animal?

(a) How do others cite the two Halachos? How much do they say he is obligated to pay to redeem the Eved and how much for the large animal?

(b) After again asking whether Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi meant literally ten times as much, and attempting to prove that he did not from Resh Lakish, we try to reject the proof on the grounds that he has to pay less for the Eved, because when he redeems him, he goes free, whereas the animal returns to him.
On what grounds do we reject this S'vara?

(c) We finally establish that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, like Resh Lakish, meant literally ten times.
Why were Chazal so much more lenient than by a large animal?

(d) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked Rebbi Asi whether, if someone sold his Eved and died, the penalty extends to his sons.
Why can we not learn from the case of ...

1. ... a Kohen who chipped the ear of a Bechor, where they penalized his children, forbidding them to Shecht it just like he was?
2. ... someone who left work for Chol ha'Mo'ed that will cause a loss if it is not performed, when he could have been performed it before Yom-Tov, or not started it until after Yom-Tov, where they did not, and his children are permitted to perform the task on hand?

7)

(a) What is the basis of Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah whether the penalty for selling one's slave extends to the master's children or not?

(b) On what grounds does the Mishnah permit a field from which the thorns were removed in the Sh'mitah year to be sown in the following year? Why did Chazal not penalize the owner?

(c) What does the Tana say about sowing a field that one manured (manually) or by placing animals there to manure it, in the following year?

(d) What does ...

1. ... Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina say regarding this Mishnah that will also resolve our She'eilah?
2. ... Abaye say about someone who rendered Tamei his friend's Taharos? Why is that?

(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that if someone sells his Eved to Chutz la'Aretz, the Eved goes free and he requires a Get Shichrur.
Who gives him the Get Shichrur?

(b) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel makes a distinction ... What does 'P'loni 'Antuchi' mean?

(c) What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say when the master sold him ...

1. ... 'li'P'loni Antuchi'?
2. ... 'le'Antuchi she'be'Antuchya'?

(d) In that case, why does the Tana of another Beraisa write 'Machartihu le'Antuchi, Yeitzei'?

(a) In which case does the Tana of the latter Beraisa concede that 'le'Antuchi' does not go free?

(b) What did Rebbi Yirmiyah ask about a ben Bavel who married a woman in Eretz Yisrael, who brought Avadim and Shefachos into the marriage, assuming that he intends to return to Bavel?

(c) What will Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah be if we hold (with regard to Nechsei Tzon Barzel) ...

1. ... that, in the event of divorce 'ha'Din Imah' (she is entitled to receive the articles that she brought in)? Why might the Avadim nevertheless be considered her husband's?
2. ... that 'ha'Din Imo' (her husband is entitled to give her money and retain the articles)? Why might the Avadim nevertheless be considered hers?

(d) What is the outcome of the She'eilah?

(a) Rebbi Avahu quoted Rebbi Yochanan that if an Eved follows his master to Syria, and the master then sells him there, he goes free. Rebbi Chiya quotes a Beraisa which says 'Ibad es Zechuso'.
What does this mean?

(b) How do we reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa?

(c) We cite another Beraisa which makes this very distinction.
What is the problem with the initial text '*Yotze* ha'Eved Achar Rabo le'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor, Kofin Oso ... '? What does the Mishnah in Kesuvos say that forces us to amend it?

(d) What is then the correct text?

(a) Rav Anan heard two things from Shmuel. One of them is the same Halachah as stated by Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan. The other follows a Statement by Rav that if someone sells a field in the Yovel year, the sale is valid, but it reverts to the seller immediately.
On what grounds does Shmuel argue with Rav and say 'Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar'?

(b) What did Rav Anan say about the two statements of Shmuel?

(c) What Rav Anan could not remember, Rav Yosef extrapolated from a Beraisa. What does the Beraisa say about an Eved whose master sold him to Chutz la'Aretz?

(d) What does Rav Yosef extrapolate from there?

(a) Why did Rav Anan not think of extrapolating from the Beraisa like Rav Yosef?

(b) Why did he not then extrapolate from Shmuel himself, who said in the case of 'ha'Mocher Sadeihu bi'Sh'nas ha'Yoveil' Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar', that the sale is invalid (implying that the money returns to the buyer)?

(c) What precedent do we have for saying that the transaction is Bateil, yet the seller retains the money?

(d) What does Rav say there?

(a) In the case of the Eved, we ask why the Chachamim chose to punish the buyer, rather than the seller (who is the sinner). We initially answer 'La'av Achb'ra Ganav, Ela Chora Ganav.
What does this mean?

(b) On what grounds do we reject this answer?

(c) Then why *is* the purchaser penalized and not the seller?

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