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1)

(a) After Rebbi Eliezer's death, Rebbi Yossi Hagelili, Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah went in to query his rulings. The fourth sage was - Rebbi Akiva.

(b) What all five queries have in common is - that they are ultimately boil down to the fact that it is not 'K'risus'.

(c) Rebbi Tarfon queried Rebbi Eliezer who rules that, in the case of 'Harei At Muteres le'Chol Adam Ela li'P'loni', she is permitted to everyone except for P'loni. Rebbi Tarfon asks on this - that if as Eliezer ascertains, the Get is valid and P'loni remains forbidden, then assuming that she marries his brother who dies without children, her husband will have nullified the Mitzvah of Yibum.

(d) Rebbi Yossi Hagelili asks that we never find a woman who is permitted to one person and forbidden to someone else. Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah asks from the very word "K'risus" - which implies that their marriage is completely cut (and not that she is still forbidden to marry someone because of it).

(a) The most dramatic objection to Rebbi Eliezer's ruling comes from Rebbi Akiva - who asks from a case where the woman remarried, her second husband died and she then went and married P'loni. By doing so, she negates the Get retroactively, thereby rendering any children that she had from her second husband, Mamzeirim. Is this what you call 'K'risus', asks Rebbi Akiva?

(b) In his second explanation, Rebbi Akiva Darshens a 'Kal va'Chomer' to (negate the Get and) forbid the woman on the world assuming that P'loni is a Kohen. Consider that, as far as P'loni is concerned she is an Almanah, and for the rest of the world, a Gerushah. Yet when her husband dies, she is forbidden to 'P'loni (because she bears the title 'Gerushah'). In that case, she ought certainly to be forbidden to the rest of the world (because vis-a-vis the rest of the world, she still bears the title 'Eishes Ish' - as far as P'loni is concerned), and if the title 'Gerushah' forbids her to P'loni (even though it is only a La'av), then the title 'Eishes Ish' (which carries with it the death penalty) should certainly forbid her to the rest of the world (like the Rabbanan).

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua objected to the above meeting - because one cannot 'knock out the a lion after his death'.

(a) Rava has a Pircha (a knockout) on all the Tana's Kashyos, except for - that of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah.

(b) He has the support of a Beraisa - whose author is Rebbi Yossi.

(a) Rebbi Tarfon queries Rebbi Eliezer from the fact that, should the woman marry P'loni's brother and he dies without children, her husband will have uprooted the Mitzvah of Yibum. We ...

1. ... amend this statement - because he cannot be accused of having uprooted it.
2. ... refute the suggestion to amend it from 'Oker Davar min ha'Torah' to 'Masneh La'akor Davar min ha'Torah' - because he cannot even be accused of doing that, since he did not ask his ex-wife to marry P'loni's brother.

(b)`The final version of Rebbi Tarfon's Pircha is - 'Nimtza Gorem La'akor Davar min ha'Torah'.

(c) Rava refutes Rebbi Tarfon's proof - based on the precedent of the case where someone marries his brother's daughter, say, who also causes the Mitzvah of Yibum to become nullified (since the woman will not be permitted to perform with her father), yet no-one suggests that this is prohibited.

(d) Rebbi Tarfon's query must be from 'al-M'nas' - because by 'Chutz', once the woman remarries and breaks completely with the ties of her first marriage, Rebbi Eliezer concedes that P'loni becomes permitted.

(a) Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili bases his Kashya on the fact that nowhere do we find the concept of someone/something being forbidden to one person and permitted to another. Rava asks on this - that every married woman is forbidden to the world and permitted to her husband.

(b) He cannot ask his Pircha from...

1. ... Terumah and Kodshei Kodshim, that are forbidden to a Yisrael but permitted to a Kohen - because that has nothing to do with Nashim.
2. ... the Arayos, who are forbidden to their relatives but permitted to everyone else - because that has nothing to do with marriage.

(c) Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili's query must be from 'Chutz' - because as far as 'al-M'nas' is concerned, Rebbi Eliezer concedes that she would be permitted to P'loni without marriage (seeing as the condition was 'al-M'nas she'Lo *Tinas'i* li'P'loni').

(a) Rebbi Akiva bases his query on the fact that the woman might marry the man to whom she is forbidden, after becoming divorced or widowed from her second husband, thereby breaking her condition ... . Rava's Pircha on Rebbi Akiva is - that in that case, we ought to forbid every T'nai by Gitin, in case one of them breaks the condition after she is already remarried with children.

(b) Rebbi Akiva's query must be from 'al-M'nas' - because by Chutz, once the woman remarries and breaks completely with the ties of her first marriage, Rebbi Eliezer concedes that P'loni becomes permitted (as we explained earlier).

(c) In the second Lashon, he asks from a case where the forbidden man was a Kohen from a 'Kal va'Chomer'. There, his query must be from 'Chutz' - because, by 'al-M'nas', the forbidden man is permitted to her (as we just explained).

(d) Rebbi Akiva asks once from 'al-M'nas' and once from 'Chutz' - because having heard that according to some, Rebbi Eliezer argues with the Rabbanan by 'Chutz', and according to others, by 'al-M'nas', he asked first on one, and the on the other, so that 'mi'Mah-Nafshach', Rebbi Eliezer will be proved wrong.

(a) Rava's Pircha on Rebbi Akiva's second explanation, which is based on a 'Kal va'Chomer' from the title 'Gerushah' on to the title 'Eishes Ish' - is that one cannot learn a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Kohanim who have extra Mitzvos (as we learned earlier).

(b) The Kashya Rava that, when all's said and done, Rebbi Eleizer's very ruling is based on the Pasuk ''ve'Ishah Gerushah me'Iyshah", as Rebbi Yochanan explained above (proving that Rebbi Eliezer does not consider this a Kashya), we answer - by establishing Rava like Rebbi Yanai who citing a certain sage, learns Rebbi Eliezer's ruling from the Pasuk "ve'Haysah le'Ish Acher" (and not from the Pasuk by Kohanim at all).

8)

(a) Despite the fact that Rebbi Yehoshua himself has a Pircha on Rebbi Eliezer, he nevertheless stated 'Ein Meshivin es ha'Ari le'Achar Misah' - because what he meant to say was that one can ask as many Kashyos as one likes, but one cannot prove him wrong after his death (seeing as there is no way of knowing that he would not have answered them).

(b) Based on the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Ki *Yikach* Ish Ishah ... ve'Yatz'ah *ve'Haysah* le'Ish Acher" - Rebbi Yehoshua asked on Rebbi Eliezer from the Torah's comparison of the divorce after the second marriage to the divorce after the first (which severed her connections with her husband completely).

(c) Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar too, asked on Rebbi Eliezer. When he said 'Heichan Matzinu she'Zeh Oser ve'Zeh Matir', he meant to ask - that we never find one person permitting what someone else forbade (like we do according to Rebbi Eliezer, according to whom, the death or divorce of the second husband permits P'loni, even though it was the husband who issued the prohibition).

(d) We repudiate the Kashya on Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar from ...

1. ... a Yevamah, whose Yavam permits what her husband forbade - on the grounds that it is really the Yavam himself who prohibits the Yevamah, and not her husband's death (which actually permits her).
2. ... a Chacham, who permits what the Noder forbade - based on Rebbi Yochanan, who explained that it is really the Noder himself who causes the Neder to be rescinded (through his Charatah).
3. ... a husband, who annuls the Neder that his wife declared - based on Rebbi Pinchas quoting Rava, who said that when a woman declares a Neder, she does so on the understanding that, if her husband wishes, he will annuil it.

(a) We learned above that Rebbi ben Azaryah learns from "K'risus" that the divorce must break the tie between husband and wife completely. The Rabbanan (who do not query Rebbi Eliezer from there) learn from "K'risus" - that any T'nai that binds the woman forever (such as 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tishti Yayin le'Olam'), invalidates the Get.

(b) Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah's source for this Halachah - is the superfluous expression "Kareis - K'risus".

(c) The Rabbanan - do not learn consider "Kareis - K'risus" superfluous.

(a) Rava initially says - that if a man gives his wife a Get on condition that she does not drink wine for ...

1. ... as long as he lives - the Get is invalid (because it is not considered 'K'risus').
2. ... as long as so-and-so lives - the Get is valid.

(b) We object to this distinction - on the grounds that, just as it is possible for the other man to die before his wife (in which case it cannot be described as not being 'K'risus'), so too, is it possible for *him* to die before his wife, so why the difference?

(c) The distinction that Rava therefore made was - between forbidding his wife to drink wine for as long as she lives (which is not 'K'risus') on the one hand, and forbidding her to drink wine for as long as he or so-and-so lives (which is).

(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether the Get will be valid if the man gives it to his wife stipulating that today she would not be his wife, but tomorrow she would be his wife again. This might ...

1. ... not be a valid T'nai even according to Rebbi Eliezer who permits Shiyur - because there at least, her husband permitted her to the rest of the world forever, whereas here there is no aspect of forever.
2. ... be a valid T'nai even according to the Rabbanan who do not - because here at least, the break with her today is total (which is not the case there).

(b) Rava himself concluded like the second side of the She'eilah, both according to Rebbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbanan.

(c) Tomorrow - she will remain divorced (because there is nothing to reunite them automatically).