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1)

(a) According to Rav Huna, if the husband claims that he gave the Get to a trustee to look after, but the trustee argues that he gave it to him as a Sheli'ach to hand to his wife, we believe the husband - because we are speaking when the woman is in the same town, in which case, had he wanted to divorce her, he would have given the Get to her directly.

(b) Rav Chisda says - that we believe the trustee, because the husband trusted him.

(c) After stating the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din ke'Me'ah Eidim Dami' - the Beraisa adds that a trustee is believed even more than the creditor and the debtor.

(d) Rav Huna ...

1. ... will explain this Beraisa - with regard to money-matters exclusively, which are subject to Mechilah (foregoing one's debt), but not to matters of Isur.
2. ... interprets 've'Chein le'Gitin' (in the same Beraisa) - as referring to Gitei Mamon.
3. ... explains the Beraisa 've'Chein li'Sh'taros' (which seems to indicate that Gitin means Gitei Nashim - also by Gitei Mamon, because the two Beraisos are learned by two different Tana'im, the one refers to Gitei Mamon as 'Gitin', and the other, as 'Sh'taros'.

(a) The second pair of witnesses required by the Tana of our Mishnah testifies that the Sheli'ach received the Get and tore it. Rav Chisda only believes the trustee - as long as he is holding a Kosher Sh'tar with which he is still able to fulfill his Shelichus, but not if the Sh'tar is torn.

(b) Witnesses are nevertheless required to testify that the Sheli'ach received the Get, even though this is evident - because the author of our Mishnah is Rebbi Elazar, who requires Eidei Mesirah in any event.

(c) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav explains the significance of the torn Get - by establishing our Mishnah in the time of the decrees of Sh'mad, where holding any object of religious significance was dangerous (so the husband would hand his wife the Get in front of witnesses and she would immediately tear it up.

(a) Rabah maintains that if the woman testified that the trustee told her that her husband had given him the Get to hand to her, even Rav Huna will believe the Sheli'ach. We refute this statement - on the grounds that, if the Sheli'ach himself would not have been believed, how can we believe the woman who quotes him?

(b) What Rabah really said was - that if the woman testified that her husband gave the Sheli'ach the Get in order to give to her in her presence, we believe her.

(c) The reason for this is because she has a 'Migu', that she could have said that her husband gave it to *her* directly, in which case she would have been believed.

(a) Rebbi Yochanan says that, if the husband claims that he gave the Get into the hands of the Sheli'ach, the Sheli'ach corroborates this, and the woman maintains that the Sheli'ach did indeed hand her the Get - we apply the principle 'Ein Davar she'be'Ervah Pachos mi'Shenayim', and we do not believe her (even if she is holding the get).

(b) We cannot believe the trustee either in this case - because he no longer has the Get in his possession (as we said earlier).

(c) We initially think that we ought to believe the husband - because of Rebbi Chiya bar Avin Amar Rebbi Yochanan, who said that a husband is believed when he says that he divorced his wife.

(d) The reason that we don't is - because he didn't say so.

(a) Based on the principle 'Chazakah Sheli'ach Oseh Shelichuso', Rebbi Yitzchak issued a ruling that someone who asked his Sheli'ach to betroth a woman on his behalf, and the Sheli'ach died - is forbidden to marry, in case the woman he marries is a close relative of the woman the Sheli'ach betrothed (and is forbidden to him).

(b) Nevertheless, we do not believe the woman who says that the Sheli'ach handed her the Get - because (since the Chazakah is not absolute) we only apply it le'Chumra.

6)

(a) Rav Hamnuna says that a woman who says to her husband 'Gerashtani' - is believed.

(b) Because she would not have the Chutzpah to say so if it were not true.

(c) Nevertheless, she is not believed when she claims that the Sheli'ach handed her the Get - because we only believe her when she has no support from others, whereas here, she has the support of both her husband and the Sheli'ach (which emboldens her, and detracts from the element of Chutzpah).

(a) The Tana Kama of our Mishnah authorizes both a Na'arah herself and her father to receive her Get. Rebbi Yehudah maintains - that, since the Torah gave the father jurisdiction over her up to the time that she becomes a Bogeres, it has automatically withdrawn her own rights until that time (because, he maintains, it would be illogical to give those rights to two people at the same time).

(b) According to the Tana Kama - the Torah gave her father jurisdiction over her, over and above her own rights, but not at her expense.

(c) If a woman cannot look after her Get, she cannot be divorced.

(a) We learn from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "ve'Shilchah mi'Beiso" - that a woman who keeps on coming back when she has been sent away cannot be divorced (which we apparently equate with not being able to look after her Get).

(b) Rebbi Yochanan explains the Beraisa, which defines 'Ketanah she'Meshameres Gitah Machmas Davar Acher' of the Beraisa (who can be divorced) as one who, should she lose her Get, will guard another object in its place. Rav Huna bar Mano'ach refutes Rebbi Yochanan's explanation - on the grounds that such a woman is a regular Shotah (who would certainly return if she was sent away).

(c) Quoting Rav Acha B'rei de'Rav Ika, Rav Huna bar Mano'ach explains the Beraisa to mean - that if she is able to distinguish between her Get and other objects, she can be divorced (though it is unclear how this describes 'Kol she'Meshameres Gitah ve'Davar Acher').

(a) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Rebbi Asi, a Katan who is sufficiently intelligent to throw away a clod of earth that one offers him, but to retain a nut - can acquire for himself, but not on behalf of somebody else. In the event that the Katan did acquire on someone else's behalf, the donor would be permitted to retract.

(b) Before he can acquire on behalf of others, he must be sufficiently intelligent - that, when one lends him an object, he returns it when he is asked for it back (though this Kinyan is only mi'de'Rabbanan).

(c) When Rav Yehudah told Shmuel about Rebbi Asi's distinction, he retorted 'Da ve'Da Achas Hi' - meaning that there is no distinction between the two cases. Rav Chisda explains that either way, the Katan will acquire for himself but not on behalf of others.

(a) 'Shitufei Mavo'os' is - the Eiruv that all the members of the various courtyards that comprise a Mavoy (a blind-alley) make, to enable them to carry in the Mavoy.

(b) It would normally consist of a barrel of wine.

(c) The Tana of a Beraisa permits the person placing the barrel of wine to be Mezakeh all the members of his particular Mavoy through his big son or daughter or through his Jewish Eved or Shifchah. The ...

1. ... minimum age of an Eved Ivri would be - thirteen.
2. ... age of a Shifchah Amah) Ivri'ah would be under twelve.

(d) Shmuel, according to whom a Katan cannot acquire for others, will explain this Beraisa - by stressing the fact that min ha'Torah, one may carry in the Mavoy anyway, and Shitufei Mavo'os is purely mi'de'Rabbanan.

(a) Rav Chisda thought that Rav Chinena Vardan (who posed the previous Kashya on Shmuel) should not have accepted the answer that we gave - because of the principle 'Kol de'Tikun, Ke'en d'Oraysa Tikun' (whenever the Rabbanan instituted an enactment, they did so following the Torah rules).

(b) We resolve Rav Chisda's problem however - by limiting this principle to enactments that have a Torah basis, but not to those that are purely mi'de'Rabbanan, such as Shitufei Mavo'os.